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1CHAPTER I
FINDING THE PLACE OF LITERATURE
In his Defense ofPoesy (1579/1595), Phillip Sidney describes poesy as "an
imaginative groundplat of a profitable inuention" (G1v). The metaphor ofpoesy as a
section of ground speaks to the sixteenth-century interest in the "place" ofliterature. I do
not use this term without due consideration: the word "place" surfaces in a wide range of
Early Modem discourses. Social structures, for instance, place individuals according to
the body politic and cosmology, which includes the celestial spheres and the Great Chain
of Being. The field ofmedicine places individuals as well; as Gail Kern Paster notes, the
Medieval and Early Modem humoral system locates individuals in relation to each other,
and along a social scale, through materialized.vapors and spoken words. I Recent critical
inquiries into Early Modem bodies, theater, and drama are also, fundamentally, inquiries
into place. Place has social, celestial, humoral, theatrical, cartographic, geographical, and
cosmological dimensions.
Place is also fundamentally linguistic. In logic, the topoi are the basic categories
by which one might define one's subject, the "heuristic for discovering things to say about
a subject" {Silva). Logical topoi help thinkers discover the categories oftruth that could
I See Paster's Humoring the Body (2004).
2be asserted of any subject.2 Roman oratory draws on these and loci communes, the
commonplaces or categories of things that one might say about a subject. As a
mnemonic device, orators would imagine a place -- garden, house, room -- and locate the
parts of the oration systematically to features of the place. When speaking, the orator
would mentally walk about in his "memory place." As Thomas Wilson notes in his Arte
ofRhetoric (1553/1587), "a place is called any roume, apt to receiue thinges" (217). For
the Early Modem writer of poesy, commonplaces were literal books to note wise sayings,
examples, parables, and the like. In writing, the commonplaces were the virtually infinite
sources upon which authors could draw to illustrate an argument. Burton's Anatomy of
Melancholy (1621/1651), for instance, offers many hundreds ofpages of authoritative
observations on melancholy. Rhetoricians also note the place of metaphor; Quintilian,
for instance, observes that metaphor is when a word is in a place to which it does not
properly belong. And writers such as Thomas More are interested in the place of
literature, in Utopia's "no place" or "happy place." Place, then, is a fundamental category
for Early Modem thinkers.
But place is not just a general topic of concern in Early Modem England. Its
manifestations across the sciences, social sciences, and rhetoric are all intertwining and
mutually defining. This dissertation provides an account of these relationships, of Early
Modem place. In particular, this dissertation addresses the lack of critical scholarship on
2 Thomas Wilson notes the following "places" about "a man's life": "The Realm, The
Shire, The towne, The Parentes, The Auncesters" as well as "The birth and infancie.
The childhood. The stripling age, or Springtide. The mannes state. The old age. The
tyme of his departure or death." "Whether the persone be a man, or a woman." Etc.
3the relationship between changing scientific views and the ways that literature has a place
and takes place. Ecocritic Ursula Heise, writing in a different context, observes that the
proliferation of the internet and other communication technologies has transformed our
sense of place. In Sense ofPlace and Sense ofPlanet (2008), she notes that the increase
in internet communities produces a sense of place that is unyoked from the constraints of
physical location: one's sense ofplace includes virtual communities. Although Heise
focuses exclusively on the technological changes of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, her observations are suggestive for earlier periods. Specifically, the sixteenth
century witnessed the development of new technology that enabled the mass proliferation
of the printed book. As we shall see, this sixteenth-century development in media
technology creates conditions for an analogous modification of the sense of place. Early
Modem thinkers deliberate the ways that rhetoric, figure, fiction, theater/drama, and the
literary text have place and take place. This dissertation considers the trajectory of these
inquiries from Thomas More to Philip Sidney, George Puttenham, Ben Jonson, and
ultimately Robert Burton. Ultimately, these authors deliberate the place of trope, a
rhetorical figure that depends upon change in meaning. For Classical and Early Modem
authors, trope figures literary language that "turns" against itself ("to trope" means lito
tum") in an instance of self-difference.3 This literary self-difference changes from taking
place in a Naturalist universe to violating the terms of a Cartesian universe ofextended
space.
3 Figure is often divided into trope and scheme (figures that work through changes in
word order, parallelism, syntax, and the like).
4In the last twenty or thirty years of literary criticism, studies of place have been a
subsidiary of ecocriticism. At its heart, ecocritcism investigates nature and the
environment. Although it is easy to assume that "environment" is synonymous with
"nature," ecocritics emphasize that the environment is more than just wilderness and that
it is not simply opposed to culture. Studies of recent periods offer critiques such as
"urban ecocriticism," which broadens the concept of environment to include "cultivated
and built landscapes" (Armbruster and Wallace 4).4 In terms of Early Modern literature,
critics Ken Hiltner and Raymond Williams illustrate the ideological dimensions of
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century pastoral. More broadly, literary ecologists treating
Early Modern literature have illuminated the ways that sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century concepts of nature and the environment respond to new developments such as
mass mining (Paradise Lost), deforestation and enclosure (MarvelT'), and an urban
landscape desperately in need of waste management (Bartholomew Fair and The
Alchemist, for example). However, Early Modern studies have not fully appreciated the
insights ecocriticism can offer. Ecocritics' inquiries into place have only recently gained
notice from Early Modem scholars. In the last several years, critics writing about the
Early Modern period have demonstrated a renewed interest in cartography, geography,
and the environment. But critical attention has yet to account for the ways that scientific
changes in the period affect rhetorical and literary theory; since Michel Foucault's Les
mots et les choses (1969, The Order ofThings), there has not been a sustained inquiry
4 Urban ecocriticism includes, for example, Michael Bennett's and David W. Teague's
The Nature ofCities: Ecocriticism and Urban Environments (1999).
5into the relationship between science and rhetoric in the Early Modern period. Moreover,
Early Modem developments in science and rhetoric have not yet been fully integrated
into the theories of place ecocritics offer. (Foucault provides a very basic sketch of
science and rhetoric but does not consider "place"; this dissertation problematizes his
limited definition of similitudes and considers in detail how changes in the sciences
affects a breadth of literary developments, including fiction, drama/theater, figure, and
literature as a geme of language.) As we shall see in the chapters to follow, the Early
Modern environment even goes so far as to include rhetorical figures insofar as those
figures are subject to theories of place.
For Early Modern writers, the term "place" calls attention to the verb form of
environment: to environ. (The term "environ" was first used in Wycliffs Holy Bible
(1382), OED). Environing presupposes a subject and center of experience, and it is along
these lines that ecocritics define senses of place. Lawrence Buell, an influential ecocritic,
suggests, that place is where abstract space acquires meaning through interaction. This
"meaning" is a function ofpersonal experience and is the fundamental quality of place.
[S]pace as against place connotes geometrical or topographical
abstraction, whereas place is "space to which meaning has been ascribed"
(Carter, Donald, and Squires1993: xii). Places are "centers of felt value"
(Tuan 1977: 4), "discrete if 'elastic' areas in which settings for the
6constitution of social relations are located and with which people can
identify" (Agnew 1993: 263). (FE 63) 5
As evident from the quote above, theories of place have an extensive history. What
environmental critics bring to discussions of place in the social sciences is an emphasis
on science and bioregion.6 Buell concludes that, for ecocritics, place includes personal
"imagined descriptive or symbolic structure," "social construction," and "ecology"
("Insurgency" 703).7 But what place means for Early Modem writers in particular is
unclear; it depends, in part, on historically specific understandings of what it means for
something to take place and how the scientifically-defined world has place. Writers like
Thomas More, Phillip Sidney, and George Puttenham investigate the possibility that
language -- more specifically figure, rhetoric, and fiction -- takes place. That is, it is an
5 Buell is careful to note that bioregionalism is not a "species of environmental
determinism" (Future 83) and to differentiate it from "regional traditionalism," which
can produce xenophobia and the like (66-68).
6 Although theorists such as Yi-Fu Tuan have long emphasized people's connections to
particular locations, ecocriticism's "most distinctive contribution to the taxonomy of
place-scales" is its contribution of "the concept ofbioregion," or geographical
localities carved out by watersheds, geological formations, and the like. Theories of
place are vital to ecocritics because place provides the ground for grassroots activism.
For literary ecologists, place blends bioregion with physical and emotional connection,
and this connection is an opportunity to inspire social change.
7 Ecocritics like Buell hope to determine "how the sense of place can be kept alert and
sensitive" (Environmental Imagination 261) in the belief that place connection, the
meaningfulness and value each person finds in his or her particular bioregion(s), is
more likely to stimulate environmental activism than a global approach, as seen in the
NTMRV nhpnnITlPnon rl"\nvP1"cph, P"I"\"1"l·+;C" "'1"One +1,,,,+ the r1e"t.... 'ct;o.... 0" cOnn~n+l·nnn
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to local places is fundamentally responsible for environmental catastrophe and psychic
alienation alike. Technological "progress" or "domination empties human life of the
significance it derived from living in and with nature and alienates individuals and
communities from their rootedness in place" (Heise 507).
7event, an example of literary performance. In contrast to (and preceding) J.L. Austin's
theories ofperformative utterances, Early Modem thinkers consider rhetorical structures
such as metaphor, trope, figure, and fiction to have a performative dimension in a way
that Austin specifically precludes. Defining performative, illocutionary utterances such
as promises and bets, Austin observes that performatives do not obtain in poetry. One
condition of a performative utterance is that it "must be spoken seriously [... ,] must not
be joking, for example, for writing a poem" (9). Austin speaks to a particular dimension
ofperformative language, but it is not the only one. Early Modem authors consider,
through the metaphor of theater, the ways that rhetorical figures and literary structures
take place; via these authors, this dissertation suggests ways to think of literary and
rhetorical structures as instances of performative language. In considering how these
structures take place, I invoke a sense of linguistic performativity distinct from Austin's
sense of the term. Instead, I draw on Early Modem authors' reflections on their own
writing practices. Thomas More and other early writers suggest that literary structures
take place as the coincidence of opposites, as difference. Later writers such as Philip
Sidney and Ben Jonson examine what will come to be called Austinian performatives and
discover that they fail to obtain in literary texts. Jonson suggests that literature,
specifically the commodified literary text, takes the form of what we would call
"misfires" of and "unhappiness" in Austinian performatives. Nonetheless, the literary
text remains a kind of contract between the author and his audience, a contract whose
futurity prevents it from ever being fulfilled. The Austinian performative takes place
8now; the sixteenth- and seventeenth century rhetorical perfonnative also takes place, but
for Jonson and Sidney, that place is always in the future.
The spatiotemporal, geographical, and cosmological dimensions of the place of
literature shift from an "earlier" sense that this place happened; rhetorical structures took
place in tenns of the cosmological relationships between distant entities.8 Rhetoricians
such as Thomas Wilson and Henry Peacham invoke Natural philosophy when explaining
that metaphor is the language out ofwhich God carves the universe. In my fourth
chapter, George Puttenham's Arte ofEnglish Poesy (1589) illustrates the changes to
rhetoric and theories of trope that Cartesian mechanism works by means of its definition
in mathematic tenns. In a radical shift from his predecessors, Putteham posits that
rhetoric is part of the physical world only insofar as it can be measured; he introduces
rhyme, meter, and the like as rhetoric's "numerositie." Against rhetorical numerosity,
Puttenham describes trope as "duplicitous." The rhetorical structure ofthe world, the
place of trope and rhetoric, becomes lies, equivocation, and fiction.
8 Here I should note that when I talk about the distinction between sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century ways of thinking, between Natural philosophy and Cartesian
mechanism, and between earlier and later perspectives, I am making a somewhat
arbitrary chronological judgment. I simply use the tenn to refer to general shifts in
ways of thinking about the physical world, and its relationship to literature. Similarly,
when I use the tenn Early Modem, I am talking about the period in the history of ideas
roughly between 1500 and the-mid seventeenth-century, specifically how those ideas
manifest in England and in tandem with ideas of the vernacular and a national literary
tradition. The tenn "Early Modem" is not without its own problems. In recent critical
discourse the term has come to emphasize the ways the period looks fonvard to
modernity. I want to stress that it also looks "backwards," "earlier," and to the other
ways of thinking that do not gain precedence with mechanism. I use the term Early
Modem to cover nearly two hundred centuries of writing in England and in response to
developments on the continent.
9My fourth chapter outlines how the place of rhetoric changes along with scientific
theories. Ecocriticism encourages critics working with Early Modem literature to situate
texts in relationship to contemporary scientific theories. Perhaps the most significant
insight ecocriticism brings to the early modem period, in addition to the many ways that
the period negotiates themes and images of nature, is Edward Casey's work with space
and place. In his Fate 0/Place (1996) and "How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly
Short Stretch of Time" (1996), Casey argues that from the classical period to the present
day, local place gives way to homogeneous, extended space. Casey identifies the
sixteenth century as the "critical turning point in the debate between space and place"
(129), even though "the full ascendancy of space over place does not happen until the
publication ofNewton's Mathematical Principles o/Natural philosophy" (1687). As
Casey notes, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopt measurable, three-dimensional
space; it is pure homogeneous extension and detachable from the physical substances that
give it dimension. Such space ultimately finds its expression in the Cartesian grid (126).
Space is an abstracted field of extension in which bodies just happen to exist.9 Place, on
the other hand, is local, experiential, and particular. For Casey, the distinction between
9 If space is infinite, it can't be made of (qualitiative) places; "some other factor must
account for such things as distance and extension, indeed anything purely quantitative
that refuses to be pinned down to place" (134). Cf. Pierre Gassendi's belief that "spatial
dimensionality is [...] strict measurability" (139). Not only is space empty of things (cf.
Giordanno Bruno et al.) "but 0/place itself." "According to the new physics, space is
something self-sufficient and wholly independent of what is in space, including
particular places. Space is thus 'an emancipated concept, divested of all inherent
differentiations or forces'" (139, qtg. Jammer Concepts o/Space 90). "Modem
mechanism has two ultimate terms: extension and motion," which equal "sheer
quantifiability" of the heavens (137).
10
place and space is particularly important because the ethos ofspace is environmentally
destructive whereas attending to place encourages care for one's biosphere. For Early
Modern studies of literature, Casey's insights suggest that changes in physical theories
underwrite the sense of place of literature and the relationship between literature and the
world. The shift to Cartesian mechanism and a universe of pure extension reduces the
ways literature can have a place in the world and take place. Puttenham's Arte reveals
that numeric scientism effectively dislocates trope -- and by extension, rhetorical figures -
- from the physical world.
Puttenham characterizes trope as duplicitous, fictional, and lying. Philip Sidney,
however, does not equate fiction and lies; he explores the place of poesy after it has been
separated from the space of the physical world. For Sidney, the place of poesy is always
the place of fiction, to which questions of falsity and verity do not apply. Poesy doesn't
lie, Sidney declares famously in his Defense, because it "nothing affirmeth." Poesy
describes a nether world in which imaginative ideas can be entertained with absolute
freedom precisely because of the categorical distinction between poesy and the real
world. The place of poesy is, for Sidney, hygienically distinct from the world. However,
as we see in chapter five, Sidney's progenitor Thomas More is not so certain that his
rhetorical world is entirely distinct from the present one he inhabits. For More, the place
of fiction is structured like irony: a linguistic fold in the real world. The linguistic fold
takes many forms in sixteenth century thinking. Rhetoric has a long tradition of seeing
this fold in terms of figure, specifically trope. Irony and metaphor are two ways that
literary language folds against itself. For More, irony takes place. More and Sidney
11
narrate the trajectory of coincidentia oppositorum, the coincidence of opposites that, for
Late Medieval thinkers such as Nicholas of Cusa, produces an experience of the real,
Divine presence. Irony is a case of language that takes place precisely because it turns
against itself. Like Peacham's and Wilson's metaphor, More's irony identifies self-
difference with literary structures' taking place.
When talking about literary structures and rhetorical figures, I refer to those
structural elements of literature beyond the straightforward meaning an utterance might
convey. Austin calls this language-of-meaning constative language. It is in opposition to
constatives that Austin defines his performatives. New Critics are another group of
thinkers who focus on linguistic structures that exceed the constative function. In an
attempt to return focus to literary structures, William Wimsatt, Monroe Beardsley, LA.
Richards, and Cleanth Brooks specify that literature is more than what it says, than how it
can be paraphrased. Early Modern inquiries into rhetorical structures help to reveal what
New Critics get right: the performative dimension of structures like metaphor. When
outlining metaphor, poetry, and other specifically literary structures, New Critics and
other theorists ofmetaphor emphasize that it is a kind of tension and that metaphors and
poems are as much about what they do as what they say. Early Modern authors such as
Thomas More would be very comfortable with Brooks' definition ofliterature in terms of
"ironic structure," ofthe ways it self-consciously asserts its difference from common
speech ("Irony as a Principle of Structure"). What joins New Critics and Early Modem
rhetoricians is a sense that literary structures are, in part, what they do. Both groups
advocate what might be called "ecoformalism," an investigation ofthe ways that literary
12
fonns and structures shape the environment of a text. As we shall see, ecofonnalism is
an inquiry into the ways that literary and rhetorical fonns take place.
Ecocriticism is not, as a whole, preoccupied with perfonnative language. In fact,
my second chapter demonstrates the degree to which ecocritics focus on representative
and persuasive language to the exclusion of other kinds oflanguage. Ecocritics'
methodology of investigating themes and images of nature is well-known, but the
consequence of this myopic focus has not yet been appreciated fully. I contend that, by
focusing on linguistic content, on what texts say about nature through themes and images,
ecocritics perpetuate the very human/nonhuman binary they hope to overcome. Given
that representations are always spatiotemporally distant from what they seek to represent,
ecocritics presume a text/world binary. But, in my third chapter, I draw attention to a
branch of ecocriticism that considers explicitly the relationship between text and world.
Ecofonnalists such as Angus Fletcher, Timothy Morton, and Robert Watson concentrate
on the ways that rhetorical and literary fonns and structures constitute the
phenomenological experience of a text and the environment the text generates. When
ecocritics turn from themes and images to literary fonn, they discover ways the text can
be said to take place. By contrast, they also suggest that the text/world binary produces a
kind of literary melancholia, a nostalgia for the nature that a text elides. Timothy
Morton's Ecology Without Nature (2007), for instance, observes that the phenomenology
ofRomantic and nature writing posits a nostalgic distance between text and world. He
concludes that the text/world dualism is necessary and advocates a melancholic "dark
ecology," but other ecofonnalistinquiries challenge Morton's conclusion. In specific,
13
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a French phenomenologist, suggests that "first-order language"
(language that takes place and has not yet ossified into deterministic meaning) is a
phenomenological experience of the "flesh of the world," everything visible and invisible
that constitutes the world. Merleau-Ponty provides the figure ofthe chiasm, a self-
different fold in the flesh of the world that seems to suggest the division between subject
and object but ultimately demonstrates the connectedness of all of nature. Merleau-
Ponty's notion of the chiasm illustrates the linguistic folds that Early Modern thinkers
deliberate: More through irony, Sidney through fiction, Puttenham through trope, and
Jonson through theater.
Written a century after More's Utopia, Jonson's Bartholomew Fair (1614)
considers how literature takes place once rhetoric and poesy become commodified
literary texts. In my sixth chapter, Jonson highlights how Early Modern inquiries into the
ways rhetoric and poesy take place draw upon theories of theater. For More, theater
highlights the ways that irony can be said to take place in the real world. For Sidney,
theater brackets fiction from the real world; only a child would mistake the stage for
reality, Sidney mocks. For Jonson, theater and the literary text are defined, in part, by the
ways they take place on the market as an economic commodity. Theater, drama, and the
potentially published text is, for Jonson, an explicit investigation of the performative
dimensions of literature. What Jonson uncovers is that the text works like a kind of
contract: specifically, a de futuro contract or contract whose fulfillment lies, eternally, in
the future. For Jonson, this discovery is an anxious one. As the author, Jonson attempts
to control his text through the Induction that prefaces the play, a reading of the Articles of
14
Agreement between author and audience. 1o However, the Articles fail to contain the text.
Just as all of the Austinian performatives in the text misfire or are otherwise misdirected,
so, too, Jonson discovers that the literary text, the play his audience receives in whatever
form, is fundamentally beyond his control. Bartholomew Fair concludes by reaffirming
the Austinian definition of literature as that in which performatives fail to obtain, but the
failures are, for Jonson (and Austin's biographer Feldman) dramatic. For Jonson,
literature is theatrical in that it ultimately fails to take place; its place is eternally deferred
into the future, the future of the printed drama.
These chapters bring to light the degree to which Early Modem conversations
about rhetoric, poesy, literature, fiction, and theater/drama define the relationship
between language and the world. Fundamental to inquiries into Early Modem literary
places is period-specific science, beginning with natural philosophy and only gradually
transitioning to Cartesian mechanism and ultimately to the mathematical universe of
Newton, Sprat, and other scientists in the Revolution. It is this mathematical universe
that ecocritics (and Morton) inherit: a universe in which the text is perpetually severed
from the world. As the coda demonstrates, the categorical distinction between text and
world produces the literary melancholy that ecocritics inherit. But before this worldview
solidifies, sixteenth-century thinkers inquire into the ways that literature and rhetoric take
place in the world. This dissertation maps the place of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century rhetoric by drawing on ecoformalism. At the same time, it offers a vision of
10 Curiously, Jonson does not include Bartholomew Fair in his 1616 Folio; it is printed
first in 1631 (Gossett).
15
ecofonnalism defined as the fonnal analysis of the relationship between literary text and
the world as this relationship shifts over time and across context. Integrating
spatiotemporal, rhetorical, and scientific notions of place, this dissertation examines the
ways that geography, cartography, rhetoric, biology, zoology, and the physical world
come together a uniquely Early Modem notion of place; in particular, these fields chart
the ways the rhetorical figures and literary structures can be said to take place. As for
literary studies, this inquiry is, in large, a generic one. As rhetoric becomes poesy
becomes literature, its place shifts from being in the world to nothing more than the
Elysian fields of fiction; finally, it is nothing more than another item on the market, a
"profitable inuention" (Sidney ibid). As Lefebvre observes, place becomes product.ll
11 Laproduction de l'espace (The Production o/Space), 1974.
16
CHAPTER II
READING ECOCRITICISM: THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE
My Early Modem colleagues often ask me "what, exactly, is ecocriticism?" They
have the general sense that ecocritics explicate nature imagery but suspect that such an
uncomplicated characterization must be inaccurate. My colleagues are both right and
wrong. The "nature" that ecocritics investigate is not self-evident; much of what
Lawrence Buell calls "second-wave" ecocriticism deconstructs terms such as "nature"
and "human," which "first-wave" ecocritics adopt unproblematically.I2 However, while it
renovates the first-wave by troubling human/non-human and culture/nature binaries,
second-wave ecocriticism nonetheless reproduces assumptions that have constrained the
field from the beginning: for the most part, ecocritics treat language -- and literature -- as
representational and normative. That is, regardless ofthe degree to which ecocritics
deconstruct images and themes of nature (however defmed), ecocriticsm largely remains
preoccupied with those representations and the environmental ethics they record and
promote. Literary critics are skeptical of ecocriticism because critics have been
examining nature imagery for hundreds of years.
12 Of course, the terms "first-" and "second~wave" ecocriticism are themselves
oversimplifications; both approaches have been in evidence since the beginning of the
ecocritical movement. Nevertheless, the mid-1990's did see a transition from an
ecocriticism primarily concerned with the application of science to literature to an
ecocriticism preoccupied with the ideology encoded in themes and images ofnature.
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Ecocriticism illuminates the beliefs about nature that have resulted in our current
environmental crisis; to this end, its ethical and philosophical inquries alone validate the
ecocritical project. But ecocritics' challenge to the human/non-human binary remains
incomplete; because representations refer to an extratextual world, ecocritics tend to
assume a categorical distinction between literature and the environment. Ecocritics fail
to critique thoroughly the partitioning ofhuman from non-human when they neglect to
explore the possibility that language and literature are of the world rather than separate
from it. Representations of nature are, by definition, spatially and temporally distinct
from the natural world they seek to represent. They describe past events with varying
degrees of accuracy, exist in commodified texts estranged from their means of
production, offer a "fictional" world different from the actual, physical world, or look
forward to a possible future. 13
The separation of literary text from the physical world coalesces in the
seventeenth century with the event of the so-called Scientific Revolution. The categorical
distinctions between literature and language and the world are a product of sixteenth
century inquiries into rhetoric, fiction, poesy, and the literary text as such. Harry Berger
Jr. and William Egginton, for instance, note that these frames contribute to a growing
sense of fiction and drama as literary genres. They also produce the division between
literature and the world that ecocritics assume. As we shall see in the chapters to follow,
the relationships between the environment and literature that ecocritics take for granted
13 See Tristan Sipley's unpublished dissertation "Second Nature: Literature, Capital, and
the Built Environment in 1848-1938" for more about the "ecological contradiction"
between the text-as-commodity and the present physical world.
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are historically situated. In particular, they develop in tandem with economic, scientific,
and linguistic changes that take place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Developments in capitalism and juris prudence, for instance, structure changing notions
of contracts and thus shape new understandings of how language performs. Early Modem
definitions of genre, fiction, drama, and performative language shape the distinctly
modem, ecocritical separation of literature from the world that we have inherited. In
examining the mutually influential structures of fiction, literary commodification, and
performative language/contract theory, Early Modem authors offer a kind of
ecoformalism: they debate the ways that words are in the world, and they define the place
of literature. 14 Modem scholars can help rectify ecocritics' general inattention to
literature as a structure of language, and a sharpened focus on the world, the
environment, and place helps Early Modem scholars to become conscious of the ways
that theories of rhetoric inquire into performative language, phenomenology, and the
scientific status oflanguage as a literal (and real) force in the world.15
DEFINING ECOCRITICISM
Cheryll Glotfelty, co-editor ofthe field's first anthology, the Ecocriticism Reader
(1996), offers an appealing vision of "literary ecology" when she defines it as the study of
14 "Ecoformalism" is Scott Knickerbocker's term. I learned it from him during our time
+A~c+h"~ n+ t1-." T Tn~"er~l·t.. ~~ r\_~_~_ ""f\f\" ""f\f\'7lVl:> l ~~~ al ll~ U II V ~ Y VI. yU;gVll, L,VV.J-L.uV I.
15 Note that the modem distinction between "metaphoric" and "literal" language solidifies
in the sixteenth and particularly the seventeenth centuries as "literal" comes to mean
"real" and "metaphoric" to mean "figurative, fictional."
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"the relationship between literature and the environment" (xviii). This early definition
suggests that eco-literary critics reflect on the many ways that literature and the
environment are mutually defining. Unfortunately, Glotfelty herself fails to recognize the
consequences of the word "literature." She ignores the formal distinction between
literature (language in a literary context) and sheerly communicative language.
Unfortunately, ecocritics rarely think explicitly about the many possible relationships
between text and world. Glotfelty sets the stage for this limited interpretation of her
otherwise suggestive definition when she clarifies that ecocritics ask questions like "How
is nature represented?" "What role does physical setting play?" and "Are the values
expressed in this play consistent with ecological wisdom?" Like most ecocritics,
Glotfelty concentrates on descriptions of the physical world and the ethics texts promote,
on, in other words, representational and normative language. She and traditional
ecocritics neglect to consider literature as a unique genre of language. And for these
critics, fiction is monolithic: it merely represents one thing or another, intended or
otherwise.
But Early Modem inquiries into rhetoric, poesy, fiction, and literature deliberate
the degree to which these forms oflanguage are performative. Early Modem language
takes place. It does so metaphorically, figuratively, but not in a way that necessarily
distinguishes these terms from the real world. Language is still part of the world for
Early Modem thinkers, and it is part of the world because it is literary. Language,
literature, and the world relate to one another. 16 It is only by attending to these
16 I define the formal terms "language" and "literature" later in this chapter.
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relationships that ecocriticism can be said to include distinctly literary criticism. In order
to move forward, environmental literary theorists must reexamine their methodology. It
is only by turning to the critical task Glotfelty suggests that literary ecology can establish
itself as a viable theory of literature as such. Environmental literary theorists must
examine critically the many possible relationships between literature and the physical
world, and they must account for the term "literature" in historically specific
environmental terms. In doing so, they will find that Early Modem rhetorical discussions
challenge and define what it means to be a product and a commodity, debate whether
fiction is "unreal" ("unreal" in the sense that performativity does not obtain), and
highlight the future into which the text, as a form of contract, looks.
In 1978, William Rueckert introduces the term "ecocriticism" in his examination
ofmetaphor. Currently, ecocriticism includes a broad spectrum of disciplines. Ecocritics
might work with the geography of space, the inequities produced and perpetuated by
environmental policies and pollution, the philosophical and ethical implications of
Heideggers' and Merleau-Ponty's phenomonology, the cognitive and biological
mechanisms behind language and literature, or the ways that language manifests across
biological and zoological boundaries; ecocriticsm now serves as an umbrella term for
interdisciplinary environmental inquiry with an activist agenda.17 Glottfelty's term
"literary ecology" dates at least to Joseph Meeker's introduction of the term in 1974, and
it names the branch ofecocriticism housed in departments of literature. First-wave
literary ecologists praise literature that evinces ecological morals and biological truths;
17 Cf. Buell FE (138).
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they include critics such as Jonathan Bate, Glen Love, Karl Kroeber and Gabriel Egan.
Tristan Sipley observes that the first wave is occupied with a particular kind of content --
the nature "out there" as described by science18 -- and its method is generally laudatory,
tending towards what Michael Cohen calls the "praise song school." For instance, Bate
waxes poetic about the ways that Wordsworth's poems emphasize the biologically
defined physical world in his Romantic Ecology (1991), and Kroeber extols the lessons
that scientific theories impart to literary criticism in his Ecological Literary Criticism
(1994).
In contrast to the first-wave preoccupation with the physical (as scientific) world,
the second-wave interrogates the ways that "nature" is always structured culturally.
Although not a self-ide!1tified ecocritic, Henri Lefebvre epitomizes the field's primary
assumption that "(social) space is a (social) product.,,19 Second-wave ecocritics examine
the social dimensions of nature and critique the environmental consequences of Western
thought. There is no "out there" for second-wavers, Sipley observes?O Praise is replaced
by "the ruthless criticism of everything that exists" (Marx). Second-wavers like William
Cronon, Donna Haraway, Annette Kolodny, David W. Teague, Raymond Williams, and
Louise H. Westling reveal that concepts such as "wilderness," "pastoral," and "human"
are all fraught with ideological baggage, that the environment is feminized and women
are degraded when the environment and nature are corrupted, and that the term
18 As noted to me in a personal email, April 2010.
19 The Production o/Space (1974).
20 Sipley email.
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"environment" includes built environments such as farms and cities. Seeking to broaden
the field from early preoccupations with ecology and to disclose the critical, and thus
activist, turn the field has taken, Buell proposes to rename the field "environmental
criticism. It Indeed, critic Simon Estok distinguishes the field from previous critical
inquires into representations ofnature by its explicitly activist dimension (ItIntroduction lt
and elsewhere).
This chapter interrogates typical first- and second-wave ecocriticism. It calls
attention to the fact that, across the board, ecocritics treat language as representative and
normative: for the most part, they ignore the formal elements of literature. And the field
of Early Modern studies, in which ecocriticism has been less prominent than in studies of
the Romantic period and the twentieth century, does not challenge mainstream
ecocriticism. The Early Modern period has yet to leave its distinct mark on ecocriticism.
Currently, ecocritical readings ofEarly Modern and Medieval texts fail to highlight the
historically-specific assumptions of the field. Ecocritical readings ofEarly Modern texts
reproduce the same assumptions in readings of texts from later periods. In fact, because
the period has only a few ecocritical critiques, the Early Modern period offers a clear
cross section of ecocriticism as a whole. A survey ofEarly Modern ecocritical studies
highlights the field's failure to engage systematically with the qualities that distinguish
literature from other types ofwritten texts. Following the ecocritical disinterest in
literature as such, Early Modern literary ecologists focus on representative language at
the expense of literary forms and structures. But, as we shall see, sixteenth-century
rhetoricians' investigations into the place of literature, into what it means for literature to
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have and/or take place, reveal the historical negotiations that produce the representative
language that ecocritics presume.
By "literary forms and structures," I refer to the dimensions of literature with
which New Critics are preoccupied. For New Critics such as W.K. Wimsatt, Momoe
Beardsley, LA. Richards, and Cleanth Brooks, the "poetic" or "literary" dimension ofa
text is that which exceeds representational content. Although New Criticism has been
criticized (and rightly so) for its inattention to the cultural contexts that shape, and
privilege, literary forms, it nonetheless provides a clear lens for Early Modem literature;
indeed, Early Modem literary critics have been turning to revised versions ofNew
Criticism for the past five years or more?l "New Formalism," as Marjorie Levinson
calls it, speaks to Early Modem literature because both define literature in terms of
irony.22 Famously, LA. Richards characterizes literary language as "ironic,',23 a
definition that speaks to, for example, Thomas More's Utopia (1516). Recent scholars
such as Levinson are propelling a socially conscious version ofNew Criticism to the
theoretical mainstream. Following suit, this dissertation demonstrates that a historically-
grounded attention to form and literary tradition is also, for Early Modem authors, an
inquiry into the environment or place of literature. (This "of" is both possessive and
prepositional.) As Early Modem thinkers come to distinguish categorically between
21 See Marjorie Levinson's "What is New Formalism?"
22 As we shall see in chapter five, irony has a long history of defining the environmental
dimensions of literature.
23 See Principles ofLiterary Criticism (1924).
-----------------
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literature and the environment, literature no longer takes place. Early Modern
rhetoricians consider linguistic performativity in more than Austinian (J.L.) terms;
literary structures take place even though they do not satisfY the conditions ofa
performative utterance. This dissertation uncovers an alternative narrative of linguistic
performativity that depends upon the frame of literature, a frame Austin specifically
discounts. As rhetorical structures take place, they suggest ways to think about literature
in environmental terms.
As subsequent chapters will show, the distinction between language and the
environment gains new currency around the turn of the seventeenth cenntury. In its
broadest strokes, this dissertation historicizes the distinction between literature and the
physical world, a distinction that ecocritics simply assume. One corollary of focusing
exclusively on representational language is that the world becomes, by definition,
extratextual. Even the rare occasions when ecocritics are attentive to the contingent
nature of the relationship between text and environment, such as when Lawrence Buell
proposes three models of reciprocity between text and physical world, are tainted by the
theory's fundamental concentration on representative language. Representative language,
and the fundamental distinction between text and world it assumes, resigns ecocritics to
mourning the insufficiency of the text. In the coda of this dissertation, I find that this
grieving, an ecocritical melancholy for the physical world, is a product of the distinction
between literature and world. Burton's Anatomy ofMelancholy (l621, 1654) laments the
real, physical world of anatomy missing from language, especially from literature. As
critical emphasis shifts from what literary structures do to what literature says, literary
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perfonnatives vanish. Literature might talk about places in the world, but it does not take
place. The ways that literature exceeds questions of verity emphasizes the degree to
which literature is fictional rather than perfonnative. The text no longer happens in the
world, Burton discovers, although it promises to. As we shall see by recourse to Jonson's
Bartholomew Fair (1614), the newly commodified literary text is structured like a de
futuro promise, a promise never fulfilled, and forever mourned as absent from the word.
FAMILIAR TERRITORY
My colleagues in Early Modem literary studies are most likely familiar with the
second-wave approach: examining the ways that Early Modem concepts of nature
influenced by race, gender, class, colonialization etc. For instance, Sylvia Bowerbank's
Speaking For Nature: Women and Ecologies ofEarly Modern England (2004) details the
contributions Early Modem and Enlightenment women authors make to ecological
thought and practice. Carefully attending to the many categories (such as class) that
intersect for each of her authors, Bowerbank emphasizes that "the 'nature' they spoke for
was inevitably constrained and entangled in the contradictory values and interests that
gave rise to imperialism, not only over nature but also over various peoples and lands
around the world" (4). For instance, Bowerbank notes that Lady Margaret Cavendish's
lament for a lost connection with nature is infonned by the demise ofa purely aristocratic
claim to forests (which, during the Early Modem period, are increasingly "designated for
the production of timber and other forest products" 14-16). Bowerbank's brand of
"ecofeminism" contrasts with earlier ecofeminism, such as that of Bill Phillips, who
26
argues that Cavendish demonstrates women's "inherent" connection with nature and
resistance to male domination.24 Phillips echoes the sentiments of Carolyn Merchant,
perhaps the most well-known Early Modern ecocritic. Merchant argues that women --
traditionally associated with nature and sources ofknowledge -- suffer from increased
commodification and domination following the Cartesian shift to a mechanistic
conception of nature. These three ecofeminists demonstrate the category's range, and yet
all offer "an important corrective" to the first-wave tendency to valorize uncritically
scientific theory, theories which some ecofeminists suggest to reinscribe the "correlation
between the history of institutionalized patriarchy and human domination of the
nonhuman" (Buell Future 19).25
24 Sophisticated ecofeminist critiques such as Bowerbank's have "been held back by the
overstated anti-rationalism and gynocentric dualism of radical ecofeminism," of which
Phillips and Merchant are examples (Garrard 176-77). Ecofeminism must be careful
not to exchange one hierarchy for another or resort to essentializing statements (24-25).
Rather than asserting that women are closer to nature, for instance, ecofeminism is
most successful when it investigates the purposes to which such an ideology has been
put and when it attends to complex historical particulars. Greg Garrard's treatment of
ecofeminism, although brief, nonetheless remains one of its best critiques. Garrard
argues that the usefulness of the practice is vexed; when given over to "irrationalism
and essentialism" there are "serious limitations" to ecofeminism. However, more
nuanced ecofeminists "bring to bear social and philosophical insights that give the
position far greater depth, scope and rigor" (27). For instance, ecofeminists have
provided "sharp critiques" of population problems as well as of "globalization, free
trade, and 'international 'development'."
25 The "starting point" for ecofeminism is "'[a]n analysis of the interrelated dominations
ofnature-- psyche and sexuality, hmnan oppression, and nO!,~l1Uman nature -- and the
historic position of women in relation to those forms of domination "' (Gaard and
Murphy 3, qtg. Ynestra King 117). The term "ecofeminism" is as old as "literary
ecology," Franyoise D'Eaubonne having coined the term "ecological feminism" in
1974 (Bowerbank 2).
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Fewer ecocritics have written about Early Modem texts than about Romantic and
twentieth-century texts, yet the Early Modem period is nonetheless subject to the full
range ofliterary ecology. For instance, the second-wave's fundamental critique of the
first-wave's praise of scientism provides the basis for Merchant's Death a/Nature
(1980).26 And Bowerbank epitomizes the second-wave approach when she stresses that
factors like race, economic status, class, and nationality inform her reading of the ways
that Early Moden nature is gendered.27 For instance, Bowerbank draws on Marxist critic
26 Robert Watson's recent Back to Nature (2007) offers another kind of critique of
scientism when he argues that the similes in Shakespeare's As You Like It speak to a
wider, scientific crisis over the epistemological failure to know the world in itself
without recourse to comparisons and likenesses.
27 Bowerbankjoins the ranks of ecofeminists such as Annette Kolodny and Lousie H.
Westling (both ofwhom explore the history ofAmerican colonization, development
and pastoral in light of the fundamental metaphor ofnature-as-woman). This
metaphor, Kolodny argues "is probably America's oldest and most cherished fantasy: a
daily reality ofharmony between man and nature based on the experience of the land
as essentially feminine" (4). William Cronon asserts that the very concept of
wilderness is colonized by vested interests. In modem parlance, it is freighted with
(American) nationalistic sentiment (76-79). Not only is wilderness commodified and
sold to tourists, but the concept of "the wild frontier" reproduces concepts of
democracy, individuality, and American national identity. It is marked by. class (trips
into the "wilderness" require leisure and money), gender (the individual, conquering
male), ablebodiedness (one can hardly scale a cliff in a wheelchair), and race (it erases
the history of native peoples' presence).
Although Cronon is interested particularly in the American notion ofwilderness,
his observation that concepts supposing a purity ofnature are nonetheless inflected by
cultural values is instructive for literary critics treating any era or genre. In terms of
the Early Modem period, we would do well to remember, for instance, that "'the
forest' referred to land under a peculiar and elaborate structure of governance"
(Bowerbank 14). It almost exclusively denominated hunting preserves open only to
royalty and aristocrats; as one critic has argued, the Early Modem forest "was a
political structure that pitted the people against the king." Moreover, it was not
unpopulated; unlawful trespassers might include "rude mechanicals," thieves, and
peasants who may have infiltrated them in order to seek shelter from the law or to
collect woodstuffs or food (ever pressing needs given the increase in enclosures).
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Raymond Williams, who unpacks the ideological baggage of the pastoral. Among other
things, Williams reveals that the Early Modem pastoral serves as a carrier of upper-class
values and that it obscures the brutality of pre-capitalist structures and oppressive
practices in the countryside (see esp. 13_54).28 Inquiries into capitalism and
commodification draw on ecocritical inquiries into colonization and exploitation of
resources, concerns that provide the basis for Ken Hiltner's Milton and Ecology (2003).
And Lara Bovilsky's, Scott J. Bryson's, and Carolyn Merchant's inquiries into what it
means to be "human" in the Early Modem period highlight second-wave interests in
animality and "post-human discourse." For instance, Bovilsky's current manuscript
project explores the boundaries of the Early Modem notion of what it means to be
human; in part, she contrasts Descartes' concept of a non-human machine with emotional
"robots" such as Spenser's false Florimel. In another vein, Gail Kern Paster argument
Finally, we might recall that forests in Early Modem England had been selectively
farmed since the Medieval period. See Oliver Rackham's Trees and Woodland in the
British Landscape.
28 Early Modem scholars might be particularly interested in Williams' observation that
the British Renaissance edits out the conflicts present in classical pastoral (such as
harsh weather and small farmers' displacement) (18); consider, for instance, the Early
Modem "country house poem," of which Jonson's "To Penshurst" provides a clear
example. Both workers and hard work vanish as partridges, carp, and eels march
themselves onto the dining table (29-38), and grateful peasants lay gifts of food and
nubile daughters at the door "to salute" the aristocratic "lord, and lady" (49-50). The
aristocracy and landed classes also co-opt the pastoral when, in Restoration comedy,
the opposition between the corrupt city and the innocent country elides oppressive
practices in the country and the 'ways the city dra\vs its very sustenance from the
countryside (46-54). Williams finds less mystification in the pastoral poems of
Marvell and Pope insofar as they are more likely to look at actual landscapes in all
their particulars, but they are freighted nonetheless with the developing Protestant work
ethic. Cf. Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization.
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that the Early Modem belief that both human and animal bodies were comprised of
humors troubles the distinction between the two and looks forward to Westling's reading
ofDerrida's "animot posthumanism" ("MC,,)?9 The Early Modem foci of ecocriticism
29 Ecocritics emphasize that the cultural division between animal and human serves to
justify human superiority and exploitation of the nonhuman. Such polarization
facilitates exploitation of humans as well. For instance, Simon Estok argues that the
increasingly well-defined distinction between human and nonhuman permits the
exploitation of bestialized humans, of animals, of and the natural world, an exploitation
that increases rapidly during the Early Modem period. Bestialization "positions the
Other outside of the human sphere and into the discursively deadened world of
resources" ("Conceptualizing the Other" 894).
Westling observes that "post-human discourse" follows two forms: the first is
"Techno or Cyborg Posthumanism" such as that developed by Donna Haraway, who
"opens the prospect of escape from bodily limitations" ("Posthuman" 29) through a
recognition of our cyborg natures and a rejection of the technology/nature dualism (cf.
Garrard 146). Haraway suggests that humans' dependence on technology results in
their having "cyborg natures" and that the boundaries between the physical and the
non-physical are complicated by our reliance on, for example, microelectronic
machines. Bovilsky's work on the ways that Early Modem "robots" define what it
means to be human extends Haraways' work to the Early Modem period. But for all
the esteem in which ecocritics hold her, Haraway's technological arguments are
peripheral to the ecocritical project, which remains largely preoccupied with the
physical world. Westling finds Haraway's emphasis on humans' virtual natures to be
politically problematic because "escap[ing]" the body "does nothing to address the
dilemmas posed by a threatened environment, but instead implies that we can escape
involvement in the rhythms of growth and decay in the biosphere" (30).
The much more common form of "post-human discourse" might be called
"Animot Posthumanism" in honor of Jacques Derrida's use of the term to signal the
"bewildering range of beings and states" (31). As Westling describes it, Animot
Posthumanism "helps to define the human place within the ecosystem by interrogating
or erasing the boundary that has been assumed to set our species apart from the rest of
the living community" (30). In addition to emphasizing that humans are themselves
animals, Animot Posthumanism arises as a philosophical implication ofecology's
underscoring of the fact that humans are intricately connected with nonhuman animals,
plants, and other participants in their ecosystems. Their mutually informing
participation in such ecosystems is understood to "eras[e] the boundary" between
human and nonhuman.
The Early Modem period is particularly fruitful for investigations into humanity
and animality. Merchant and Bryson argue that, increasingly, humans have defined
themselves in opposition to nature (which includes animals and the body), and that the
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suggest ecocriticism's connections with recent critical interests in Early Modern
materiality. Early Modern ecocriticism fulfills the six topics Greg Garrard identifies with
ecocriticism in his primer Ecocriticism (2004): pastoral, wilderness, apocalypse,
dwelling, animals, and the future/utopia. However, the one kind of Early Modern
"material" language upon which ecocritics fail to comment is performative language,
both in the Austinian sense (oaths,judgments, etc.) and in the context ofEarly Modern
thinkers' interest in theater and drama as a developing genre. Ecocritics' inattention to
performative language suggests that the theory is not yet fully developed in its relevance
for Early Modern literature. Standard Early Modem scholars such as Steven Greenblatt,
Stanley Fish, Northrop Frye, and Jonas Barish emphasize that the Early Modems are
preoccupied with linguistic performativity. Greenblatt, Fish, and Barish consider how
linguistic performances shape and reflect human subjects and how theater maps on to
"real life," and Northrop Frye distinguishes between different types ofEarly Modem
literature based on their performative dimensions.3o
Scientific Revolution slowly resignified terms such as "animal" and "beast" in
opposition to the human, whereas earlier such terms included the human (Bryson 45-
46). Interestingly, Early Modem physicians' understanding that all organic bodies are
comprised ofhumors looks forward to Westling's animot posthumanism. Gail Kern
Paster, for instance, observes that the humoral makeup that both humans and animals
share renders both open to mutual influence; moreover, Paster argues that shifting
humors result in dynamic subject positions for both humans and nonhumans, positions
that modem critiques ofanthropocentrism (including Paster's own) advocate
{"l\!fp]<l1"lf'hn]" ('",fC''')
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30 See Steven Greenblatt's Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Stanley Fish's Self-Consuming
Artifacts, Jonas Barish's Ben Jonson and the Language ofProse Comedy, and Northrop
Frye's Anatomy ofCriticism.
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THE WORLD OF THE WORD
Both first- and second-wave theorists champion literary realism. First-wavers
endorse literature that provides accurate representations of biological, ecological, and
other scientific facts and laws. Second-wavers expand realistic representations of nature
to include rhetoric and figuration, which can express personal experiences of nature
realistically. But, even though first- and second-wavers defme literary realism
differently, they both focus on themes and images ofnature.31 Because they focus on
representational language, language that does something has no place in environmental
literary criticism. (And, as we shall see, when literature does something then it takes
place.)
The emphasis on representational language undermines the field's goal of
overturning the culture/nature binary. Representational language assumes an extratextual
world to which it then refers. Unfortunately, even the few ecologists who theorize
explicitly about language focus monocularly on representative language, a fixation that
hampers the development of the field. In the final analysis, its methodology keeps
literary ecology from being a viable theory of literature rather than a subsidiary of history
or science. Granted, it is unreasonable to critique the field for failing to offer something
never explicitly part of its activist mission. But ecocritics' shortsightedness frustrates the
31 A noteworthy exception to this rule is the burgeoning field of ecodrama. As we shall
see later in this chapter, the earliest forays into ecodrama still reproduce the field's
fixation on nature themes. HO\XleVer, more recent \vorks are more sop11isticated in that
they consider the ways that theatrical pieces produce a sense of space. Subsequent
chapters' emphases on the developments of drama suggest that, insofar as ecodrama is
concerned with performative, productive language, a sound environmental literary
theory will need to engage ecodrama.
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contributions the field could make to the study ofliterature. Because literary ecologists
limit their attention to textual content, they never have the opportunity to uncover the
ways that literature might be continuous with the physical world. In other words, they
miss the ways that literature might be said to have an environment or to environ. As we
shall see, the very division between text and world that ecocritics assume takes shape
during the seventeenth century. The ecocritical fixation on representative language
develops in the later part of the Early Modem period, and it develops against a theory of
literature that concentrates on the ways figures take place and on the ways literature can
be said to have a place. Early Modem studies can enrich ecocriticism by returning
attention to rhetorical theories alternative to the representational model.
From early on, however, ecocritics have prized literature .grounded in a modem
notion of scientific realism. Glen Love, perhaps the most prolific first-wave theorist,
conflates scientific and literary realism. His Past President's Address at the 1998 meeting
of the Western Literature Association titled "Revaluing Nature: Toward an Ecological
Literary Criticism" challenges English scholars to account for the environmental
movement in their criticism. Love argues that literary critics ought to train more
rigorously in evolutionary biology (rather than the "arcane fields of physics," the
language ofwhich is presumably less realistic) to foster a better understanding of what
constitutes good literature ("Science, Anti-Science" 74).32 This argument exemplifies the
first-wave's "call forgreater scientistic literacy"; first-wavers "commend the scientific
method's ability to describe natural laws, and [...] look to science as a corrective to
32 Cf. William Howarth's "Some Principles ofEcocriticism."
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critical subjectivism and cultural relativism" (Buell FE 18). For Love and other first-
wavers, scientific methodologies and truths ground responsible texts, which represent the
world faithfully. Love argues that scientific training provides literary critics with two
important interpretive tools: it helps them to acknowledge and understand our
interrelatedness with the nonhuman world, and it provides the means by which to judge
the success of a text. For Love, science (specifically evolutionary biology) provides
truths by which to determine accuracy of content and standards against which to judge a
text's style.
Although Love is a literary critic insofar as he offers readings of literary texts, his
theory suggests that he is not invested in literature as a genre. Love argues that literature
is like ecology in that "[l]iterature involves interrelationships" ("Ecocriticism and
Science" 561). However, not all "interrelationships" are of interest to Love; for one,
Love is not talking about the intertextuality that poststructuralists emphasize. Rather,
Love argues that
ecological awareness enhances and expands our sense of interrelationships
to encompass nonhuman as well as human contexts. Ecological thinking
about literature requires us to take the nonhuman world as seriously as
previous modes of criticism have taken the human realm of society and
culture. That, it seems to me, is ecocriticism's greatest challenge and its
greatest opportunity.
Ecocritics will be better readers oftexts, Love argues, because their "ecological" point of
view will attune them to the nonhuman dimensions of a text. Ecology's emphasis on
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interrelatedness requires that ecocritics attend to nonhuman characters and resist reducing
the physical world as represented in a text to mere landscape or setting.33
However, the ways that authors represent the nonhuman world are not all equally
valid for Love. He insists that "realistic" texts are the most legitimate; thus, Love argues
that ecocritics should renovate the canon. Literary representations of the natural world
that depart from the strict technical accuracy scientific methodology demands are the
deplorable effect of critics' and authors' preference for theory over reality ("Science,
Anti-Science" 70). Literature's interdisciplinarity with science demands a return to
"literary realism," which Love understands not as the stylistic development of the
nineteenth century, but rather in terms of the transparent, unambiguous, literal language
of scientific discourse. Love presumes that a scientific style of writing provides the most
uninhibited access to the actual world, a world best known through scientific
methodology: "the biological sciences [are] not just another social construction. Rather,
they are the necessary basis for a joining ofliterature with what has proven itself to be
our best human means for discovering how the world works" (PE 8). Love argues that
texts that are "realistic" in style and content are committed to developing our
understanding ofthe real world and thus demonstrate superior "ecological relevance," the
benchmark by which Love evaluates a text's value.
On one hand, Love appears to engage literary form as well as textual content
because he argues for a particular kind ofwriting style. However, the realism with which
33 Love presumes, of course, that critical attention has not been focused on the nonhuman
dimensions of a text before their recuperation by ecocriticism.
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Love is concerned is more about communicating information than stylistics. Love
focuses on language that can be evaluated in terms oftruth and falsity; like other
ecocritics, he prefers "realism" because it tells the "truth" about nature (or our
experiences ofnature, as second-wave ecocritics qualify). (As we shall see in chapter
five, Philip Sidney stresses that poesy is not concerned with questions oftruth.) Style
matters for Love only to the degree to which it allows the natural world to shine through
on its own terms. Ultimately, it is not literary form that interests Love but the content
that form facilitates. 34 He limits literature to the ideas it "stores" and "transports." That
is, he reduces style to representational content. Love illustrates the first-wave's
methodology of focusing on content at expense of theories of literary form (which I shall
treat in more detail shortly). The content with which Love is concerned is extratextual:
science reveals truths about the physical world outside of the text. Moreover, the texts
most likely to exhibit the literary realism Love privileges would be scientific treatises
rather than literary texts. Literary texts are problematic because they multiply the
distance between text and world; scientific treatises, however, come close to eliminating
this distance by framing truths about nature as constant laws and as mathematical
expressions. Literary forms as such are beyond the pale of Love's ecocritical purview.
34 For instance, he reduces the pastoral to "a testament to our instinctive or mythic sense
ofourselves as creatures ofnatural origins, those who must return periodically to the
earth for the rootholds of sanity somehow denied us by civilization" ("Revaluing
Nature" 231) and rejects pastoral conventions overall 'when he argues that the superior
"western version of the pastoral may be said to reverse the characteristic pattern of
entry and return so that it is the green world which asserts its greater significance"
(235). As was the case with realism, it is the content that the Western pastoral
facilitates, rather than its conventions or structure, with which Love is interested.
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Like the first-wave that Love exemplifies, the second-wave is also reducible to a
primary interest in representational accuracy. However, in the case ofthe second-wavers,
the experience ofthe physical world is the closest we get to that world. Knowledge
remains mediated by, among other things, literary form. Unlike the first-wave, second-
wavers begin with the assumption that language mediates experience and thus that we
can never get to the physical world itself. The second-wave acknowledges that texts
reproduce nature in many ways, and these representations can take a multitude offorms.
Therefore, they value rhetorical devices and figurative language because they help
convey worldly experiences. But, for all the second-wave critiques scientific
transparency, it simply broadens considerations of how language can represent the
physical world and our experiences of it. It remains preoccupied with the
representational dimensions of texts (including the ways rhetoric represents the world) in
a continual effort to get to the physical world behind and outside the text. The lack that
first- and second-wave ecocritics identify with language is its fundamental separation
from the physical world.35
For second-wavers, rhetoric, style, and geme become legitimate areas of
investigation because they encode our many relationships with nature; thus, explicating
literary forms can expose our assumptions about nature. Metaphors and other figures
reveal the ways that gender, race, class, and so forth shape conceptions ofnature. Style,
rhetoric, figures, and other literary devices speak to a particular way of experiencing the
35 As we see in chapters six and seven, Jonson's Bartholomew Fair and Burton's Anatomy
ofMelancholy suggest that the division between language, literature and the world
produces a melancholic desire to return to nature.
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world, an experience located either in the past (as recall) or the future (the ethics
ecocritics hope to instill). Contemporary nature writing, for instance, is predicated on the
personal experience of nature; it usually entails a "nonfiction prose essay describing a
first-person narrator's efforts to establish an intensely felt emotional connection with the
natural world" (D. Phillips 185). For the most part, nature writing displays the triadic
structure "excursion, epiphany, recollection." Dana Phillips points up the spatiotemporal
distance, and difference, between literature and the physical world. The text records or
promotes the subjective experiences we have with the world, and its tools include
metaphor and other figures. Experience may call for language that is more than simply
literal. No longer do ecocritics privilege the strict, technical accuracy that first-wave
ecocritics prefer. Buell concludes that first-wavers probably "narrow [their] sights
overmuch" when they focus exclusively on "dense, accurate representations of actual
'natural environments" (Buell Future 40) because the realities of our lived relationships
with the world may be captured best by figurative language. Since "a 'lifelike rendering
of an elk is too restrictive,' [... and it discloses] no more than the surface particularities
ofa single creature" (Buell qtg. Silko 85), Buell commends figurative language (32-29).
Second-wave ecocritics consider nature writers like David Abrams and Annie Dillard --
who have effusive, emotional styles and draw on thick, sensual imagery -- "realistically"
to represent deep, intimate connections with a nature more complex than the physical
world' scientific laws give us.
Although they reclaim rhetoric and literary form as important fields of inquiry and
valid methods of representing a physical world defmed in terms of its experience, second-
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wave ecocritics nonetheless perpetuate the first wave's preoccupation with
representational language. Texts record our relationships with the environment--
relationships shaped by cultural assumptions -- in their rhetorical and formal dimensions.
For second-wave ecocritics, literary form plays an old role in a new guise. Stylistics and
formal devices are tools for transmitting and representing experiences ofnature. Authors
can use figurative language to illustrate their experiences, and a text's rhetorical
dimension records (unconsciously or otherwise) the fundamental beliefs that shape our
experience of the world. If first-wavers discount literary form in favor of scientific
description, the second-wave reduces literary form to content, to the ideology it suggests.
Literary ecologists examine form and stylistics for their ideational content -- for the ways
they shape themes and images of nature to ideological ends, eco-friendly or otherwise. In
second-wave ecocriticism, literature continues to be limited to its representational and
normative functions, and literary form is simply one more carrier of content.
But literary form, New Critics teach us, is precisely the ways that literature is
more than its paraphrasable "point." When I argue that literary ecologists ignore literary
and rhetorical forms and structures, I refer to the literary, poetic "value" that W.K.
Wimsatt identifies with the excess to a text's "moral" or "message." Wimsatt notes that
[i]t is possible to name certain formal levels of expression which, though
intimately bound up with and deriving their value only from their relations
to the stated meanings, are not yet parts of this meaning in the sense that
they always add to it or in their absence distract from it. Under this head
come the various forms of syntactic and phonetic support of statement (the
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parisosis and paromoeosis ofAristotle), to some extent the intimations of
what is called prose rhythm, and, for certain kinds of writing and within
limits, even correctness of diction -- much, in short, though not all, of what
is commonly thought of as "style." (93)
Style, Wimsatt observes, names the "formal level" of a text, one that exceeds textual
"meaning." Although the two are intimately interrelated, Wimsatt nonetheless argues for
"separable poetic and moral values." (By "moral," Wimsatt refers to the message or
meaning of a text, to "the moral of the tale. ") Texts remain responsible for their
messages, but Wimsatt emphasizes the dimensions that exceed these messages; the ways
a text is more than the information it attempts to communicate is the "poetic value" of a
text.
Whereas the "moral value" of a text is concerned with true and false statements,
with information, the "poetic value" is performative in the sense that it does something.
New Critics regularly describe literary forms and rhetorical structures in terms of
movement and change, interplay and events. LA. Richards, for instance, notes that poetic
language is characterized by a tension between vehicle and tenor; with it, one "utters not
one meaning but a movement among meanings" (48). Scientific language, on the other
hand, is concerned exclusively with meaning and should be as static as possible.
Accepting the distinction between scientific and poetic language that Love (among
others) evokes, Richards characterizes the former in terms of its "technicalized and rigid
speech," its use of words that "mean the same whatever other words they are put with" or
that fluctuate only slightly along conventional lines (48). Literal language is the domain
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of scientific language alone (120), and in it "we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle"
(119). It is this scientific language that Love seeks; meaning surpassing that which is
transparent is a problem that Love hopes to solve.36 Only by reducing the language-ness
oflanguage can literary texts demonstrate their worth and allay language's ability to
distance us from a scientifically determined reality. For Love, scientific style trumps
literary (or "poetic") style, or, rather, it folds it into its own project by reducing those
elements that are distinctly poetic to mere content.
Thus, when Love argues that literature should represent nature more scientifically,
he argues that literature ought to relinquish the formal qualities that make it more than a
vehicle for ideational content: the very qualities that distinguish literature from scientific
writing. And although second-wave theorists welcome inquiry into what Wimsatt calls
the "formal level," they do so in order to determine the "moral value" of the text's "poetic
value." Literary ecologists across the board seem to ignore the most basic lesson of New
Criticism: that literature cannot be reduced to its paraphrasable meaning. Of course, I am
not suggesting that New Criticism simply replace ecocriticism. Each can provide a
corrective for the other; properly understood, environmental literary criticism calls
attention to the historical and environmental dimensions of what New Critics call literary
form. Environmental literary criticism calls for a historically-specific account of the
relationships between literary structures and the physical world. Ecoformalism offers a
corrective to ecocriticism's general disinterest in poetics and literary form. Moreover, it
36 Note that Love does admit the existence of specifically literary styles, unlike, as we
shall see, the evolutionary literary critics he both inspires and idolizes -- Joseph Carroll
and Robert Storey.
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offers new insight into Early Modem discussions of rhetoric and literary forms by
examining how these discussions both shape and are shaped by environmental concerns
such as theories of science. As we shall see, Early Modem thinkers negotiate the place of
rhetoric and the ways that literary structures take place in the world.
EARLY MODERN VENTURES
Although mainstream ecocriticism concentrates on Romantic and later texts, it has
engaged Early Modem texts since Joseph Meeker's Comedy ofSurvival (1974).
Ecocriticism is also making inroads into Medieval studies. Unfortunately, even though
these earlier periods present very different views ofthe natural world, they are subject to
the same ecocritical methodology as later periods. Book-length eco-Renaissance texts
include Raymond Williams classic Country and the City (1973), Ken Hiltner's Milton and
Ecology (2003), Sylvia Bowerbank's Speakingfor Nature (2004), Gabriel Egan's Green
Shakespeare (2006), and Robert Watson's Back to Nature (2007). Of these, Green
Shakespeare is the best example of both first- and second-wave approaches. Egan
emphasizes the truths ecology reveals at the same time that he exposes the ways that
Early Modem notions of nature reflect cultural ideology. Egan argues that Shakespeare's
texts exemplify current ecological principles such as feedback loops, micro- and
macrocosmic correspondences in fractals, cybernetics, and systems theories.
Green Shake!>peare illustrates the advantages and the limits of first- and second-
wave theories. Egan's emphasis on representational language -- "I believe in truth," he
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has said to me37 -- results in his assumption that the "best" pieces of literature are those
that evince what we now consider scientific truth. Although Shakespeare's works
sometimes display the flawed attitudes that have led to the current environmental crisis,
they also look forward to modem ecological law. Egan emphasizes ecological law more
strongly than do most of his second-wave colleagues, but Green Shakespeare simply
makes explicit what is implicit in mainstream literary ecology: the task of the literary
critic is to investigate themes, images, and ideas ofnature (textual content, in other
words); and textual ethics are related directly to modem scientific theories and
ecologically sound values.38
Egan prefaces his readings of Shakespeare's plays with an examination of two
scientific principles: systems feedback and the micro-/macrocosmic correspondence of
fractals. Egan emphasizes these two principles because, according to him, they provide
scientific proof for the ecological values of interconnection, unity, and harmony. Egan
reads cybernetics and systems theory to break down the distinction between organic and
mechanic systems; he suggests that such a revelation is a useful corrective to Cartesian
and Enlightenment mechanism, which he blames (along with capitalist and Marxist
beliefs in unlimited resources) for the current environmental crisis (15-16). Egan notes
37 In personal conversation following his presentation at the Shakespeare Society of
America Conference, March 2008.
38 Second-wavers might resist association with scientific theories given that they critique
the first-wave for privileging scientific definitions of the world to exclusion of all
others. Nonetheless, second-wavers are like first-wavers in that both consistently
privilege and promote concepts and values they identify as ecological or
environmentally sound. Egan's emphasis on ecology simply makes explicit the
scientism at the heart of second-wave critiques.
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that fractal dynamics evince a micro-macrocosmic relationship, and thus he concludes
that Elizabethan science is right in that it develops a "system of alleged correspondences
between the celestial bodies, social relations, and human biology" (25, reo E.W. Tillard's
The Elizabethan World Picture). Ecocritics often dismiss the Early Modern period
because of its (supposedly non-eco-friendly) Cartesian dualism,39 so Egan delights in
recuperating Early Modern politics. This is the force of his argument: although the Early
Modern period does not have the advantage of our superior (that is, "right") scientific
theories, it is nonetheless informed by a similar ideology;40 thus, it can help us understand
39 See Westling's "Literature, the Environment, and the Question of the Posthuman,"
Tartar's "Collective Subjectivity and Postmodern Ecology," and Elder's Imagining the
Earth among many others. However, the supposition that Cartesian dualism and
Enlightenment science result in environmental degradation is far from self-evident and
not necessarily accurate. Scientific laws and the ways humans use those laws to justify
social practices are separate and distinct issues. For instance, Darwin's "survival of the
fittest" has been used to justify eugenics as well as critiques of class systems. In
another of her overlooked yet insightful arguments, Kate Soper emphasizes that
Cartesian dualism is not necessarily less "eco-friendly" than non-dualism.
It is difficult to see why 'humanists' should necessarily be indifferent to the fate
of non-human nature, or prove incapable of advancing its cause. Nor doe~ there
seem any reason to suppose that naturalism will guarantee good human relations
or necessarily help to mitigate ecologically damaging forms of social exploitation.
[...] Both the dualist and the anti-dualist may be equally sensitive to the cruelties
or malpractices that may be justified on the bases of their respective positions.
(175)
Moreover, Soper suggests that the assumption that humans need to "do" something
about an "environmental problem" assumes a certain measure of Cartesian dualism;
"[u]nless human beings are differentiated from other organic and inorganic forms of
being, they can be made no more liable for their effects on the eco-system than can any
other species, and it would make no more sense to call on them to desist from
'destroying' nature than to call upon cats to stop ki!!ing birds" (160).
40 Egan notes that,
Although he would not, of course, have used these terms, Shakespeare's plays
show an abiding interest in what we now identify as positive- and negative-
feedback loops, cellular structures, the uses and abuses of analogies between
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contemporary problems, and it can illustrate appropriate environmental values. Egan
argues that Shakespeare's plays are right insofar as they presage modem scientific
findings such as feedback loops and cellular structures (51), "relevant" (51) when they
reveal the roots of current environmental problems and test how alternate environmental
attitudes might play out, and "useful" (4) because they promote the ethics that the natural
world dictates (ethics like interconnection and harmony).
Egan's argument is limited in that it restricts the utility of texts to their
embodiment of modem day scientific principles and laws. First, if the usefulness of texts
is limited to the degree to which they demonstrate modem theories of science, then the
majority ofthe English corpus is worthless. Most of the culturally significant texts from
the Bible to Shakespeare to Virginia Woolf, from Beowulfto the Brontes to Sherman
Alexie become largely irrelevant or "childish" (51), at least those parts of the text that do
not clearly evidence current theories of science. Offering another version ofLove's
"literary realism," Egan prioritizes science and limits the critical purview to the ways that
texts correspond with the physical world. Literature is reduced to nothing other than one
means among many of propagating desired (or evolutionarily inevitable) content. Egan
hamstrings literary theorists by overlooking the unique skills literary critics offer to the
academy; assuming that science teaches literature (and not the other way around), he
transforms the field into an extraneous subsidiary of science departments. He admits as
much when he notes that Early Modem "plays dramatize the contesting notions ofnature
natural and social order, and in the available models for community. Characters
in Shakespeare display an interest in aspects of this natural world that are relevant
for us, and if we take that interest seriously we find that there is nothing childlike
or naive about their concerns. (51 )
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and invite us to consider why the antagonists choose to articulate their positions in
relati"on to them" (16); Egan limits the environmentality of Early Modem texts to the
ways they "dramatize," that is represent, environmental themes. As we shall see in the
chapters to follow, however, Early Modem drama is fundamentally concerned with place,
and literature taking place, over and above any explicit concerns about themes and
images of nature. The very literary structures that exceed the "[un]childlike" (51) Early
Modem concern with scientific theory and what Wimsatt calls "moral value" are part of
the world in terms of having place and taking place.
In addition to ignoring the structural ways that literary form (as distinct from
representations and "dramatiz[ations]") is part of the physical world, Egan also ignores
the scientific lessons of the past four hundred years. Given that science changes so
rapidly, Egan runs the risk of dating, and thus nullifying, his claims. Some would argue
that developments in ecology have already done so. Many of the ecological values that
ecocritics (including Egan) stress are outdated: they are based on science from the 1940s
and 50s. As Dana Phillips notes, "[t]he values to which ecology dedicated itself early on
-- especially balance, harmony, unity, and economy -- are now seen as more or less
unscientific" (Phillips 42, cf. Garrard 57, D. Phillips 42-82). In particular, Garrard
emphasizes that "the notion of 'balance' in ecosystems is scientifically problematic, and
ecologists no longer assert that biological diversity is necessarily linked to stability" (27).
We should also note that Egan's theories do not straightforwardly map on to the most
recent developments in scientific thinking about the world: quantum physics. Modem
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quantum physics describe the world in terms of "probabilities" and even "charm,,,41
qualities that have no name in ecology.
. Beyond Egan's problematic science, ecological "values" do not transfer
straightforwardly from ecology to literature. Phillips and Garrard remind us that
ecological terms are metaphors. As Phillips demonstrates, in their inception such
ecological principles were analogies, "rhetorical models" rather than physical laws or
principles (44, 55-60). We can use words like "unity" and "complexity" to talk about
physical processes, but the words should not be confused with the scientifically defined
processes themselves. Ecology provides metaphors for ethics, but these ethics are no
more "scientific" for the metaphors they employ. This is the paradox of ecocritics'
dismissal of literary form; by failing to engage with metaphor and other literary forms,
ecocritics actually overlook one way that literature is part of the world: metaphors take
place. In the final analysis, although ecocritics hope to find an extrahuman (and thus
objective) source for ethics,42 the suggestion that science dictates appropriate ethics is
simply unscientific.43
41 "Charm" is one of six types of quarks, whose "flavors" also include up, down, strange,
top, and bottom. See Quarks and Leptons by Francis Halzen and Alan D. Martin.
42 Such ethics are not moral in the pejorative sense, but simply right (that is, scientifically
accurate and evolutionarily beneficial). Ecocritics suggest that scientific theories offer
ethics free from human prejudices. For instance, Karl Kroeber argues that his
"ecological literary criticism" is more socially responsible than formalism and
historicism (e.g.), both of which are at odds with natural law insofar as they are
preoccupied with abstraction, antagonism, isolation, and "power over" (1-3). Kroeber
assumes his ethics are ideologically neutral and scientific; like Wordsworth, Kroeber
chastises the uninformed critic "not because he is ideologically evil or mistaken but
because he has made himself discordant with the elemental rhythms by which humans
adapt to nature's beneficence" (11). Ecocritics generally suppose that the ethics they
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In misguidedly applying outdated, metaphoric principles from a branch of science
to literature, Egan ignores the ways that form and different fields of inquiry shape the
scientific truths they "discover." One field does not translate simply to another. For
instance, while fractals may demonstrate that the microcosm reproduces the macrocosm,
this correspondence fails to apply in other fields, most notably in physics and biology.
Modem science is currently unable to elucidate connections between physics at the
quantum (subatomic) level and at the Newtonian (macro) level. Similarly,
derive from ecology are self-evidently right and beyond the realms of human politics
and responsibility. Consider, for instance, Love's desire to integrate science into the
humanities as a corrective to interested ideologies; it is the "best means we have for
freeing ourselves from dogma, prejudice, and error" ("Science, Anti-Science" 70).
43 Scientific principles have not been proven to be related to human ethics in any way.
Perhaps Dana Phillip's legendary crankiness on this point arises, in part, from the fact
that he is having to repeat what scientists from Albert Einstein to Stephen J. Gould
have been saying for decades: scientific law cannot provide the basis for human
systems of ethics. Even Kate Soper's ecocritical standard What is Nature? is the
victim of selective readings that overlook her claim that nature "does not tell us what is
desirable in the way of comportment toward it" (159). Phillips notes that even Donald
Worster, an environmental historian whose penchant for ecology has led to his
popularity among ecocritics, "has had to admit that ecology provides us 'with no model
of development for human society to emulate'" (Phillips 143, qtg. Worster 720 [sic]).
This is not to say that we don't need a renewed environmental ethic -- the fact that the
US White House was still suppressing scientific information on global warming in
2007 (according to Senator Barbara Boxer) demonstrates the enormity of the crisis now
facing us. However, the nature revealed by scientific law need not be the source for
that ethic; "just because we desperately need to develop an environmental ethic does
not mean that we need to see the environment as an ethical entity in its own right"
(143). In fact, it is mistaken to divorce t.~ose values from their human roots and locate
them in a prepolitical nature; to jettison ethics from the human realm is to relinquish
our responsibility for developing sound environmental ethics.. A more responsible
attitude towards the natural world will have to come from our own difficult decisions
and ethical quandaries.
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insurmountable distinctions apply between the organismic and subcellular levels.44 The
identity fractals may exhibit at the micro- and macrocosmic levels does not necessarily
prove micro- and macro-correspondences across the fields. Different kinds of science
produce different forms of knowledge.
Indeed, the fundamental problem with the close readings in Green Shakespeare is
that they fail to attend to the differences that form and methods of inquiry introduce.
Consider, for instance, Egan's reading of Coriolanus. Egan distinguishes between the
individual, familial, and social levels operating in this play, and his discussion of the
characters' manipulation of the metaphor of the body politic reveals shifting relationships
complicated by class and other vested interests. Further, he observes that the play asks
questions similar to those modern biologists ask about the motivation for altruism. But
his argument loses its footing when Egan equates Coriolanus' thematics with current
theories of genetic reproduction. Rather than treating the relationship between the two as
metaphorical, as different ways of inquiring into "reproduction," Egan simply identifies
them. This leads him to suggest, for example, that the "characters express the wish to
impart their genes to the future" (56). Egan quickly recovers, noting that, in the Early
Modern period, "genetic" concerns would be considered in terms of "dynastic"
ambitions. Nonetheless, his argument continues to assume a straightforwardly equivalent
relationship between the kind of replication with which Coriolanus is concerned and
44 I thank Dr. J. Mathew Watson at the Gregor Mendel Institute in Vienna for
clarification on these points in email communication in 2008.
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current theories of genetics.45 Egan forgets that what it means for genes to reproduce and
that the kinds of reproduction of interest to characters in Early Modern texts are entirely
different. For instance, Early Modern inquiries into reproduction are fraught with
questions of religion and morality, property, textual production, and even the relationship
between the physical and ideal realms.
In fact, the differences between these kinds of reproduction are formal. Early
Modern authors are sharply attuned to the literary figures they use when considering the
complex and contradictory forms of reproduction. Shakespeare's sonnets, for instance,
develop a tension between physical, textual, and ideal reproduction, all ofwhich are
linked with the poet's disillusionment with the poetic form he borrows from Petrarch.
When Shakespeare's poet remarks to his beloved, in sonnet 56, that "you live in this"
(14), he suggests that his poem provides a truer, more long lasting reproduction ofthe
young man than would biological reproduction, and he identifies the young man, his
"you," with an ideal form that can continue to live in poetry (whereas a physical body is
not present in the verse in the same way). But the fact that the best description of the
young man is to say "you alone are you" (84.2) suggests that textual reproduction
somehow distorts the ideal that the poet identifies as the essence of the young man.
Shakespeare's distinction between different kinds of reproduction demonstrates that it is
oversimplistic to reduce Early Modern reproduction to biology like Egan does. The
sonnets emphasize the differences introduced by form and the way those differences
45 To his credit, Egan does take into account factors such as class when considering
genetic success.
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become meaningful. In particular, they draw attention to the tradition of fascination with
form in which they participate. Shakespeare's sonnets would be one casualty of a literary
theory that defines textual value by its correspondence to the scientific truths of the
twenty-first century. Thus, when Egan reduces Coriolanus' "message" to an invective
against "the absurdity that ensues when soldierly concern for reputation overrides the
genetic imperative" to reproduce (56), he is unable to address Shakespeare's insight that
the form reproduction takes radically alters what reproduction means and how it means,
what it does and its dimensions of truth.
To my knowledge, only two Early Modem ecocritics attempt to move beyond
content and provide a reading of literary forms and structures: JosephMeeker and Robert
Watson. Watson's recent Back to Nature historicizes the ecocritical tum to nature (and
away from words) in scientific developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.46
Although Watson does not engage with ecocriticism in detail, this dissertation expands
his general observation that sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers increasingly
tum to the physical world as an extralinguistic source of truth. This dissertation poses the
question: what is the relationship between the word and the world, their structure, in the
sixteenth century, the relationship that leads to the seventeenth-century effects that
Watson proposes. Meeker offers a more sustained inquiry into literary forms (genre in
46 Watson argues that the preoccupation with similes inAs You Like It speaks to the
period's concern that t.lJ.e only way to know something "vas to liken it. \lIatson provides
a useful overview of epistemological changes in the so-called Scientific Revolution,
but he does not offer a sustained inquiry into rhetorical forms and the various
relationships they have with the physical world over the years. This dissertation seeks
to flesh out this field of inquiry.
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specific); unfortunately, he too defines form in terms of its content. Meeker argues that
Early Modern comedies are more consistent with ecological values than are tragedies.
He defines the comedic structure in terms of "loss of equilibrium and its recovery" (25),
complexity, flexibility, and community networks. For Meeker, such facets are suggestive
of ecological values. In contrast, "the tragic tradition in literature and the disastrous
misuse of the world's resources both rest upon some of the same philosophical ideas" of
unmovable idealism, the supremacy of the individual, and man's superiority over nature
(59). However, the structures Meeker identifies as comedic are just as present in tragedy.
In his Poetics, Aristotle notes the same characteristics of tragedy that Meeker does for
comedy. Aristotle emphasizes in tragedy the importance of unity (VIII) and complexity
(X), and his requirements that the audience should pity the characters as well as learn
from them promote community values (XIII). Of course, there are important differences
between Meeker and Aristotle, such as Meeker's aversion to strong feeling (23).
Nonetheless, what is clear is that the general structures with which Meeker is concerned
are not unique to comedy. We could just as easily interpret rhyme to confer unity and
balance, but I suspect that Meeker would not suggest that Skelton's doggerel is more
ecological and therefore better than Milton's blank verse. What is ultimately important to
Meeker is not the form that comedy takes but its content, the supposed ecological values
the text demonstrates.
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THE NATURE OF WITHDRAWL: ENVIRONMENTAL MIMESIS
Lawrence Buell explicitly considers the relationship between text and word and
provides a productive investigation of the perfonnative dimension of language. This
investigation takes place in the context of what has been referred to as the "Mimesis
Wars" between Lawrence Buell and Dana Phillips.47 Buell and Phillips consider which
kind ofmimesis Buell refers to when he notes in "The Ecocritical Insurgency" (NLH
1999) that we are in need of "environmental mimesis: [...Ja critical practice that operates
from a bidirectionality, imagining texts as gesturing outward toward the material world
not withstanding their constitution as linguistic, ideological, and cultural artifacts" (705).
Phillips argues that Buell's tenn "mimesis" refers to 1:1 correspondence between text and
world that the text is world. Phillips castigates Buell because such correspondence is
mere wishful thinking (The Truth ofEcology, 2003). Buell replies in The Future of
Environmental Criticism (2005) that he makes no such claim and that, of course, by
"mimesis" he means that a text must have "environmental referentiality" (32). What is at
issue in this debate is the relationship between text and world; both Phillips and Buell are
anxious to establish a distance between text and world, a relationship of referentiality.
Although Buell and Philips and Peacham use the tenn "mimesis" to emphasize a
distinction between text and world, both Plato and Aristotle use the tenn to relate text and
world. Plato and Aristotle believe that mimesis depends upon a frame between world and
text; for Aristotle mimesis is suggestive of dramas and tragedy, reflections on the world
that are cathartic to participants (Physics). For Plato, actors of tragedy produce mimesis,
47 See for instance Kevin Maier's English 423 "Ecocriticism" Blogspot, March 9 2008.
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the only difference between acting and the real world being that the former is not
concerned with statements of truth (Ion). Although critics often counterpose Plato's
inspired mimesis with Aristotle's reflective one, the two both define mimesis in
relationship to drama, to performances. Plato and Aristotle agree that mimesis takes
place, but it is precisely this possibility that both Buell and Phillips foreclose when they
emphasis that texts merely refer to the environment.
In emphasizing that language represents the environment, and our experiences of
it, literary ecologists necessarily separate the two. For literary ecologists, literature points
to a world perennially outside the text and to experiences prior to the text. The text and
the world are spatially and temporally distinct. Dana Phillips argues that the text/world
binary is a necessary consequence of limiting language to its representational function.
"[O]nce we accept that our language is essentially representational, we inevitably make
this mistake," that to be "in touch with language" is to be "out oftouch with 'the object-
world'" (167).48 When defined as representational, language is part of a reflective
process that gets in the way of an immediate encounter with the world that exists outside
of the texts. Of course, texts can promote more "eco-friendly" approaches to the world
48 Distinguishing himself from mainstream ecocritics, Phillips argues that "[o]ur access to
language and our access to the world are the same: we cannot lose the world and keep
language." How Phillips intends that similarity is unclear; he justifies his claim with
"evolutionary history and scientific practices," suggesting that because Phillips
understands language to have an evolutionary basis, because it helps us to "manage[]
the world," he concludes that language is not distinct from the physical world. In this
way, Phillips offers a new manifestation of the first-wave's insight that language is
grounded in biological processes. However, he does not develop a more complex
understanding of the connections between language and the environment than the fact
that the two are mutually informative according to evolutionary biology.
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and can help to convince the unenlightened to become environmental activists.
Nonetheless, "promoting" and "convincing" remain distinct from actual encounters with
nature; important investigations into the ideology of "nature" notwithstanding, one
suspects that ecocritics would prefer readers to put down their books, leave their air
conditioned offices, and go for a hike. As Heise observes, ecocritics treat language and
texts "initially [...] as mediating tools," but ultimately as "little more than obstacles" to
an authentic encounter with nature ("Hitchhiker" 512).
When considering the relationship between word and world, ecocritics Philips and
Buell emphasize that the former refers to the latter and deny the possibility that literature
takes place in the world; this thinking develops in the sixteenth century and in distinction
to the classical understanding that the text is a kind of event, a drama. As we shall see in
the chapters that follow, theories of drama are crucial to understanding a more intimate
relationship between text and world than reflection. Sixteenth century thinkers suggest
that texts take place like drama (theater) takes place: they operate within a frame that
suspends some rules of the physical world but not others. In particular, they follow
economic rules but trouble performative utterances. Buell and Phillips prefer Aristotelian
mimesis but fail to consider the dramatic way that Platonic and Aristotelian mimeses are
both linguistic performances. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, an ecoformalist
investigation ofEarly Modem theories of rhetoric reveals an understanding that rhetorical
figures and literature do something. Because literary performatives are excluded from
J.L. Austin's performative utterance, Early Modem ecoformalism expands our
understanding ofwhat performative language looks like.
55
Early Modem Studies speaks to the field of ecodrama in that it considers the ways
that literary language is performative. Lawrence Buell defines ecodrama as that which
"scripts environmental encounter and embeddedness" (47); the plays that Buell cites as
examples of ecodrama, plays by Ibsen, Soyinka, and Walcott, all dramatize
environmental crises. Ecodramatists might also consider the ways that dramatic works
call attention to the physical space in which they are produced and the environmental
consequences ofproduction materials. This dissertation offers another way to think of
ecodrama. What we find is that theater is the lens by which sixteenth-century
rhetoricians inquire into the spatiotemporality of poesey or literature. Drama, I argue,
characterizes the place of rhetoric because the form of rhetoric is a performative one.
Buell suggests that all plays are ecological, not just those that deal with themes and
images ofnature.49 But performative language applies to more than just plays; this
dissertation suggests that, at least for the sixteenth century, literature as a whole takes
place in ecological terms.
Buell intends his remarks on ecodrama to clarify one of three models "for
thinking about the reciprocity between text and environment: as rhetoric, as performance,
and as world-making" (Future 45). As Buell develops them, all three reduce to
representation. However, ofall ecocritics Buell comes closest to formulating an
environmental literary theory that attends to the dramatic dimensions of a literary text.
49 Buell notes that ecodrama is not limited just to those "that directly thematize
environmental issues"; since "[d]ramatic performance always requires and reproduces
physical environments," Buell notes that all plays contain an environmental dimension
(48).
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His remarks clarify where an ecoformalism attentive to dramatic frames and performative
language must begin.
Buell's first model, "rhetoric," is an apt title for the representational and
normative forms of language that we have already identified with the ecocritical project.
By analyzing textual rhetoric, the ecocritic can identify the degree to which a text
adequately represents the facts as well as the text's "vision of the good" (50). This
"good" is what I have been calling the "normative" dimension oflanguage, the
environmental ethics ecocritics promote.50 Promoting good also characterizes
"performance," Buell's second model of the relationship between language and the world.
For Buell, a performative text is one that has real-world effects, such as a non-fiction
activist testimonial (46-47). This is simply another version ofnormative language. 51 As
we have seen, "ecodrama" is another example ofthe performative model. As Buell
develops it, ecodrama is performative simply because it happens to be a particular genre
(a drama). Buell's third model, world-making, also assumes representational language
50 In this sense, language both '''represents the world' but also 'positions us in relation to
the rest of the world'" (45, qtg. Brown and HemdI215). The "position" about which
Buell (and Brown and Hemdl) speak can be characterized as ideological or in terms of
our ethical stances on the world -- in short, as our relationships with it. As Buell
develops it, the rhetorical relationship between language and the environment is
consistent with the representational relationship between literature and the environment
that we have been investigating thus far; literature "represents the facts," contains an
ideological dimension that recOids beliefs about the world and prornotes ethical beliefs
about the world.
51 Testimonials report previous experiences, explain points of view, and, ideally, change
the ways that minds think about nature.
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insofar as Buell defines world-making in tenns of utopias and the like; such texts create a
consistent sense of the world.
For all that he proposes three distinct models of the relationship between language
and the world, Buell concludes that "[t]he writing process itself [...] does not equate
with the moment of discovery as the writers experienced it; but the rhetorical energy
points backward to the prior experiences of discovery" (E/262). Spatially, the world is
outside of a text which can only hope to represent it with increasing accuracy.
Temporally, texts come after the world which, as Buell points out above, occurs "prior"
to writing. The world and its experience are distinct from -- and more authentic than --
their representations. The role of a nature writer, then, is "to keep alive the sense of the
'undiscovered country ofthe nearby'" (qtg. Mitchell 9) -- to point most efficiently to the
world outside of the text, and to provoke a sense of desire to experience that world first
hand. The most important work an eco-friendly text can hope to do is to inspire readers
to "engage with the world" outside ofthe text (Buell WE 2). As nothing more than
collections of representations, literary texts simply reproduce the supposed distance from
the world that ecocritics then critique and claim to work to overcome.
And yet Buell's survey of potential relationships between text and environment
includes the seeds from which will grow an ecofonnalist reading of the environments of
literary texts. In its original context Buell's third model, "world making," reveals how the
literary text can be said to have a place in the world. Angus Fletcher's "environment-
poem" suggests that the environment of a poem includes all of the relationships that
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poem develops. 52 These relationships are environmental, Fletcher argues, because they
take place. The "environment poem" is a literary text's performative dimensions. When
we examine Early Modem rhetoric, we discover a theory ofperformative language
distinct from - and, indeed, a necessary precursor of -- J.L. Austin's. Austin does not
acknowledge literature (such as poetry) to generate performative utterances (9).
Nonetheless, as we shall see, Early Modem rhetoricians negotiate structures that take
place, and, in detailing the production of this place in terms of drama, they emphasize the
performative nature of figures and literature. Early Modem theories of theater and drama
interweave with those of place.
The few ecoformalist arguments that exist, such as Timothy Morton's Ecology
without Nature (2007), tum to the ways that literary forms establish structural effects
such as "ambiance" and "atmosphere." Although he does not acknowledge his debt to
Fletcher, Timothy Morton argues that these are two ways that texts "make" a world. For
52 Unfortunately, Buell reduces the relationships Fletcher postulates to those between the
characters in the text, characters that include the setting and all the flora and fauna that
"'belong or don't belong'" (50 qtg. Fletcher 122-28). As Buell describes it, the reader
"enter[s] into" an environment-poem, not in the sense of "readerly 'identification' with
the 'world' of the text," but insofar as "[t]he poem is itself to be taken as a world" (50).
More than plot, characters, and setting, this "world" includes the "'aggregate
relationships between all participants. '" Buell interprets Fletcher's "environment-
poem" to produce a particular kind of reader response: the reader appreciates the
ecology or relationships the text offers. Buell reduces the environment poem to a
particular kind of content: the representations of ecological relationships. For him, the
environment poem demonstrates that "the environment can also be figured as that
which constitutes the discourse that constitutes it." As Buell uses it here, "figure" is
opposed dialectically to literal, as applies to the physical world. Buell concludes that
the environment poem demonstrates that the environment and physical world inform
the relationships that the poem contains; the text is "accurate." Buell uses Fletcher's
concept of the environment poem to demonstrate that all texts are embroiled in
environmental contexts, contexts which disrupt authors' and readers' claims to control.
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Morton, however, these structural effects are predicated on dialectic opposition, including
an opposition between world and text. These structural effects signal I~text" not "world."
Morton argues that textual phenomenology depends upon this fundamental difference.
For him, the irresolvable division between text and world characterizes "dark ecology,"
an ecology not afraid, Morton argues, to embrace the fundamental fact of dualism.
Morton's "dark enjoyment" speaks to the literary melancholia of the seventeenth century,
a melancholy that arises from the dualistic, categorical distinction between word and
world.
The dualism Morton posits is the inheritance of seventeenth-century
developments; what sixteenth-century thinkers offer, on the other hand, is a way to think
about pheonomenological relationship in terms of difference, not necessarily dualism.
This difference-within-a-unity is the defining characteristic of metaphor, irony, and other
rhetorical figures and literary structures (such as fiction). Ecocritical favorite Maurice
Merleau-Ponty offers a figure called the chiasm as an example of this difference; for
Merleau-Ponty, this difference characterizes the chiasmic utterance as a
phenomenological one. When properly understood, Merleau-Ponty provides a way to
talk about figures as something that take place and fiction as a kind of place. For
instance, Thomas More's Utopia suggests that irony (a chiasmic figure) characterizes the
place of fiction. Ecoformalism considers the ways that chiasmistic language is literary
language and how rhetorical figures, as chiasms, take place in the world. The differences
between text and world that first- and second-wave ecocritics identify need not
necessarily locate the two in dialectic opposition. Merleau-Ponty's figure chiasmus can
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help us to think about how sixteenth-century figures such as irony can be characterized as
instantaneous difference, can take place in the world even though they are structured
according to a fundamental difference from that world. Difference, Merleau-Ponty helps
us to understand, need not be dualistic and need not result in literary melancholy, even
though this is the tradition that ecocritics inherit.
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CHAPTER III
DIFFERENTIATING ECOFORMALISM
As we have seen, the first and second waves of ecocriticism focus on themes and
images of nature and thus are preoccupied with representational language. Subsequently,
mainstream literary ecologists assume a categorical distinction between the text and the
physical world. There are, however, alternative traditions within ecocriticism that
explicitly engage connections between text and world. These include a methodology
grounded in evolutionary biology and one grounded in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.
The first considers the biological origins of language, and the second interrogates the
experience of language. Both investigate ways that language is in the world rather than
spatiotemporally distinct from it. The first clarifies the ways that the physical world
shapes our language through evolutionary biology. Unfortunately, it has little to tell us
about the formal structures of literature other than to remark that art permits our big
brains to hypothesize. The second details the experience of language as an event that
takes place in the world; regrettably, the literary ecologists who work with Merleau-
Ponty focus on pre-linguistic experiences. They detail the "pre-rational" experience of
what Merleau-Ponty calls the "flesh of the world." But Merleau-Ponty does not exclude
language or literature from his phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty, certain kinds of
utterances (like works ofliterature) call attention to their phenomenological experience.
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The phenomenology of these speech acts derives from the degree to which they exceed
pre-determined, "canned" meaning.
The evolutionary biology approach (along with its offspring cognitive linguistics)
and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology provide a basic understanding of what it means to
talk about the materiality of language. Both ground the materiality of language in the
human body,53 although Robert Storey and Joseph Carroll disagree as to whether
literature is a distinct genre of language. Carroll discusses literature in terms of art in
general whereas Storey argues that "literature" means a linguistic text, regardless of
whether comic book or nonsense rhymes (114). The two agree, however, that the
functions of literature include communication, pleasure, ratiocination, and so forth. In
the literary analyses they produce, Carroll and Storey dismiss literary form as, for
instance, simply one more way humans take pleasure. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand,
talks about literature as a part of "first-order language." "First-order" is distinct from
"second-order" language in that the latter is primarily communicative (in terms of strict
meaning) and the former is an experience ofoneself in and through language. Although
Merleau-Ponty does not go into depth on the ways literature constitutes a specific kind of
first-order experience, he clarifies how literary structure is part of first-language.
Merleau-Ponty works through the phenomenology of difference in a figure he calls the
chiasm. Merleau-Ponty uses the figure ofthe right and left hands touching to illustrate
chiasm:
53 Or "mind," as Merleau-Ponty denominates the brain/body/awareness nexus.
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My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching
things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the
moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my
right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but then its hold
on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do
not really touch it -- my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand
only its outer covering. (Visible 147-48)
Merleau-Ponty notes that the experiencing consciousness is restricted to only one hand at
a time. This limited perspective, however, does not preclude the two from being of the
same flesh; "this hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand touching [...]
is not an ontological void, a non-being; it is spanned by the total being of my body and by
that ofthe world" (148). The two hands belong to the same body, and the experiencing
consciousness can pass over from one hand into the other. Chiasmic language, language
that folds against itself in an experience of difference (although not ultimately duality,
Merleau-Ponty insists) is literary language.54 Not only does this fold characterize the
phenomenology of literary structure, but it also helps to explain how, for early modern
scholars, literature can be part of the world and yet different from it at the same time.
Properly read, Merleau-Ponty provides a way for talking about literary structure without
being trapped in the melancholic literature/world dualism.
54 Such folds oflinguistic non-identity include, for example, irony, metaphor, and fiction.
Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm is different from the rhetorical figure "chiasmus,"
which is the repetition of ideas or grammatical structure in reverse order. For Merleau-
Ponty, the chiasm figures the phenomenological experience of difference within a
unified structure.
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Reading the generic dimensions of literature, and the ways that literature
constitutes a genre itself, for what they have to say about notions of the environment and
place is called ecofonnalism. Ecofonnalism is a distinct thread of ecocriticism because it
moves beyond the representational and nonnative language on which the first- and
second-waves focus. Ecofonnalists are the few ecocritics who treat the fonnal elements
of literature. Sadly, ecofonnalists such as Angus Fletcher and Timothy Morton have
received insufficient attention from their ecocritical colleagues, largely because the
observations they make about poetic fonns do not translate easily into commentary on
themes of nature. Nonetheless, Fletcher and Morton reveal the relevance of literary
forms and structures to environmental studies; as we shall see, these structures create the
place of literature, and they provide a new way to talk about perfonnative language.
Detailing the ways that literary structures frame the world of the text, Fletcher's and
Morton's arguments make evident that these structures take place as they make place.
Ecofonnalism, then, is fundamentally concerned with the ways that structures of
literature establish the place of the text and how that place relates to the "physical world"
and "first world." I use the tenn "place" literally, as do Early Modem authors. In the
sixteenth century, the tenn signals social class and mobility, rhetorical invention, tropes,
and the experiencing body. It is a key concept for early modem rhetoricians, who work
out the perfonnative dimensions of literature by considering how literature takes or
makes place. By the seventeenth century, place has become product, and rhetoricians
work to define the newly developing commodity. The very literary structures
ecofonnalists inherit coalesce in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
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As we explore the Early Modern place of literature, we see that the relationships
Morton and Fletcher propose are historically specific. Morton in particular is a direct
descendant of the Scientific Revolution, which demands a categorical distinction between
literary language and the scientifically-defined world. Although Morton's "Ambient
Poetics" offers an example of an inquiry into the structural effects of the literary text, his
conclusion that these effects prove a text/world dualism is misconceived.
Phenomenology, Morton argues, is predicated on a fundamental distinction between
subject and object; thus, the experience of literary structures indicates a text/world binary.
Morton advocates "dark ecology," a "dark enjoyment" ofthe inescapably dualistic nature
of experience. The dualism in which Morton is mired is arguably the product of the
seventeenth century, but it is hardly uncontested in the Early Modern Period. The
problem is that Morton misreads Merleau-Ponty to suggest that dualism is necessary.
When we return to Merleau-Ponty, however, we see that he describes the markedly
nondualistic phenomenology of sixteenth-century rhetoric. In the Early Modern period,
we find that, for a time, literary structures are part of the world because they take place.
They derive from an internal difference, from irony, Thomas More and LA. Richards will
say, and yet they do not necessitate a text/world binary.
More speaks to a history of looking at literature as a fold in the real, a "no place"
in this "best place." This fold is an example ofMerleau-Ponty's chiasm; it instantiates
difference, but this difference is contained within a unity. As we shall see in chapters
four through six, this fold comes to signal fiction, and, eventually, also a (failed or
incomplete) contract by the end of the Early Modern Period. Difference grows into the
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dualism Morton assumes. By the Scientific Revolution, linguistic difference becomes
duality; literature is displaced from the physical world of science, and ecocritics (such as
Morton) inherit this condition. But the text/world binary is not necessary; instead,
sixteenth century texts suggest that literature has a place in the world; it takes place
through figures of self-difference, such as irony and metaphor. In the earlier part of the
period, these figures are structured like Merleau-Ponty's chiasm. At least in the sixteenth
century, ecoformalism is concerned with a kind ofperformativity, of literature taking
place.
THE BIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE
In the mid-1990s, Joseph Carroll and Robert Storey publish book-length inquiries
into the ways that evolutionary biology shapes literature. They draw on biology,
biogenetics, and cognitive psychology as they explain how literature serves evolutionary
functions. Although they do not call themselves ecocritics, Storey and Carroll influence
first-wave ecocritics like Glen Love, who finds that their work "affirms" the "thesis that
Darwinian evolutionary biology offers the most defensible basis for literary theory"
("Science, Anti-Science 76). Carroll and Storey illustrate one way that science can
illuminate lingustics and studies of literature: biology and cognitive science trace the
ways that certain linguistic structures have biological bases. Cognitive psychologists like
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Mark Johnson observe, for instance, that metaphors based in bodily experience structure
abstract ideas.55
Carroll situates literary biology in opposition to poststructuralism. In Evolution
and Literary Theory (1995), Joseph Carroll argues that "knowledge is a biological
phenomenon, that literature is a form ofknowledge, and that literature is thus itself a
biological phenomenon" (1). The evolutionary basis for literature means, for Carroll, that
"literary works reflect and articulate the vital motives and interests ofhuman beings as
living organisms" (3); "realistic" and "symbolic" works serve different cognitive needs
(131). Likewise, Storey's Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the Biogenetic
Foundations o/Literary Representation (1996) attacks poststructualism. For Storey, a
literary criticism grounded in evolutionary biology is
a turning away from the strained ingenuities, the political sophistries, the
uncritical obeisances to fashionable authority that now corrupt the
practices of the profession, and a turning toward a conception of literary
production and appreciation as "acts [...] of a human brain in a human
body in a human environment which that brain must make intelligible if it
is to survive." (xvi, qtg. Turner vii-viii)
The literary "act" in which Storey is the most invested is narrative, which he identifies as
a "pancultural and transhistorical" biological trait (103). Narrative performs a number of
55 See, for instance, Metaphors We Live By, co-authored with George Lakoff. Lakoff and
Johnson argue that associations such as up with "good" and down with "bad" are based
in bodily experiences: falling down is bad and being able to look up and see is good.
Thus phrases like an "upswing" in hiring and a "downturn" in the economy.
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useful functions: it "make[s] intelligible" the world by filtering and ordering sensory
data, and the narratives we tell ourselves provide the materials that "concatenate" into
what we call the "self' (92). What is most interesting to Storey is that written narratives
are a "making special" of evolutionarily beneficial activities (such as reflection) in order
to reinforce them (106). Storey is particularly attentive to the differences between types
of narrative. He argues that tragedy "is a meditation on the destructive effects of [...]
ambivalences" or "biogenetic antagonisms" produced between and among oppositions
such as male and female, kin and non-kin, and the like. Comedy, on the other hand,
"exploits those ambivalences as a source of incongruity, inviting the spectator to take
pleasure in Homo's own paradoxical allegiances" (103). In other words, tragedy explores
the ways that our biology fails us and comedy laughs at the unexpected ways our biology
encourages cross-pollination.56
For Carroll and Storey, the means by which critics interrogate literature are the
same as those by which scientists interpret the world. Text and world, however, are not
mutually illuminating; although science can tell us about literature, literature and its
criticism have little to say to scientists. When Storey writes that "it's not that criticism,
or literature, ever needed a conceptual universe of its own, but that each is explicable
only in terms of the natural world that the human being shares with the rest of terrestrial
phenomena" (xvii), he argues that evolutionary biology provides sufficient explanatory
56 Here, Storey stands on the shoulders of Joseph Meeker, whose Comedy ofSurvival
argues that comedy relies upon stable environmental ethics and tragedy illustrates poor
ecological ethics. Unfortunately, Meeker's description of Aristotelian comedy could
pertain just as easily to Aristotelian tragedy, and so the distinction he makes between
the two is unsound.
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power for the existence and details of literature and its criticism. Ultimately,
evolutionary biologists reveal the deep structures that literary texts only intuit: "only a
Darwinian conception of the evolved and adapted character of the human mind can
provide an understanding of a human nature that is sufficiently profound and incisive to
correspond with the intuitive understanding embodied in the literary tradition" (Carrroll
"Deep Structures" 165). Carroll and Storey conclude that evolutionary biology accounts
for everything that happens in a text and propose that the field offers the best
methodology for literary analysis.
From this standpoint, the form that knowledge (or pleasure, or imagination)
comes in does not contribute anything unique or require a distinctive explanatory
apparatus. One would be mistaken to talk about "literary form" as if it were meaningful
beyond the observations science might make of it. Indeed, Storey argues that "literature'
should be understood not simply as a canon (or anti-canon) of 'great' (or 'interesting')
verbal works. It includes nonsense rhymes and fairy tales, popular song lyrics and
supermarket novels, TV scripts and comic books" (114).57 To call all these things
literary ignores the roles that literary tradition and cultural capital play in close readings;
for instance, literary critics read sonnets quite differently from comic books and movies.
A literary theory founded on evolutionary biology folds literature and literary form into a
more general account of verbal work: communicating information, producing pleasure,
57Here, Storey establishes himself as an anti-elitist whose theories apply to all verbal and
written works. One need not argue that one is better than the other, but Storey makes it
impossible to talk about the differences between literature and every day speech
(however slight the distinction between the two), which are precisely differences of
form.
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and testing possibilities. The readings Storey offers reflect his disinterest in literary
fonns. Using current genetic theories to explain characters' motivations, Storey details
Iris Murdoch's examinations of altruism and morality in A Fairly Honorable Defeat.
Given that a specifically literary fonn does not exist for Storey, it is perhaps unsurprising
that he passes over stylistics, structure, and figurative language, focusing solely on plot;
the absence of attention to these literary qualities conveys that evolutionary biology has
little to say about the fonns, structures, and conventions ofMurdoch's text.
This is not to say that evolutionary biologists reduce all language to
representations of the physical world. Storey and Carroll do recognize fonns oflanguage
other than representative ones; biology pennits a spectrum of functions that language and .
literature might fulfill. Representation, art, performance, and play are all possible.
However, a literary theory grounded in evolutionary biology cannot explain the specifics
offonnal changes over the centuries. First, the methodology ofevolutionary biology is
to state that what exists is possible because ofenvironmentally detennined genetics. It
can describe and justify the things that exist, but it cannot theorize about them.
Evolutionary biology has little to say, for instance, to Donne's "To His Mistress Going to
Bed" other than to observe the biological motivations for sexual and poetic urges.
Second, evolutionary biology is concerned with such a grand scale that it is unable to
accommodate historically specific manifestations of literature and language that take
place over, say, decades or even years. As Richard Dawkins remarks in The Selfish
Gene, human genetics have remained relatively unchanged for at least 10,000 years,
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whereas cultural memes change much more frequently. 58 Thus, a literary criticism
grounded in evolutionary biology is rather limited; it can only comment on the ways that
texts fulfill general and millennia-old biological impulses.
Evolutionary biology may explain the existence of literature, but it has little to say
about specific formal issues, particularly because literary form and the conversations
about it change over short periods of time. And we ought not to be surprised that the
intricate details ofliterary form remain beyond the scope of evolutionary biology's
interest. That evolutionary biology and ecology both deal with averages as well as
enormous spans of time suggests that they may not be the best ways to approach formal
specifics. If everything that happens in a text is reduced to a particular biological
function, evolutionary literary theory will remain uninterested in the differences in which
literature trades.59
58 A meme is a unit of cultural ideas. Like genes, memes suffer a kind of natural
selection, evolution, hybridization, mutation, and the like. Memes "evolve" as quickly
as culture does. For instance, "going green" is a popular meme today.
59 For instance, what would a literary theory based in evolutionary biology have to say
about these lines from Andrew Marvell's "The Garden" (1681 posth.): "Annihilating
all that's made / To a green thought in a green shade" (55-56)? Are comments on the
complex metaphor "green thought in a green shade" reduced to observing that pleasure
arises because we are hard-wired to enjoy excess or the regularity of meter and rhyme,
observations which could just as easily be applied to Skelton's doggerel or vulgar
limericks? Does Storey's theory consider that, although the meter could be the same in
both lines, content shifts the stresses in the second line to "green"? And what would it
tell us about the lines' tension between meter, literal meaning, and parts of speech?
Tension and its relief may reflect biologically grounded physiological responses, but
what about the specific kinds of tension generated here or the history of ideas and
poetic histories in which Donne and Marvell participate? Other than to note, like Mark
Jonson and George Lakoff, that abstract metaphors are based on concrete ones
generated from bodily experiences, what would Storey and Carroll have to say about
the long tradition exploring how metaphor works?
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ECOPHENOMENOLOGY
A literary theory grounded in evolutionary biology is useful, however, to the
degree that it recalls the bodies that produce language and literature. Evolutionary
biology is only one of many recent lines of inquiry into the speaking body. As Gail Kern
Paster reminds us, historicists emphasize that these bodies are, in part, shaped by
sociocultural forces at the level of decade, year, and minute. The very feelings these
bodies experience are, to some degree, culturally grounded. Consider, for instance, the
physical expressions we call manners. Norbert Elias charts the development of manners
in the Medieval through Early Modem periods, and he observes that class-based manners
increasingly constrain the body's expresions, both gaseous and verbal. Such observations
are useful insofar as they particularize the Early Modem body, but neither Paster's nor
Elias' work speaks to theories ofliterature (as opposed to language); the verbal
expressions the Early Modem body expels belong to the general realm of language rather
than the particularized category of literature.
Perhaps the most promising branch of ecocriticism investigating the relationship
between embodiment and literature is ecophenomenology, a metaphysical version of
cognitive psychology. Ecophenomenology grows from the work of twentieth-century
continental philsophers Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as the
earlier Jakob von Uexkiill (who is interested primarily in animals' "interpretations" of
their environment).60 Ecophenomenology finds its fullest expression in Merleau-Ponty,
60 Von Uexkiill argues that each animal's umwelten is composed ofthe particular parts of
the environment that matter to him. A dog, for instance, has quite a different world
than would a tick.
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although a few ecocritics praise Heidegger for his work on "dwelling" and caretaking.61
Merleau-Ponty argues that experience is the starting point of knowledge, and his studies
of the role that embodiment plays in key concepts such as language, identity, and time
help to particularize ecocritics' vision ofhuman/nonhuman interconnections. Merleau-
Ponty's concept the "flesh of the world" (Visible 130-55) provides "a way of envisioning
the physical interrelatedness of body and habitat" (Heise 511). The flesh of the world is
the worldly fabric comprised of all that is reality. Merleau-Ponty argues that this "flesh is
not matter, is not mind, is not substance," but rather is the very '''element' of Being"
(139), which encompasses the visible and invisible of the world. This unified plenum
bolsters the ecocritical challenge to traditional dualisms such as human/nature,
mindfbody, and human/animal. As Merleau-Ponty asks, "where are we to put the limit
between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?" (138). Ecocritics use
Merleau-Ponty's careful scientific and philosophical work to critique anthropocentrism
and to detail the experiential qualities of the connections between human and nonhuman;
61 Some ecophenomenologists make use of Heidegger's insistence on the responsibility
ofhumans to be "shepherds," to allow non-human animals and nature to express
themselves fully (Heidegger 245): "Martin Heidegger's notion of 'dwelling' as part of
human essence and as a form of existence that allows other forms of being to manifest
themselves [...] has been interpreted as proto-environmentalist by some" (Heise
"Hitchhiker" 511). Moreover, Heidegger's environmental politics are largely
consistent with ecocritics'; Heidegger "combines a poetic awe before Earth's being
with a savage deconstruction of the death-denying project ofworld mastery that we are
taught to call progress" (Garrard 30). Ecocritics welcome Heidegger's environmental
message and read him to challenge human/nature and body/mind binaries (Heise,
Westling "Posthuma.n" 34). However, Heidegger's questionable political affiliations
and his displacement of the human/nature binary onto a human/animal binary make
Heidegger a problematic figure for ecocritics. For instance, Louise H. Westling notes
"Heidegger's recoiling from human animality" when he carefully distinguishes the
human "world" from the non-human "Earth" ("Posthuman" 33, cf. Garrard 31).
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for instance, they deploy Merleau-Ponty's concept of the "chiasm" to explain why such
connections may not be immediately obvious, why we have historically distinguished
between human and nonhuman as well as between mind and body. When it is fully.
appreciated, Merleau-Ponty's chiasm actually dismisses ecocritics' insistence on the
text/world dualism; the chiasm illustrates the self-difference that characterizes rhetorical
figures, the same self-difference that, for Early Modem authors, characterizes the literary
fold of the world against itself through such structures as irony, metaphor, figure, and
fiction.
Unfortunately, a number of ecocritics misread Merleau-Ponty's insistence that
bodily experience is the ground of knowledge and that pre-reflective experience precedes
reflection, using his claims as the basis for arguments that differentiate experience from,
and privilege it over, language.62 Said ecocritics define language as rational and
reflective and thus suppose that it is distinct from the pre-reflective interconnection with
the world we have by virtue of our embodiment. Consider, for instance,
phenomenologist David Abram's description of his body's response to "the mute
solicitation ofanother being" (a bowl) as a "silent conversation," a "mute dialogue that
unfolds far below my verbal awareness -- and often, even, independent ofmy verbal
awareness" (52). Abram playfully uses terms like "conversation" and "dialogue" to
suggest a method of engagement that is actually beyond human language; 63 he
62 Merleau-Ponty characterizes the distinction between the two as a formal distinction;
thus time is non-continuous between the two.
63 Dana Phillips seems to miss the figurative humor of this line, its reaction against
spoken language, when he uses it to suggest that "phenomenology involves a stunning
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emphasizes the pre-linguistic as a marker of the authenticity of his relationship with the
bowl, a relationship free from a congealed symbolic system. Abram suggests that such
experiences take place pre-rationally, pre-linguistically, and that texts can only recount
them lyrically with the goal of stimulating similar future non-linguistic experiences in
readers.64 But as we shall see, ecocritics like Abram misread Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenology to reject language in favor of pre-rational experience.65
However, there are a few ecocritics who call attention to Merleau-Ponty's
examinations of the ways that communication is an embodied experience of the flesh of
the world. For instance, biosemiotician Timo Maran emphasizes Merleau-Ponty's insight
that the "flesh of the world" is essentially communicative; he argues that all creaturely
interactions consist of questions, inquiries, and responses. This communication is
extrahuman; it includes humans but is not limited to human language. (In his
indifference to contradictions; otherwise it's very hard to understand how one could
speak seriously about 'carrying on a continual dialogue' with things located outside of
the realm of one's 'verbal awareness'" (214).
64 Dana Phillips, in particular, finds such approaches frustrating because he reads them to
eliminate the need of literary critic insofar as critiques of phenomenological texts
would deny the truth oftheir experiences: "the reader is to approach the nature writing
text in the same phenomenological and anthropological frame of mind in which its
author has approached the world, or run the risk of trespassing on its 'being'" (231). In
other words, Philips complains that phenomenological criticism isn't possible. This
chapter hopes to demonstrate that Phillips is too narrow in his understanding of what
phenomenology has to offer to literary theory, largely because he fails to distinguish
between a phenomenological piece ofliterature and the phenomenology oflanguage of
urhi('h 1iter<::u'y ('rl'tl'c" m,Oht """,lr"" """"y.............. .L.L" ... ""'... _ Io.J .1...1.6.1..1. .1..1..1.\....J.:\,."'" "~""".
65 See Ted Toadvine's "Limits of the Flesh: The Role of Reflection in David Abram's
Ecophenomenology" for a critique of Abram's mistake of defining language
exclusively in terms of (second-order) reflection and meaning.
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consideration of nonhuman animality, Maran follows in von Uexkiill's footsteps.)
Communication is, at its heart, potentially a phenomenological experience bridging the
human and nonhuman. Ecocritic Leonard Scigaj, for instance, draws attention to
interspecial communication in Pattiann Rogers' poem "The Mad Linguist." Rogers
writes that "[t]he language of pines and poplars [...] is 'a network / of ever-smaller
branches spreading outward'''; Scigaj reads Rogers as emphasizing that language "is not
limited to the phonetics speech of humans. Rogers seems to be extending beyond human
speech" as a way to suggest the intimate dialogue ofhuman and nonhuman that
constitutes the expressive flesh of the world, the phenomenological union of the human
and nonhuman (Scigaj 336-37). Ecocritic Louise H. Westling focuses on animal rather
than plant communication; she summarizes Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as follows:
Merleau-Ponty writes of "the 'deep world of untamed perception' (1973: 118) [that]
exists in a 'whole series oflayers of wild being' around us which is intertwined with our
embodied selves and is the source ofmeaning (1973: 117-8, see also Wolfe 2003: 3)"
("Posthuman" 39). Westling concludes that "Merleau-Ponty call[s] for a reawakening to
the world around us, that requires listening to the other voices that we have forgotten to
hear, voices that arise in what we may have formerly assumed to be silences." Although
Westling allows that human language is part of the "wholeness" that is the flesh of the
world ("Virginia Woolf' 869), her reading of Virginia Woolfs Between the Acts
underscores the specifically nonhuman language that characterizes the expressiveness of
the flesh ofthe world. For instance, her highlighting ofWoolfs description "From cow
after cow came the same yearning bellow. The whole world was filled with dumb
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yearnmg. It was the primeval voice sounding loud in the ear of the present moment"
(866, qtg. Woolf 126) suggests that the "primeval voice" open ''to the whole of the
natural world" does not speak human language. The line Westling cites foreshadows
Miss La Trobe's epiphany at the end of the text when she communes with nature
specifically by leaving human words behind: "words rose above the intolerably laden
dumb oxen plodding through the mud. Words without meaning -- wonderful words"
(191). The "words" Miss La Trobe relishes are more than human; they speak even to the
"dumb oxen." For Westling, Merleau-Ponty's connection between the human and
nonhuman is most important; her goal is to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between
humans and animals and the multitude of ways that humans and animals communicate
with one another.66 Although they do not discount the existence of literature, Woolf,
Westling, and Rogers highlight the ways that expressiveness superceeds human language;
thus, they fundamentally are unconcerned with Merleau-Ponty's insights into literature.
Nonethelesss, the experiential dimension of human language and its subsequent
product, the literary text, are primary preoccupations of Merleau-Ponty. When Scigaj
observes that, in addition to delighting in extrahuman language, Rogers' poems suggest
"that poetic perception is an active process of synthesizing the visible into language" and
record her drive "to find the right word to complete the encounter" (345), he points up the
ways that Roger is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's belief that speech "accomplishes
thought" (Phenomenology 207). For Merleau-Ponty, the act of speaking can be the
66 See, for instance, Westling's "Darwin in Arcadia: Brute Being and the Human Animal
Dance from Gilgamesh to Virginia Woolf."
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appropriate fulfillment of an experiential act; language can be an experience just as
extrahuman language and any other type of experience can. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty
offers a vision of language in which it is not representational but rather, as experience,
part of the phenomenological world. And, as we shall see below, Merleau-Ponty
contends that literary language is often experiential.
Merleau-Ponty notes that different forms of language are experienced in different
ways. What he calls "first-order language" grows from our embodiment in the world:
"the body 'survives with and in language and narrative, partly because language's
physicality extends the phenomenal world's physicality'" (Westling "Virginia Woolf'
856-57, qtg. Doyle 45-46). But Merleau-Ponty understands language to be more than an
"extension" of our embodiment in the physical world. Language is one way our
embodiment comes to be.67 For Merleau-Ponty, the word itself has meaning in the same
way that the world does. He distinguishes himself from empiricists, who argue that
speech is a mechanical association and that "the meaning ofwords is considered to be
given with the stimuli or with the states of consciousness which it is simply a matter of
naming" (Phenomenology 203). He also sets himself aside from intellectualists, who
believe that a word is an arbitrary thing that stands in for a thought, that "it is thought
which has a meaning, the word remaining an empty container" (205). In contrast,
Merleau-Ponty argues that "speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made
thought, but accomplishes it" (207). The silent speech that we call thought "is not a
67 For Merleau-Ponty, human language arises from the striving for expression that
characterizes the "flesh of the world"; such striving is fulfilled by the word but not
reducible to it.
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representation" (209) but rather the emergence of meaning that is "accomplish[ed]" in the
word. The word has meaning not as a jug has water, but rather as a jug has a shape; the
word means.68 Merleau-Ponty's first-order language is an alternative to the representative
language ecocritics assume. It does not simply refer to predetermined meaning but rather
brings meaning into existence. First-order language is not representational; in this sense,
first-order language encompasses the dimensions of literature that exceed representation,
that are more than about simply communicating meaning. Merleau-Pontyalso
emphasizes that first-order language is performative, although not necessarily in the
Austinian sense of making a promise or passing ajudgment. Instead, it is a "coming into
being"; it takes place. It is this performativity of the first-order oflanguage that Merleau-
Ponty emphasizes. (We will return later to the structure of this type of performative
language, a structure Merleau-Ponty thematizes through the chiasm as "'what it is not
itself" Phenomenology 372.)
68 In a similar way, our experience of the world reveals it to be meaningful.
The passing of sensory givens before our eyes or under our hands is, as it were, a
language which teaches itself, and in which the meaning is secreted by the very
structure of the signs, and this is why it literally can be said that our senses
question things and that things reply to them. 'The sensible appearance is what
reveals (kundgibt), and expresses as such what it is not itself.' We understand the
thing as we understand a new kind of behaviour, not, that is, through any
intellectual operation of subsumption, but by taking up on our own account the
mode of existence with the observable signs adumbrate before us. A form of
behaviour outlines a certain manner of treating the world. (Phenomenology 372)
Here, Merleau-Ponty is emphatically literal in his description of our relationship to the
world as one ofquestion and answer. And the answer we receive in our experience of
the "sensory givens" of the world is a meaning that inheres in the things we sense;
those things do not represent meaning, but rather are meaningful. And our experiences
do not reflect such meaning but rather instantiate it. We can understand "the thing and
the natural world" only by taking up their attitudes, their "mode[s] ofexistence."
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Although the term "first order expression" suggests its primacy, Merleau-Ponty
finds that it tends to be overshadowed by "second order expression" (207, fn. 4).
Language quickly ossifies into predetermined meanings, into the representational
language that figures so largely for ecocritics. Second order language, Merleau-Ponty
observes, "makes up the general run of empirical language." It draws on sedimented
meanings that "demand from us no real effort of expression and will demand from our
hearers no effort of comprehension" (213-14). Such speech appears to refer to
preexisting concepts that overshadow its experience.69 Merleau-Ponty distinguishes
between the "spoken word," which refers to preexisting concepts, and the "speaking
word" (229), which happens in the moment of its expression, its being taken up by the
body. The speaking word
is the one in which the significant intention is coming into being. Here
existence is polarized into a certain 'significance' [sens, meaning or
direction, rather than signification or literary representation] which cannot
be defined in terms of any natural object. (229, brackets in orig.)
The "speaking word" is a present "coming into being"; it is not the past-future of
representation, but rather "a certain style ofbeing" (213) in the present world; it must be
inhabited in order to be realized.
The word is then indistinguishable from the attitude which it induces, and
it is only when its presence is prolonged that it appears in the guise ofan
69 Out of such sedimented language, however, we construct new, authentic expressions
through "coherent deformations," or shifts in usage, construction, and the like.
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external image and its meaning as a thought. Words have a physiognomy
because we adapt towards them, as towards each person, a certain form of
behaviour which makes its complete appearance the moment each word is
given. (274)
Before "prolong[ation]" or repetition reduces the word to a concept, first-order language
is an experience ofposition, an "attitude." (Later we will see how metaphor satisfies the
condition oftaking up an attitude.) Such "authentic speech" (207, fn. 4) integrates the
verbal and the intellectual with the bodily senses as a total experience. All words have
this possibility; "[w]e find here, beneath the conceptual meaning ofwords, an existential
meaning which is not only rendered by them, but which inhabits them, and is inseparable
from them" (212). In second order expression, however, this "existential meaning," the
experience of the word, falls into the background as the word represents "ready-made
meanings" (213).
Like J.L. Austin, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between language concerned
primarily with communication and language that takes place. For Austin, the distinction
is between constative and performative language. The former correlates with Merleau-
Ponty's second-order language; both consist of sedimented meaning. For both, the latter
exceeds representational content. And like J.L. Austin's behavatives, Merleau-Ponty's
first-order language is something the body takes up as an attitude.7o However, Merleau-
Ponty has a far broader understanding of the ways that language is perfonnative than
does Austin. Austin limits perfonnative utterances to things like promises, bets, and
70 Austin defines behavatives as adopting an attitude such as in the phrase "I apologize."
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verdicts. Each ofthese is performative in the sense that a first-person speaker performs
an act. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, does not so limit his definition of performative
language. He opens up the possibility that all utterances can have a performative
dimension, not just those that fulfill the conditions necessary for the speaker to make a
promise or give a verdict. First-order language can be any type of utterance provided that
it calls attention to its phenomenology rather than to the determinate meaning it conveys.
Merleau-Ponty's first-order language applies to a larger cross section oflanguage
than Austin's performative does because it applies to texts, not just spoken utterances.
Although Merleau-Ponty is not explicit on this point, he suggests that works of literature
exemplify first-order language. That Merleau-Ponty uses "a novel, poem, picture, or
musical work" to illustrate forms of the body-as-becoming rather than the body (or text)-
as-object (Phenomenology 175) points up the privileged role that he assigns to the literary
text as an instance of authentic speech. His suggestion that literary structures are
somehow more amenable to phenomenology than non-literary structures should tum
ecocritics' attention to literature as such. And the Early Modem period is a particularly
fruitful time to begin such inquiries; debates about the qualities of literature as literature
are at the forefront as the literary text as a commodity overcomes courtly poesy. Thomas
More, for instance, deliberates on the difference between what Merleau-Ponty calls "all
these many commonplace utterances, [for which] we possess within ourselves ready-
made meanings" (213) and works ofliterature. For More's Utopia, one way that
literature signals that it is an "authentic utterance," that it cannot be reduced to
"superficial meaning" and "representation," is through irony; irony is a linguistic fold of
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the world against itself because it revises its claims about the world at the same time it
speaks them.71
Merleau-Ponty observes that works of art, including literature, "sing the world
newly (217). By this, he suggests that literature, as a work of art, materializes in the
world. For Early Modem authors, literature emerges (in part) performatively. As we
shall see in chapters five and six, there is a reason why theories of literature so often
deploy language from drama and theater. As Early Modem authors work out the ways
that literature is a distinct speCies of language, they bring to light the ways that literature
takes place. And as More's Utopia suggests, the place that literature takes is equivocal; it
is both a "no place" and "best place." Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm is particularly
apt because it speaks to the unity in difference that characterizes the place ofEarly
Modem literature, the way that Early Modem literature is performative. His
phenomenology ofliterature, of first-order language, emphasizes the ways that Early
Modem literature takes place and that it is not only a collection of representations of the
world. Experience need not be non-linguistic. This is the insight of cognitve psychology
and Paster's work with humors: we do not break through language to a prior, truer body.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is something about the form of literature (as distinct
from language) that makes the work of art happen in addition to whatever (second-order)
meanings it might invoke and accrue.
71 As the following chapters demonstrate, "linguistic folds" refer to rhetorical figures and
literary structures that offer a coincidence of difference or non-self-identity. The term
"fold" points to the fact that the difference isn't temporal but rather takes place
instantaneously.
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Ecocritics like David Abrams who typify experience as necessarily non-linguistic
misread Merlau-Ponty's characterization of first-order language. We should also be
careful not to allow Merleau-Ponty's insights into nonhuman communication to conceal
the fact that human language can be an experiential event as well. Unfortunately, the
field of ecophenomenology largely reproduces the "topics-based" approach I critique in
chapter two; ecophenomenologists invoke Merleau-Ponty's notions of intertwining and
embodiness to justify the value of a particular text or passage. Similarly, literary critics
drawing on cognitive science often focus on the ways that figures derive from
biologically grounded cognitive drives. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty's linguistic
phenomenology provides an important contribution to ecocritical studies in that it offers a
unique understanding of the relationship between literature and the physical world.
Literature, as defined by its formal (literary and poetic) dimensions, can be something
that happens in the phenomenal world. To put it another way, literary structures take
place.
THE PLACE OF ECOFORMALISM
Ofthe three critics who explicitly interrogate literary form (Angus Fletcher,
Timothy Morton, and Robert Watson), only Watson speaks directly the Early Modem
period. Watson argues that the similes in Shakespeare's As You Like It reveal anxiety that
the only way to know something is to liken it. Subsequently, Watson argues, there was a
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widespread tum to nature as the source of truth.72 In essence, the world, not the word,
became the source oftruth.73 Watson argues that, in the Early Modem period, truth
"departed on its amazing modem itinerary [...] from meaning to matter" (20), from
language to the physical world. Such an epistemological shift informs, for instance,
Bacon's claim that language is one of the four "idols" that muddy our perception of
reality. Back to Nature historicizes ecocritics' preoccupation with nature at the expense
ofliterature. However, other than a brief mention in the introduction, ecocriticism is not
a primary focus of this text, and Watson does little to develop the implications ofhis
argument for environmental literary theory. He does not clarify how earlier periods
might have challenged ecocritics' emphasis on representational language. Watson
appears to limit words to "meaning," and thus he fails to engage simile as a structure
(rather than simply a carrier ofmeaning, a comparison). But his work does suggest that
inquiries into models of the relationship between literature and the physical world should
begin with the earlier periods ofEnglish literary history and must attune to the ways that
rhetorical structures do more than carry meaning. Sadly, Watson flirts with ecocriticism
only to fail to engage it as a theory and interrogate how his argument about Early Modem
simile asks ecocritics to consider literature and rhetorical structures in their own right.
72 Watson identifies "urbanization, capitalism, new technologies, and the Protestant
Reformation" as the primary causes ofthe developing "nostalgia for unmediated
contact with the world of nature" (5).
73 The humanist emphases on context and historicity "expose the internal referentiality
and historical instability of any verbal system, a recognition that refutes any lingering
hope that words will directly reflect things" (15).
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Fletcher and Morton, on the other hand, explicitly engage ecocritical theory.
They suggest that literary forms and structures constitute events in terms of taking place.
They focus on the ways that texts structure their experience. InA New Theory For
American Poetry (2006), Fletcher argues that the "environment poem" establishes a sense
of boundary and horizon, the "eternal return" and "continuous reemergence of order"
from chaos (8), that it blends active and passive voice into the II middle voice ll such that
the boundaries between subject and object are blurred, that it fits disparate elements into
a unified whole in a movement called "rendering," and so forth. For Fletcher, poetry is
the privileged form because the reader is more involved in poetry than prose, which is
more likely to devolve into IIfactual reference" (176). Nonetheless, Fletcher appreciates
Montaigne's "Of Experience," for instance, because it "meditate[s] on the field of
interactions between many inhabitants" of the world (139). An environment poem does
not "represent" the world; rather, it is an experiential unity characterized by ambiance,
shifting horizons, interaction, and coherence among inconsistency. Fletcher suggests that
the poetic structure to which he refers is particularly consistent with the physical world; it
shares key structures.74 Unlike Meeker, who also focuses on literary structures (genre),
Fletcher is not making an argument about ethics. Instead, he calls attention to the ways
that texts structure their phenomenology. The environment poem enacts an environment
insofar as it provides a sense ofhorizon and consistency as well as a centralized identity.
74 Fletcher asserts that the lI[i]ncompleteness theorem of Kurt Godel [...] models the ·way
a true environment-poem holds together." "Either the poem is complete or consistent,
but it cannot be both of these. The complete, or as I would say, the coherent
environment poem is necessarily inconsistent at some point, and for this reason it
coheres II (11).
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The environment poem (noun) environs (verb). In this sense, Fletcher illustrates one way
that a literary text can be performative: it structures its experience. For Fletcher, the
environment poem is not "thematic" but rather is an emotive experience; reading an
environment poem means "living through an event" (136). Fletcher suggests that
ecocritics should revise their definition of environment to include the phenomenology of
literary texts, and he argues that poetic structures are the field on which this
phenomenology takes place.
Timothy Morton's Ecology Without Nature (2007) offers many of the same
arguments as Fletcher's work. Morton details "ambient poetics," techniques that "encode
the literal space of [texts'] inscription" (3). Ambient poetics includes "rendering" (a
sense of consistency), "medial" or phatic dimensions (including "the page on which the
words were written or the graphics out of which they were comprised" 37), "tone," the
"Aeolian" (or "sense of processes continuing without an author" 41), words' "timbral"
sound ("rather than [...] symbolic meaning" 39), and the "re-mark" (a structural element
that splits foreground from background, the text from the surrounding natural world).
These dimensions of ambient poetics constitute nature writing's structure over and above
the content the text offers. Morton argues that his critique is an aesthetic one.75 He notes
that, "[i]nstead of talking about content -- software and wetware -- I explore the realm of
75 Morton insists on formal analysis because it is only by critiquing the aesthetic
dimensions of the text that we can see past the claims for unity with nature that nature
writing supposes.
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form" (28). By form, Morton refers to the ways that nature writing establishes itself as a
coherent object (or unity),76 the ambient poetics it generates.77
But, Morton argues, this unity is pure fantasy. "Ecomimesis," or the literary drive
to get outside of the text into the world (through such strategies as "as I write" the snow
falls, etc.) only betrays the fundamental dualism of text and world.78 For Morton, the
supposed split is fundamentally necessary for text and world because, without it, neither
would exist. "[W]hat we are really dealing with is the idea of medium, split into two
aspects (foreground and background)" (48). This duality between self and nature,
between real and fantasy, between text and world is, Morton argues, inescapable. He
concludes that "the dissolution of inside and outside is strictly impossible"; in other
words, "nature writing is a dense chiasmus" (70). That is, the text and the world remain
distinct because experience is predicated on difference, a difference Morton names
"dualism." Morton assumes that this dualism constitutes a fundamental, categorical
breach between text and world, and he goes on to detail the experiential structures of that
76 The use of the term "unity" here highlights the ways that I find ecological terms useful:
"unity" and other ecological "values" can apply to literary structures, but not in the
moral sense, and they are not tied to "scientifically justified" content.
77 Because ambient poetics produces an experience of the world, "it is supposed not just
to describe, but also to provide a working model for a dissolving of the difference
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human beings' description ofthe environment" (63-64).
78 Morton uses the term ecomimesis in the sense Dana Phillips uses the term; he derides
nature writing for its alleged pretense to be in contact with the physical world.
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breach.79 Morton encourages ecocritics not to mourn or attempt to recover nature but
rather to accept the fact of this duality. Morton calls this approach "dark ecology": the
appreciation of the duality between text and world (and between self and world) and the
recognition that the nature we engage is always a fantasy. "Dark ecology [... ] is a
perverse, melancholy, irreducible otherness" (151).
In support of his claim for the fundamental dualism between self and nature,
Morton invokes Merleau-Ponty's idea of the "chiasm." However, Morton misunderstands
the term. Merleau-Ponty explicitly argues that the chiasm names difference but not
duality, yet Morton takes Merleau-Ponty's figure of the chiasm to signal an
insurmountable dualism. Morton notes that the chiasm is "an intertwining of what is
sensed with the one who is sensing," but "chiasmus doesn't solve anything, because in
order to work, both terms must be preserved even as they are cancelled at another level"
(69). That is, Morton understands the chiasm to depend upon a subject/object dualism.
However, Merleau-Ponty actually uses the term chiasm to explain how the apparent
difference between seer and seen, between two hands shaking, is unraveled by the unified
plenum of the flesh of the world. Merleau-Ponty'S notion ofthe chiasm suggests that
otherness is a quality of an experienced unity. Just as a handshake is reversible, what
counts as "sentient" and "sensible" in any given interaction is determined entirely by
perspective. Thus, although difference characterizes the contact between hands, or
79 This "duality" is what vexes ecocritics the most about Morton; see, for instance, Janet
Fiskio's recent review of Ecology Without Nature in ISLE. Paradoxically, even though
ecocritics perpetuate the text/world distinction, they resent Morton's claim that
human/nature duality is an inescapable fact of life.
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between the seer and the seen, Merleau-Ponty suggests the inadvisability ofusing such
consciousness to determine categorical boundaries.
The "total being" that is the flesh of a body, and of the world, is possible "as soon
as we no longer make belongingness to one same 'consciousness' the primordial
definition of sensibility, and as soon as we understand it as the return ofthe visible upon
itself' (Merleau-Ponty Visible 142). Consciousness does not define identity, so a sense of
difference does not necessarily indicate duality. The "return of the visible upon itself' is
a fold in the plenum that is the world, a fold that allows the plenum to experience itself;
the flesh of the world is a "texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself' (146).
. That is, the "fold" or "return" is necessary because it produces the sense of difference
required for experience; but this sense of difference, the "chiasm," does not require
duality.
[T]his distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant
with it, it is synonymous with it. It is that the thickness of flesh between
seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility and for the
seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means
of communication. (135)
For Merleau-Ponty, the flesh of the world is "thick" with chiasm; the world belongs to
the visible and sensible only insofar as it sees and touches as it is seen and touched,
insofar as it returns upon itself. The chiasm is constitutive ofthe experience that is the
flesh of the world, by which it comes to know itself through distinct consciousnesses.
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Without difference, without the thickness of the fold, Merleau-Ponty suggests, there
would be no experience at all, but thickness does not preclude identity and unity.
Literature has a long history as a structure of difference. Morton offers us one
vision, but strict dualism summarizes neither Merleau-Ponty nor Early Modem
literature.8o As we shall see, Merleau-Ponty provides a much more appropriate theory for
Renaissance literature than his heir, Morton. In the following chapters, I explore the
ways that difference and internal contradiction are historical qualities characterizing
literature. For instance, the Medieval and Early Modem notion of coincidentia
oppositorum (the coincidence of opposites) figures, for Thomas More, as the internal
difference of irony. Early Modem literature has a sense of internal difference in
rhetorical equivocation, fiction, and the commodity ofliterature. This remainder of this
dissertation inquires into the historical dimensions of literary difference, beginning first
with the "self-different" rhetorical figure ofmetaphor. But difference is not the same as
duality. By definition, coincidentia oppositorum is a unified event. And as we shall see
in chapter four, certain rhetorical structures (tropes) name the chiasms, the folds in the
cosmos Natural Philosophers explain through qualities such as "likeness." The chapters
that follow diagnose and detail the various relationships between linguistic difference and
80 Early Modem critics may be familiar with the distinction between the physical world
and the literary ones through Henry Berger Jr.'s analysis of the Early Modem division
between the first world of the author, the second world of the text, and the green world
that is to the second world what the second is to the first. Berger does not examine the
pheoneomenology or particular structural events that constitute these frames, so
Morton's observations illustrate one way we might approach the Early Modem period.
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the real world. Among other things, we find that differences need not be categorical.
Early Modem rhetoricians explore the idea that figures and literary structures take place.
This dissertation corrects the dualism between text and nature that ecocritics assume by
illuminating the place of literature as detailed by Early Modem authors.
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Early Modem English literature
challenges the division between world and text Morton requires in his "dark ecology."
Among other things, Early Modem literature can help us understand Morton's
melancholy. The duality Morton identifies with literature solidifies in the so-called
Scientific Revolution. Ultimately, ecocriticism descends from the Scientific Revolution
and assumes the very duality that it denies Morton. The world/literature dualism is born
ofthe historical conditions in turmoil in Early Modem England. Ultimately, as we shall
see in the coda, this split, the duality between text and world, generates the literary
melancholia that colonizes both the literary text in the seventeenth century and Morton's
dark ecology. Literary melancholy is the product of the split between text and world.
Melancholy takes the place of nature.
THE ECOPHENOMENOLOGY OF METAPHOR
Two early and often overlooked ecocritical essays venture into the
ecophenomenology ofpoetics and metaphor: William Rueckert's "Literature and
Ecology: an Experiment in Ecocriticism" (1976) and Neil Evemden's "Beyond Ecology:
Self, Place, and the pathetic Fallacy" (1996). The former observes self-evidently that "a
poem is stored energy," and the second takes a brief detour from public space planning
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into the ways that metaphor satisfies the fundamental conditions of place. These essays
consider the ways that literary forms are performative (as "energy") or take place. Angus
Fletcher refers to this literary performativity when he claims to investigate "the being and
becoming of things," a being he identifies with lakobsonian metonymy (10). For
Fletcher, metonymy is the "locating figure" whereas metaphor is the "classifying figure,"
so metonymy is the privileged figure. We will return later to the ways that classifying is
an issue of place for Robert Burton and to the place long associated with metaphor. The
salient point here is that each of these authors identify figures with a kind of performative
language -- language that is performative by being literary, not by making a promise or
apology or other Austinian performative utterance. By investigating rhetorical forms and
literary structures, ecoformalists identify a way to talk about performative language other
than in a strictly Austinian sense. These authors find that rhetorical figures take place.
Figures take place by discharging a kind of energy. Fletcher surmises that the
energy can be described as a wave. He quotes Erik Gunderson's observation in The
Handy Physics Answer Book (1999) that "a wave is a traveling disturbance that moves
energy from one location to another without transferring matter" (147). For Fletcher,
these waves are evident in Walt Whitman's "undulant forms" (9). These critics agree that
poetic energy takes place in the form of rhetorical forms, particularly tropes (the division
of figure that depends upon changes in meaning, the most familiar examples being
metaphor and metonymy). The energy that rhetorical figures demonstrate is of primary
concern to each of the ecoformalists considered here. In chapter four, we discover how
energy, long associated with trope, migrates to from rhetoric to the physical world;
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chapter four narrates the history in which metaphorical energy becomes categorically
distinct from real and literal energies. 81
Literature is, unfortunately, a secondary concern for William Rueckert; he
overlooks the provocative statements he makes about form and concludes that literature is
merely a vessel and conduit for the energy that arises from poets' creativity: "in literature,
all energy comes from the creative imagination. It does not come from language, because
language is only one (among many) vehicles for the storing ofcreative energy" (l09).
Although Rueckert ultimately fails to fulfill the promise of his speculations because he
does not offer a fuller theory ofmetaphor (i.e., what it means to say that"a poem has
energy"), his lyricism is nonetheless provocative. Rueckert's claim that "a poem is stored
energy, a formal turbulence, a living thing, a swirl in the flow" (l08) speaks to the sense
that poems seem full of life, like they do have a sort of energy about them, an energy that
arises in ways that literary works do more than convey meaning. Rueckert suggests that
poems (by which he means literature in general) are more about what they do than what
they say.
The concept of a poem as stored energy (as active, alive, and generative,
rather than as inert, as a kind of corpse upon which one performs an
autopsy, or as an art object one takes posession of, or as an antagonist -- a
knot of meanings -- one must overcome) frees one from a variety of
critical tyrannies, most notably, perhaps, that of pure hermeneutics, the
81 We should remember that the distinction between metaphorical and literal statements is
also historically specific. As chapter four demonstrates, the distinction depends in part
upon developments within the field of natural philosophy.
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transformation of this stored creative energy directly into a set of coherent
meanings. What a poem is saying is probably always less important than
what it is doing and how -- in the deep sense -- it coheres. (110)
Rueckert echoes an important New Critical insight here: the text is energetic insofar as it
exceeds content, it does rather than says, and it is performative rather than representative.
That is, metaphor's energy derives from its formal structure. The literary and rhetorical
structures that take place, that demonstrate energy, are performative in quite a different
way than Austin's performative utterance. In contrast to J.L. Austin's observation that the
first-person speaker grounds the illocutionary act, ecoformalists identify figure as the seat
of what it means for literature to take place. Chapters four through seven investigate the
ways that literary structures are themselves performative because they demonstrate
energy. We see that Early Modem authors investigate performative language through
theories of how theater takes place.
Neil Evemden demonstrates that ecoformalists' inquiries into metaphor take up
the sense ofplace. Metaphor, he observes, depends upon a sense ofplace. In the
chapters following, we discover the history of the place called metaphor. For Evemden,
having a sense of place locates the structure ofmetaphor in the physical world. Editors
Cheryl Glotfelty and Harold Fromm pair Ruckert's "Literature and Ecology" with
Evemden's "Beyond Ecology." "Beyond Ecology" reads like a typical ecocritical
treatise: it emphasizes that literature illustrates key ecological values such as
96
interconnectedness.82 As evidence of the ways that ecological systems challenge strict
boundaries, Evemden cites the cichlid, a fish that viciously defends its territory during
mating season (97). The usually docile fish, Evemden observes, acts "as if he is as big as
his territory." The fish's sense of place expands beyond the cluster of data points
localized within his skin. He concludes that the territory, not the skin, defines the fish's
"self." The fish's territoriality illustrates the "sensation" ofhaving a sense of place, a
sensation that, for instance, motivates the homing pigeon and distinguishes between
tourist and resident (100).83 Part of what the fish is is his sense ofplace.
The remainder of Evemden's essay details the implications that "sense of place"
has for public planning. But he also remarks that the sense of place that pertains to a fish
also obtains in metaphor. He argues that metaphor, too, draws on senses of place.
All the metaphorical properties so favored by poets make perfect sense:
the Pathetic Fallacy is a fallacy only to the ego clencher. Metaphoric
language is an indicator of "place" -- an indication that the speaker has a
place, feels part of a place. (10 I)
82 Evemden argues that humans are deeply interrelated with their environments; "rather
than a subject-object relationship in which the observer parades before the supposedly
beautiful view, we have instead a process, an interaction between the viewer and the
viewed" (97). For him, this insight is important because it challenges "strictly
formalist view[s] of aesthetics" (96).
83 For Evemden, it is necessary to appreciate the felt "sense ofplace" when planning
public spaces; "environmentalism without aesthetics is merely regional planning," he
concludes (103).
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Evernden is not the first, and certainly not the last, critic to remark that metaphors
interpolate certain subject positions.84 But his contribution to ecoformalism is his
recognition that literary structures such as metaphor depend on senses ofplace. As we
will see in my fourth and fifth chapters, rhetoricians have long investigated metaphor in
terms ofplace. For instance, classical authors define metaphor as a word that is out of
place; for these authors metaphor invokes, as it violates, senses of place.
Ecoformalism, as Evernden, Rueckert, and Fletcher practice it, invokes the key
discoveries ofNew Criticism: the performative, energy-laden dimensions ofliterary and
rhetorical structures. For instance, Evemden notes that a homing pigeon navigates by
"correct[ing] the tension it feels when it finds hitself 'out of context'" (100). Being in
place and out ofplace depends, he suggests, on a sense of "tension." The place of
metaphor is characterized by tension, and this tension constitutes the energy ofmetaphor.
Formal discussions ofmetaphor regularly stress its tension and energy. Rhetorician
Wayne Booth, for instance, equates energy with the ways that metaphors exceed their
content; "more is communicated than the words literally say. What the more is cannot be
easily described. Aristotle and others called it energy," which is "not mainly a question
of cognitive content" (52). More than content, metaphors have energy, what
Wheelwright and Rueckert call "life." Energetic "tension" is a common descriptor for
84 For instance, in Ted Cohen's argument that metaphors encompass more than cognitive
content, he observes that metaphors cultivate intimacy; they invoke shared assumptions
about language and the world. Wayne Booth concurs; he emphasizes that "to
understand a metaphor is by its very nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist
or to reject him, and that is simultaneously to decide whether to be shaped in the shape
the metaphor requires or to resist" (63). Cohen and Booth both emphasize the
structures ofmetaphor rather than metaphor's propositional content.
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what metaphor does. Wimsatt, for instance, observes that metaphor requires a "tension,"
a "problem" (128).85
The energy ofmetaphor derives from its tension, which is a product of the
constitutive difference that defines metaphor. As Richard Klein observes in "Straight
Lines and Arabesques: Metaphors of Metaphor" (1970), metaphors assert both that A=B
and Ai=B. Klein concludes that metaphor is internally contradictory and characterized by
a ceaseless movement by which it strives to overcome itself. New Critics in particular
emphasize that metaphors create tension by asserting a union in difference. I. A.
Richards notes that "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things
active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of
their interaction" (93); metaphor happens "when we put together in a sudden and striking
fashion two things belonging to very different orders of experience" (124) and create
"tension" (125). W.K. Wimsatt notes that metaphor requires a "copresence of likeness
and difference" (127).86 For him, "the difference between its parts" (159), a difference he
calls "chiasmus," "save[s] the physical quality of words" (166). (Wimsatt's "chiasmus"
carries a different emphasis than Merleau-Ponty's; for Wimsatt, the term emphasizes
distance and difference, the self-difference that metaphor never overcomes.) Although
there are significant differences between critics' accounts of metaphor, such as the
85 Wimsatt notes that "dead metaphors" such as the mouth of a river relax this tension
because they are so common place.
86 Wimsatt extends this quality to rhyme as well; he notes that rhyme is most effective
when it juxtaposes things that are quite different in connotation, denotation, verbal
form (e.g. part of speech), and so forth.
99
distinctions between interactive and tensive theories, the energy producing self-difference
ofNew Critical metaphor offers one way ecocritics might inquire into the place of
literature. Theorists of metaphor join Rueckert and Evernden in stressing the
performative dimensions of literary and rhetorical structures. Metaphoricians stress that
metaphor is more than just meaning: it both "takes place" and depends upon a violation
of place; it is constituted by phenomenological difference and distance, and therefore has
energy.
This dissertation brings to light how New Criticism can contribute to
ecoformalism. By returning focus to the non-representational dimensions of texts,
methodologies that attend to form (as New Criticism did) help correct ecocritics'
predilection for linguistic content. Ecoformalism offers a material, historically-grounded
lesson in the development ofliterature qua literature. In a strange twist of fate, New
Critics such Wimsatt and Richards, who do not take into account the historical periods in
which texts are written, join emphatically material ecocritics like Rueckert and Evernden
in emphasizing the energy of rhetorical structure (specifically the structure we call
metaphor). Although the ecocritics ultimately return to the ways that texts distribute
ecologically sound content, they nonetheless offer insight into the phenomenology of the
very literary structures with which New Critics are concerned. It is this literary place that
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theories of rhetoric and literature negotiate.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PHYSICS OF RHETORIC IN PUTTENHAM'S ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE
For Early Modem thinkers, folds in the fabric of the world are, in part, linguistic;
they explore cosmological chiasms via inquires into language, particularly rhetorical
figures and fiction. 87 "To trope" means "to turn," and as we shall see, natural
philosophers understand the universe to be structured by rhetorical figures such as
metaphor, metonymy, metalepsis, and the like.88 These figures name the chiasmatic
relationship between otherwise distant, different entities. For instance, Early Modems
believe that the moon affects wolves because of a "sympathy" they share, because of
likeness in quality; although they appear to be quite different and distant entities, wolves
and the moon are related metaphorically (metaphor is not yet opposed to reality).
Metaphor is, in this case, a kind of chiasm: it names the kind of fold in the world
presumed by the qualitative relationship between wolves and moon. Later rhetoricians
such as George Puttenham, however, attempt to disambiguate the folds that rhetorical
figures name from the physical world; to this end, Puttenham redefines figure as
something that is duplicitous and that is in contrast to a physical world ofpure,
87 By "chiasm," I refer to the figure as Merleau-Ponty uses it, not to the rhetorical figure
chiasmus, which indicates a phrase with parallel (but reversed) structure ("It is easy to
lefu'TI chess, but to mastcr chess is difficult.").
88 Metonymy is a kind of metaphor by which one refers to a thing by one of its attributes
("We await word from the crown"). Metalepsis is another kind of metaphor; it refers to
a thing by reference to something remotely connected with it ("lead foot").
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uninterrupted extension. The fold or doubleness metaphor names becomes synonymous
with lying and trickery. Puttenham's reconceived definition of figure draws on changes
in natural philosophy. The transition from natural philosophy to Cartesian mechanism
establishes a categorical distinction between figure and the physical world that is based in
part on limiting chiasmus to rhetoric. When the universe is defined in terms of extension
rather than of sympathies, the folds that tropes name no longer exist in the physical
world. An extended field is numerically regular and can have no folds. Tropes are no
longer the "forces" that obtain between distant entities. What we call "force" and
"energy" transfer from trope to physical impact. As late-sixteenth and seventeenth
century rhetoricians redefine figure and trope, then, they dismiss chiasm (force at a
distance) as purely linguistic and not real; tropological chiasm differs from the
straightforward extension in space that the universe demonstrates.
MATERIALIZING FIGURE
In a short article, Margreta de Grazia observes that "if sensible properties
constitute thingness" (231), then "a word is a thing in the sixteenth but a nonthing in the
seventeenth century" (234). She draws on the fact that GeorgePuttenham and other early
modem rhetoricians use terms such as "weight" to describe meter, figures, amplification
and the like. De Grazia concludes that, by the time ofthe Scientific Revolution, words
have been emptied of their ''thingness'' so that they can better "give a clear representation
ofthiIigs" (231). However, given that we continue to remark on the "weight" ofan
argument and the "clarity" of prose, it remains unclear what, exactly, is unique about
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Early Modem rhetoric for de Grazia. Moreover, her claim is less straightforward than it
first appears: are we to understand that, for the Early Modem period, "words are things"
in the sense that apples and trees are things, in the sense that gravity is a thing, or in the
sense that theories of gravitation are things? Indeed, when we return Puttenham's Arte of
English Poesie (1589) to its historical context, we find that the kind of "thing" that words
are is precisely what is under negotiation.
Puttenham writes during a time when natural philosophy is transitioning into
Cartesian mechanism and the branches of science we now recognize. Renaissance
naturalism can best be described as a carry-over from Medieval mysticism and alchemy;
its latest mainstream expressions are in Harvey Gilbert's De Magnete (1600) and in Jean
Baptiste Von Helmont's work with magnetism and medicine (spanning several decades
until his death in 1644) (Westfall 25-30). Renaissance naturalists understand the cosmos
to be an animate system ofmutually influential bodies whose behaviors result either from
bodies seeking their proper place or union with the whole or from the "sympathetic"
attraction or "antipathetic" repulsion that occurs between bodies or between a body and
the place it occupies. The belief that sympathies existed between astrological and
terrestrial bodies reveals the assumption fundamental to Renaissance naturalism: the
connection of all parts of the universe. As Allen G. Debus explains, ''the general
acceptance ofthe macrocosm and the microcosm along with the great chain of being gave
credence to the acceptance of correspondences existing everywhere between the celestial
and sublunary worlds," as well as between entities in the same sphere (12). All entities
have an "animate spirit" that desires union, participates in friendships, and seeks to
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restore proper order. "In Renaissance Naturalism, mind and matter, spirit and body, were
not considered as separate entities; the ultimate reality in every body was its active
principle, which partook at least to some extent of the characteristics of mind or spirit"
(Westfall 31). Magnetism, for instance, names the motion exhibited by disjoined bodies
seeking union, and the free fall of heavy bodies is a result oftheir seeking their natural
place at the center of the universe.
The most popular and noteworthy scientific texts published in sixteenth century
England hearken back to the classical universe as filtered through medieval scholars;
natural philosophers largely assume a Ptolomaic, geocentric universe (although none of
the illustrations of the spheres include equant circles) whose motions are the effects of
"attractions," "repulsions," and numerological or qualitative "correspondences.,,89
Although most texts include some basic algebra and geometry, they mostly draw on logic
and reasoning to describe the natural world, and they refer difficult, theoretical questions
to the "authorities": Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Ptolomy, Proclus, Orontius, and Johannes de
Sacrobosco. English natural philosophers make use of geometry, algebra, mechanism,
and mysticism in often theoretically inconsistent ways. For instance, in his Castel of
Knowledge (1556), Robert Recorde characterizes the surface tension of water in terms of
geometrical desire: "the partes of water dooth all wayes couette [the] rounde forme" of
spherical perfection (137). Aside from the few English natural philosophers who provide
original theoretical inquiries (William Gilbert, William Harvey, and arguably Thomas
89 Thomas Digges' appendix provides the only image of a heliocentric universe among
the texts here surveyed.
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Digges), most are less concerned with the theoretical consistency of the natural laws
behind observable phenomena than with explicating the practical applications of those
phenomena. Henry Janowitz observes that about "ninety percent [of science texts in
England] was in the vernacular" (79); thus there was a great wealth ofpractical primers
for the lay person and journeyman who had little hope of attending university. Texts
such as Salysburye's Description ofthe Sphere (1550), Anthony Ascham's A Lytle
Treatyse ofAstronomye (1552), Recorde's Castle ofKnowledge (1556, 1593), William
Fulke's Goodly Gal!erye (1563), John Maplet's Dial! ofDestiny (1581) are comprised
largely of definitions and predictions. Preoccupied with practical applications for the lay
person, natural science texts published in English between 1550 and 1600 mostly define
(terminology, concepts, and procedures) and predict (they include tables and charts that
indicate tides, good days for bloodletting, and for planting; they also calculate zodiac
signs based on degrees of latitude, and so forth).
Descriptions of such phenomena frequently evince the animism that characterizes
Renaissance naturalism. For instance, attraction indicates friendship, and repulsion
signifies enmity. Digges characterizes gravity as "affection" (n.p. [13]), and the mutually
influential relationship between the Earth and moon as an "alliance" (n.p. [6]). Similarly,
Maplet notes that astrology is possible because of the "concord or common fellowship of
the seuen Planets"(1r). Planets such as Saturn, Jupiter, and Mercury are in "concord" and
are "friends" (4r); their "attonement, or agreement" results from their "lyke Nature,
Quality, Substance, might, or powre." Saturn's "enemies," on the other hand, include
Mars and Venus, planets that cause "[g]reate contencion" (4r). At the turn of the
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seventeenth century, Johannes Kepler blends the language ofRenaissance naturalism
with musical terminology to describe the ratios between the five Platonic solids (the cube,
tetrahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron, and octahedron), ratios which he identifies as
literally harmonic; the variations of a planet's orbit, and the relationships between
planetary orbits, demonstrate musical harmonies and dissonance. That planetary orbits
demonstrate harmonic ratios suggests "genetic kinship" and "marriage" between the
Platonic solids (171-74) as well as between the planets themselves (204). The dissonance
Kepler identifies between Mars (f sharp), Venus (e flat), and Jupiter (d) arises from
Venus' marital bias; "this difficulty is caused by the wedding of the Earth and Venus," a
wedding that leads Venus to draw so close to her husband that she disrupts the heavenly
harmonics.
More practical than theoretical, English scientists mostly treat "attractions" and
"correspondences" as self-explanatory and unproblematic. Such terms simply name the
causes of celestial and terrestrial movements and inform a universe understood as an
interpenetrating system of what we would now call forces. Whereas we post-Newtonians
understand these forces independently of the bodies in which they manifest, naturalists
understand forces such as gravity and magnetism in terms of bodies' shared qualities.
Consider, for instance, Thomas Digges' description of gravity in his "Addition" to his
father Leonard's Prognostication (1555/1576). Digges writes that
Gravity is nothing els but a certaine proclivity or natural coueting of partes
to be coupled with the whole, which by diuine providence of the Creator
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ofall is given and impressed into the partes, that they should restore
themselves into their unity and integrity, concurryng in spherical fourme.
(n.p. [13])
The "partes" to which Digges refers are bits of earth; it is a natural law, Digges asserts,
for elementary particles to join together into the unity God established. "Unity" (and a
spherical one at that) is the natural state of elemental earth; bodies of earth "couet" one
another because God's law dictates that parts seek the whole. Thus heavy objects must
have earth in them; they fall to the ground because they seek to be unified with it: "things
[...] naturally fall downward being of earthy nature" (n.p. [11]). The "natural place" of
earth is at the center of the universe, and since "nothing can be more repugnant to the
forme and ordinaunce of the world, then that thinges natural y should be out of their
natural place," earth seeks its union at the center of the universe (n.p. [12]). Whereas the
heaviest element, earth, seeks the center, lighter elements such as fire and air flee the
center and create concentric spheres around earth. "To ayre and fyre, in regard to their
lightnes, [their natural motion is] upward and from the center" (n.p. [8]). Those things
that rise from the earth must contain fire or air; they "by firye force are carried upward"
(n.p. [11]). Differences in what we would now call gravity, specific gravity, and weight
were a consequence of the relative heaviness of the four elements. In contrast to
Newton's revolutionary hypothesis that all bodies have gravity, sixteenth century
scientists like Digges understand gravity to be synonymous with the phenomenon of
heavy bodies' free fall; it describes the motion of particles of earth, and, to a lesser
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degree, particles of water, as each particle seeks to join its fellows in a sphere.9o Levity,
on the other haild, names the quality of light bodies. Earth is not simply a certain kind of
particle; rather, it is a substance that has the tendency to move towards the center of the
universe and to join in spherical union with other pieces of earth.
As with gravity, naturalists' conception of magnetism results from the attraction
between entities' shared qualities. In the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon argues that "the
Load stone could attract Iron" because the stone and iron "concurre and agree in Nature,
for the conformitie and likenesse of their Natures" (56). Three hundred years later,
William Fulke notes in his Goodly Gallerye (1563) that the magnet has a "natural vertue
[...] to drawe iron," a virtue that exists "by a similitude of nature, and such an appetite,
as is male and the female" (70v). Both Bacon and Fulke attribute the force of magnetism
to likeness in qualitative natures; as John Maplet notes in The Dial! ofDestiny (1581),
"agreement [of bodies] is in like nature, quality, substance" (4). "Similitudes" and
discordances between naturalist entities rely on qualitative (not quantitative)
relationships, and these similitudes constitute fundamental structures of the animate
cosmos. For Digges and his colleagues, forces such as gravity and magnetism are the
product of three factors: attraction and repulsion, the desire for an originary unity, and the
90 Due to his endorsement of the Copernican, heliocentric system, Thomas Digges'
understanding of the natural location of ea..rt:h is actually a good deal more complex
than his colleagues'. He notes that, since the Earth is not the center of the universe, the
natural place of earth is in the fourth sphere. He also considers the possibility that
there exist multiple centers towards which earth gravitates, and thus prefigures
Newton's discovery that gravity is a property of all bodies (3-4, 8).
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"natural place" of distinct elements. The ways an entity moves and the relationships it
has are part of the definition of that entity.91
The likenesses and similitudes that inform Natural Philosophy lead Michel
Foucault to argue that sixteenth-century epistemology is one of similitude and the
seventeenth-century one ofdifference. In The Order ofThings (Les mots et les choses,
1969), Foucault observes that sixteenth-century philosophers seek out likenesses in order
to understand phenomena in the natural world whereas seventeenth-century philosophers
and scientists increasingly seek to differentiate between entities (a differentiation
facilitated by the development of dictionaries, botanical classifications, etc.). Foucault
identifies four kinds of similitudes: convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy.
Foucault's thoughts on similitudes accurately describe the interconnected, animate
universe of Renaissance naturalists. Although The Order ofThings does not recognize it,
the four forms of Foucault's similtude are different kinds of trope. Convenientia is the
similitude introduced by spatial proximity; it is this likeness-by-proximity that both
metonymy and synecdoche name.92 Aemulatio, on the other hand, is "a resemblance that
needs no contact"; it "has been freed from the law of place and is able to function,
91 Cosmological entities are defined according to their relationships and narrative history
as well. For instance, in John Maplet's Diall ofDestiny (1581), Maplet defines the
planets according to their celestial paths, mythological history, effects on people and
animals and other planets, signs, and so forth.
92 The figure of metonymy refers to one thing by its attributes or things closely associated
with it. Two ofPuttenham's examples include calling love "Venus" and "thy hands,
they made thee rich," in which hands signify labor (191). Synecdoche names a whole
by its parts or vice versa, such as referring to fifty head of cattle (where the head is
only a part ofthe whole).
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without motion, from a distance" (19). The tropes metaphor and metalepsis both assert
likeness between distinct entities, and catechresis, in particular, emphasizes this
distance.93 Foucault's analogy "superimposes" convenientia and aemulatio; in doing so,
it recognizes both the distance between entities and the degree to which one is immanent
in the other. The sixteenth-century understanding of allegory depends upon precisely this
relationship; allegory speaks both to a difference between levels and their fundamental
connection.94 Finally, sympathy, the form of resemblance in which "no path has been
determined in advance, no distance laid down, no links prescribed" (23), describes both
the category of trope in itself and, depending on one's definition, metaphor, the
fundamental trope.9S Indeed, as we shall see below, sixteenth-century theories of
metaphor were sufficiently complex and broad to categorize metaphor as sympathy.
93 Metaphor, of course, draws two things into relationship. With metalepsis, one refers to
another thing with which it is only remotely related. Puttenham's example emphasizes
the distance between the two; "Woe worth the mountain that mast bear / Which was the
first causer ofall my care," Medea is reported to lament, of the birthplace of those
ships' masts that brought Jason to her (193). Finally, catechresis refers to metaphors
that exist because of a lexical hole: one term signifies something that's not "proper" to
it; that catechresis is regularly described in terms of words occupying improper
"places" (Quintilian et al.) points up the fact that distance is the fundamental"
component ofcatechresis. We will return to the "place" of metaphor in chapter five.
94 Commonly, allegory is defined as an extended metaphor. Foucault's definition of
analogy points up the fundamental quality of sixteenth-century Protestant takes on
allegory: the inherence of a distant (Biblical) world in the present one.
9S As a category, tropes refer to a wide variety of relationships; what holds this set
together is that the relationships are all assertions of "similitude" (as Foucalt defines it,
a definition that exceeds the claims that simile makes) or of some kind of connection.
Contemporary inquiries into metaphor, including Northrop Frye's and Armin
Burkhardt's, reveal that metaphors work on a wide range of levels. Burkhardt, for
instance, notes the "mixed" metaphor (such as Noam Chomsky's "colorless green ideas
sleeping furiously").
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Although Foucault argues that sympathies and antipathies characterize a secondary,
derivative human experience of the universe, naturalists understand these likenesses to
inhere in the cosmos itself. That is, naturalists do not just think that the world-is-known
according to similitudes; rather, the cosmos is a system of relationships based on
sympathies and qualitative likenesses.96 And these likenesses are tropological. Tropes
inhere in the naturalist cosmos in the form of relationships between entities.
The cosmological relationships tropes define are precisely those to which
Merleau-Ponty's chiasm speaks. The entities they involve -- be they planets, particles of
earth, or wolves -- are distant and yet alike; they have an identity that bridges the distance
between them. For natural philosophers, trope names the relationship of qualitative
likeness in spite of distance. Metaphor offers two terms, or the similarity of at least two
cosmological entities, but undercuts the distance implied by dualism. The cosmological
relationships tropes name are precisely those we now discuss in terms of force: gravity,
magnetism, and so forth. Tropes literally have force: the force that joins (at least two)
distinct entities existing at some distance apart from one another. It is worth noting that
both "energy" and "force" describe rhetorical features hundreds of years before naming
phenomena in physics (OED). Tropes name the tensive force shared by spatiotemporally
96 Actually, in a sense, naturalists do see likeness in the universe as the foundation of
epistemology; according to Peacham, God puts metaphors in the universe so that
humans can understand. But for Peacham and natural philosophy, there remains a
likeness between the world-as-known and the world-in-itself, a linguistic (tropological)
likeness. The tropological world is still the real world.
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distinct entities.97 This is Merleau-Ponty's chiasm: tension within different parts of the
same "thing," within the trope as a unit. Tropes name the forces in a cosmos modeled on
qualitative relationships, on "likeness." The cosmos of the natural philosopher is ordered
by tropological forces between things, such that these things cannot be defined without
reference to the forces (and unity) to which it belongs. Whereas Cartesian mechanists
posit a billiard ball universe in which the impact of entities is the only possible force
between objects, natural philosophers understand the cosmos to be ordered by tropes, by
a multitude of literary forces between entities.
The idea that trope links remote things in the cosmos is a theory of rhetoric as
much as it is a physical and cosmological one. Or rather, theories of rhetoric, at this point
in time, were also theories about how the world worked. We can see this in sixteenth-
century vernacular rhetorical treatises informed by naturalism. Certain sixteenth-century
rhetoricians show a greater predilection for Renaissance naturalism than others. Thomas
Wilson and Harry Peacham, for instance, regularly draw on naturalist terminology. In his
Art ofRhetorique (1553, 1585), Wilson observes the "marriage" of the firmament and the
earth and characterizes the figure "contradition" as a "repugnancy" between terms (96).
Peacham, in his Garden ofEloquence (1577, 1593), states that "metonimia" (metonym)
97 The particular vision of trope invoked here, the "tensive" metaphor, appears in Paul
Ricoeur's The Rule ofMetaphor and Phillip Ellis Wheelwright's Metaphor and Reality.
For both authors, metaphor does not compare or blend two things or ideas; rather, it
names the tension generated by two things that attract one another yet are apart. The
focus is not on the "meaning" of the metaphor so much as on what it does and how it
is. Such theories are indebted to New Criticism for their emphasis on the force,
tension, and event/phenomenon that is metaphor.
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speaks to the "conveniencie" ofthings "nigh knit together" (19).98 Peacham makes
explicit the naturalist belief that tropes inhere in the physical world. In the midst ofa
long passage distinguishing various kinds ofmetaphor (i.e., metaphors from man to beast,
from the four elements, from men to God, and so forth), he embarks on a cosmological
lesson. He observes that
so infinite and incomprehesible is the nature ofAlmightie God, and mans
capacitie of so small a compasse, that no one attribute of God can be
conceiued by mans weake understanding without the helpe of earthly
images and naturall propertie well knowne to man, and therefore
forasmuch as mans eye cannot behold inuisible vertues, nor his
understanding able to apprehend the incomprehensible wisedome:
Almightie God ofhis goodnesse hath desribed him selfe by the most
excellent and euident letters and characters imprinted most liuely in his
creatures, not only by such as are somewhat secret, but also and most
chiefly by such as are evident and manifest to mans understanding and
knowledge. (12)
Metaphors that apply "earthy images and natural property well knowne to man" to God,
Peacham argues, provide access to otherwise "infinite and incomprehensible" attributes
98 Translating Erasmus' exhortation to a young man to marry, Wilson calls attention to the
many "marriages" in the natural world, Wilson reminds his audience that Pliny
observes "both Male and Female, in all things that the earth yeeldeth," including stones
and the "Skie or Firmament, that is euer stirring with continuall moouing: Doth it not
plaie the part of a housband, while it passeth up the earth, the mother of all things, and
make it fruitfull with casting seede?" (48).
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of God. For instance, Peacham notes the metaphoric descriptions of God as "father" and
"shepherd" indicate his "loue and tender compassion" as well as "dayly providence and
careful custodie ofhis people" (12-13). Metaphors such as "God the father" do not
simply compare human fathers and God, then, but actually inhere in the world as the
"letters and characters" that reveal God's truth.
Metaphor draws relationships between entities distant from one another in space
as well as those whose distinctness is a categorical one. Peacham, as well as many ofhis
classical predecessors, takes as self-evident the ways that metaphors assert connections
between entities "not proper" to one another (3); categories ofmetaphor include: "man"
and his "senses," "from the mind to the bodie," "from man to the brute creature," "from
things without life to things having a life," "from the foure Elements," and such (4-13).
The copia of Peacham's categories and examples gestures towards an infinitude of
possible metaphoric connections across all levels of distinction. Peacham's metaphor is
as remarkably versatile as Foucault's sympathy. What Peacham's Garden reveals is that
metaphoric sympathies are part ofthe world; they constitute the fundamental "truths" of
"God's nature," and these truths are relational in character. Foucault would have us read
Peacham's description of metaphor to indicate a larger sixteenth-century epistemology of
similitude, but for Peacham the naturalist cosmology is a tropological one. Distinct
entities share "qualitative likenesses" that produce the cosmological events we now call
"forces." These likenesses are the fundamental truths, the "invisible vertues," written into
God's nature. Naturalists inhabit a physical world literally structured by tropological
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relationships. "Words are things" not as apples are things, but as gravity and magentism
are things; tropes express the forces and interconnections between entities.
The sixteenth-century shift from what historians call Renaissance naturalism to
Cartesian mechanism redefines physical thing-ness in terms of measurability. Whereas
for Renaissance naturalists, rhetorical figures like metaphor and synecdoche inhere in the
natural world in the form of relationships between entities, mechanists dismiss the
relationships these figures name as occultish forces at a distance.99 Mechanists limit
contact to direct impact between enties defined in terms of their extension in Cartesian
space. The fundamental quality of this extension is its quantity; Cartesian quiddity is, at
its core, measurable. Although this narrative of competing visions of cosmological
quiddity reductively proposes two distinct world views, it nonetheless offers insight into
the role rhetoric plays in the period's visions of the physical world. By rejecting forces at
a distance, Cartesian mechanism dislocates trope from the physical world. Instead,
rhetoric is only part of the physical world to the extent that it can be numbered.
Rhetoricians and scientists become preoccupied with meter, rhyme, synonym and
homonym, and schemes (figures that involve changes in word order and syntax). When
we return to Puttenham's text, we find that he rejects the naturalist understanding that
trope resides in the physical world; he limits rhetorical quiddity to the ways that rhetoric
can be numbered, to its "proportions" (meter, rhythm, and rhyme scheme, etc.). Far from
99 "Force at a distance" refers to influences exerted by distant entities, in contrast to direct
impact, which mechanism requires. Such a force might include the attraction of like to
like, an attraction that, for Renaissance naturalists, accounts for the movement of earth
towards earth (a motion we now attribute to gravity).
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offering an alternative vision of the quiddity of language as de Grazia argues, then,
Puttenham actually looks forward to the non-thingness of seventeenth-century rhetoric.
This chapter's inquiry into Puttenham's Arte offers a narrative of the severance of rhetoric
from the world that was codified by the so-called Scientific Revolution. 100 Concurrent
changes in the fields of rhetoric and physics solidify a distinction between the two,
ultimately decreasing the literal (or rather "real") force and energy of rhetoric and its
tropes.
MECHANIZING RHETORIC
It is not surprising that de Grazia draws on Puttenham when she investigates Early
Modem rhetoric. Puttenham's Arte is the most popular rhetorical treatise of the period for
literary scholars because it is the first original English rhetoric. Indeed, its differences
from other rhetorical treatises of the period -- such as Peacham's and Wilson's, both of
which parrot the classical tradition -- mark the Arte as a significant text in its own right.
Puttenham is particularly interested in developing a uniquely English literary tradition; he
evaluates forefathers Chaucer and Wyatt, argues for the use of the vernacular, and
generally updates classical expectations for new, modem demands. One way Puttenham
distinguishes himself from his classical predecessors is by using a different system of
categorization. For instance, Puttenham rejects the classical division of "figure" into
"trope" (a "derivation from the ordinary or principle signification ofa word," Silva) and
100 Steven Shapin reminds us that the "Scientific Revolution never happened" (l) insofar
as it was neither a discrete event (or series of events) nor a sudden transformation in
thinking; I use the term as a convenient short hand.
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"scheme" (a "derivation from the ordinary arrangement of words"), substituting instead
the tripartite structure of "figures auricular," "figures sensible," and "figures sententious."
Puttenham also offers an entirely new category ofpoesie: "Proportions Poeticall.,,101 In
this section, he defines and characterizes the right use of stanza, meter, rhyme, rhyme
scheme, and shape poems. Puttenham is the first among his colleagues to devote an
entire book to this new category, and it constitutes a full third of his treatise.
Like his naturalistic colleagues, Puttenham assumes that natural philosophy and
rhetoric intertwine.102 However, scientific theories make their appearance exclusively in
his Book II, "On Proportions Poeticall." These proportions, absent from classical
treatises, detail the ways that verse can be numbered. Puttenham's emphasis on the
scientific nature of rhetorical "proportions" suggests that his treatise bears the traces of
nascent mechanism. Indeed, he notes that the terms "scientificke" and "mechanical/" are
101 I describe the evolution of "rhetoric" to "poesie" and ultimately to "literature" in
chapters five and six.
102 Puttenham explains that all components of the quadrivium (arithmetic, astronomy,
geometry, and music), as well as theology and rhetoric, are interrelated insofar as they
are concerned with "proportion."
It is said by such as professe the Mathematicall sciences, that all things
stand by proportion, and that without it nothing could stand to be good or
beautiful. The Doctors of our Theologie to the same effect, but in other
termes say: that God made the world by number, measure and weight:
some for weight say tune [...]. (78)
Here, the reversal between the "good and beautiful" of the "Mathematicall sciences"
and the "number, measure and weight" that "Doctors of out Theologie" discover in the
natural world reveals the degree to which Puttenham understands God's world to be
informed by mathematical regularities; that is, physical things are numerical. Math,
theology, philosophy, music, rhetoric, arithmetic and geometry: all treat "proportion
guided of the things that haue conueniencie [conveniency]," that are "near" one
another insofar as their similarity permits proportional -- that is, numerical --
comparison (78-79).
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synonyms (158). Puttenham's mechanism and insistence on a numerically-defined
universe leads Puttenham to rethink figures, particularly trope. Cartesian mechanists
understand the universe in terms ofpure extension; there is no room for "folds" in the
fabric of the universe, no such thing as force at a distance. Such folds and chiasms
become, for Puttenham, purely literary, mere trope. He dismisses trope from the real
universe using numeric terms; he writes off metaphor for its "doubleness" and
"duplicitie." Trope does not clarify the physical world but instead "deceives" the mind.
The numeric terms by which he rejects trope imply that it violates a numerically defined
mechanical universe. In particular, we shall see that, for Puttenham, trope is inconsistent
with the mechanistic law that prohibits two objects from occupying the same space at the
same time. As a consequence of this law, which is predicated on a physical world
defined by extension, the tropological force that unifies otherwise discrete objects -- the
energy of trope -- becomes exclusively mental (rather than physical). Puttenham's Arte
thus speaks to the increasingly separate trajectories ofrhetorical and the physical worlds;
this separation ultimately is codified by the developments of the Scientific Revolution.
Whereas Peacham and Wilson concentrate their inquiries into the natural world in
their sections on figure, Puttenham's explorations ofphysical law arise in the section
treating those parts of rhetoric that can be numbered (weighed, counted, timed): its
"proportions.,,103 His scientifically defined universe is characterized by quantity rather
than quality; indeed, he specifies that "God made the world by number, measure and
103 In this sense, Puttenham looks forward to Johannes Kepler's preoccupation with the
"harmonies" between planets and the ratios that describe the universe.
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weight" (78). It is in this emphasis on number as the fundamental measure of the
physical world that mechanism shows its influence on the Arte. 104 As science historian
Allen Debus notes, mechanism is one means by which mathematics, or number,
colonizes the natural world (8-9). To quote Descartes, the "laws ofmechanics, which are
the same as laws of nature" (31), describe a world of extension in which number is the
fundamental measure. There can be no fold in the field of extension. It is numerically
impossible. As Puttenham brings mechanism and extension to the rhetorical world, trope
comes to indicate a "duplicitous," merely linguistic category of speech rather than a
tensive fold in the real world.
Puttenham's interests in science come to the forefront in his mathematical Book II
"On Proportions Poetical!." Invoking the contemporary theory of gravity, he explains:
104 Granted, mathematics had been a tool for understanding the cosmos and rhetoric for
well over a thousand years. Geometry, for instance, expresses the relationships
between heavenly spheres. Johannes Kepler, writing at the turn of the seventeenth
century, is best known for his preoccupation with the numeric "harmonies" exhibited
by the variations of a planet's orbit and the relationships between planetary orbits. His
interest in the "harmonies" between geometric ratios arises from his belief that
quantitative harmony is the purest expression of God (Holton 349). Indeed, Kepler
observes that "God's reasons" are geometric (Harmonies 221). But the development
of what would become Cartesian mechanism reconfigures the mathematically
described world in a way that diminishes the local relationships fundamental to
Renaissance naturalism. Galileo's and Kepler's scientific "advancements" make long
strides in replacing an animate system with a mechanical, heliocentric system that
cannot conceive of force at a distance. Kepler, for instance, explicitly rejects
natllr~11'"ill uThpn hl'S sef'rmrl erliti"n of' 'l/f"sfov;1Jm rn{'monvrrnh;~1Jmf1 h') 1\ "A...1""A" fl.A
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"anima motrix" (animistic soul) of his first edition (1596) with "vis" (force). He also
applies celestial mechanics to the earth, universalizing mathematical rules. Most
notably, Galileo's unique approach of treating motion separately from entities disallows
the qualities that were the explanatory forces for naturalism's force at a distance.
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[T]o that which was highest lift up and most eleuate or shrillest in the
eare, they [the Greeks] gaue the name ofthe sharpe accent, to the lowest
and most base because it seemed to fall downe rather than to rise up, they
gaue the name of the heauy accent [...]. Then because euery thing that by
nature fals doen [down] is said heauy, and whatsoeuer naturally mounts
upward is said light, it gaue occasion to say that there were diuersities in
the motion of the voice, as swift and slow, which motion also presupposes
tyme. (91-92)
In this segment, Puttenham does not debate the scientific theories as to why gravity
works; in a passage naturalistic for its emphasis on qualities ("heauy," "light"), he simply
remarks that the human voice follows the same principles of movement as physical
objects. Betraying his mechanistic tendencies, however, are Puttenham's emphases on
the numeric qualities of "accent" -- weight, speed, and time. His treatment of rhythm is
also preoccupied with number: he underscores the weight and speed of what he calls
"measure" and "numerositie" (90-91). Rhythm is "high or low, or sharpe or flat, or swift
or slow" (90-91). In fact, the rhetorical sense of "numerositie" begins with Puttenham's
Arte (OED 1).
When we return to the passage on which de Grazia bases her argument that
sixteenth-century words are palpable (and therefore, she argues, "things"), we discover
that the "palpability" she identifies derives from rhetoric's numeric qualities. In the
passage, Puttenham treats rhetoric as palpable, as a sensible entity in the physical world,
only insofar as it is an object of measure. Puttenham notes that "iust and reasonable
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measure" produces a persuasive tale; he concludes that "the minde [is] no lesse
vanquished with large 10ade of speech, than the limes [limbs] are with heauie burden"
(207). De Grazia reads the "heauie burden" of a "large loade of speech" to signal the
quiddity of sixteenth-century words. But Puttenham does not suggest the palpability of
words in toto; rather, weighty words are those that have "measure." (By "measure,"
Puttenham refers most immediately to decorum, but this moral concept is enmeshed in
theories of meter and mathematics. !Os) De Grazia is right to observe that Puttenham
illustrates a tradition in which "words are things," but this tradition is distinct from the
earlier, figurative tradition to which Peacham and Wilson speak. The Arte specifically
rejects those rhetorical components (e.g. trope) that, for Peacham and Wilson, constitute a
meaningful inherence of rhetoric in the world; only those rhetorical dimensions that have
"numerositie" are part of Puttenham's mechanistic world. For him, words are things, that
is, they follow physical law, only to the degree that they can be measured. His
conception of words (or their proportions) as palpable things of nature derives from their
numerical properties, their weight and speed. Rather than offering an alternative to
seventeenth century views on linguistic quiddity, as de Grazia claims, Puttenham
represents an important step in the separation of rhetoric (which would come to be
limited to figure with the spread of Ramism) from the "real" world. 106
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and Form in Early Modern England."
106 Frenchman Petrus Ramus renovated the fields oflogic and rhetoric by moving three of
the five classical categories of rhetoric (invention, disposition, and memory) to logic
and limiting rhetoric to elocution (primarily figure) and pronunciation. Ramus
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Puttenham's self-declared "mechanicall" science, which manifests for him as a
new attention to "proportion," shapes his treatment of trope. He emphasizes that trope is
a departure from reality rather than fundamental to its processes. For him, trope is
violent, dark, and dishonest. In specific, metaphor is "guilefull and abusing," and
allegory is "a duplicitie of meaning or dissimulation vnder couert [covert] darke
intendments" (166).107 Metaphor, the epitome oftrope, holds a special place in his
loathing; it is "not [...] naturall" (189), but a "wresting" together of two distinct
meanings. The sympathetic attraction that naturalist trope names becomes, for
Puttenham, a kind ofviolence. He finds trope fundamentally "improper" because it is
deceptive by nature; it is "occupied of purpose to deceiue the minde, drawing it from
plainnesse and simplicitie to a certain doublenesse" (166). His emphasis Oll metaphor's
"darkness" and obscurity reveals a fundamental difference between his metaphor and
Wilson's and Peacham's. Puttenham's metaphor conceals the truth whereas Peacham and
Wilson emphasize the ability oftrope to reveal the created world. Peacham observes
that, because nature is populated by things "resembl[ing]" one another, trope is a means
by which "matters are well expressed, their meanings more largely uttered"; sometimes,
without trope, the poet "could not declare the nature of the thing so well" (2). Tropes
make "visible" the truths in God's Book ofNature; without tropes, we could not observe
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after the turn of the century. Walter Dng remains the authority on Ramism.
107 Tropes and other "gileful" figures are the choice tools of Machivellian, conniving
courtiers, "scholemen," and other rhetorically-gifted dissemblers.
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the truth of the universe. 108 Like Peacham, Wilson notes that tropes can lend clarity
where literal language cannot. He observes that, in some cases, "the whole matter
seemeth by similitude to be opened" (156 [rnisnumbered; 174]). For naturalists,
metaphor produces a "large[r]" understanding; it "open[s]" the "nature" of a thing. But
Puttenham's trope, on the other hand, merely "darken[s]" reality; Puttenham's trope is
equivocal, ambiguous, and duplicitious. lo9
The specific language by which Puttenham condemns figure and trope -- his
accusations of their "doubleness" and "duplicitie" -- suggests that that the fundamental
problem with trope is that it troubles numeric consistency. He beseeches his readers to
construct decorous figures by "keeping measure" (167); he commends the "poetical
science" above the "foul indecencie or disproportion" of hack poets. But as much as
Puttenham desires a measured metaphor that keeps proportion with the physical world, he
accepts the impossibility of such a venture. He urges that metaphors not be used in
venues concerned with truth, such as, in his example, a court of law. Metaphors,
"illusions to the minde, and wresters ofvpright iudgement, [...}make the iudges
affectioned," and they are as improper "as if a carpenter before he began to square his
timber would make his squire [square?] crooked" (166). In this simile, the reality with
108 Peacham and Wilson remark that figures help us to know the world. This is not to say
that similitudes are merely epistemological tools. Rather, they are the very
"characters" of the cosmos. Similitudes help us to read the cosmos because it is
funrl"m""nta11" l~nn-"~"1-~~L uu .1 \",1'.1 .1.1).1.1 l:)U.l"::) Ll\..l.
109 Although, by necessity, Puttenham's treatise includes a wealth of "acceptable" figures,
these too. become figures of "vice" if they are used incorrectly (and there is a plethora
ofways to misuse them).
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which a judge should be concerned is the timber and the metaphor the crooked
carpenter's tool. The problem with the square is not simply that it is crooked and
therefore unable to measure properly. Because the square is the tool against which
mismeasure is to be identified, the very basis for measure fails in metaphor. "True" and
"false" no longer apply when the tool to gauge verity, the ideal yardstick that defines all
other yardsticks as being the proper length, is out ofmeasure. It is not simply that trope
is numerically irregular in terms of being "crooked" or "false," then; Puttenham suggests
that trope violates rhetorical mechanism by destabilizing the numerical system itself.
Puttenham's preoccupation with metaphor's "violence," as suggested by his
remark that metaphors "wrest" the mind, helps to clarify how trope violates a
mechanistic, numeric universe: it asserts force at a distance and links two distant,
separate entities. He regularly emphasizes figures' violence. For instance, he tells the
story of an Orator from Egypt who convinced the multitude to. commit suicide "by the
force of perswasion: and ifperswasions were not very violent, to the minde ofman it
could not have wrought so strange an effect" (153). Puttenham figures the "violent"
"force ofpersuasion" as a literal chain; Hercules, he notes, reported seeing "figured a
lustie old man with a long chayne tyed by one end at his tong, by the other end a the
peoples eares, who stood a farre of [off] and seemed fastned to his tong, as who would
say, by force ofhis perswasions" (154). The example of Hercules is not unique to
Puttenham's treatise; Wilson includes it as well, and the story has classical roots. Wilson
notes the story in the preface to his Arte titled "ELOQUENCE FIRST giuen by God, and
after lost by man, and last repayred, by God againe": "Hercules, being a man of great
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wisedome, had all men lincked together by the eares in a chain, to drawe them and leade
them euen as he lusted" (n.p.).110 The most significant difference between Wilson's and
Puttenham's versions is that Wilson emphasizes the divine nature of eloquence whereas
Puttenham stresses its violence. Specifically, Puttenham emphasizes that eloquent
violence bridges the distance that should otherwise keep men safe from harm. Both
Wilson and Puttenham characterize Hercules' voice as a "chain," but Puttenham specifies
that it links men "who stood a farre of [off]." The violence that characterizes elocutio
(which is primarily figure) is a product of figure's ability to violate the mechanical law
that prohibits force at a distance. Descartes, we must remember, restricts force to direct
contact or impact. There is no such thing as force at a distance. Gravity, for instance,
was determined by vortexes of particles surrounding a celestial entity; and Descartes
explains magnetism as the effect of tiny screw holes threaded one way or the other, thus
accepting different "threaded" charges. In a mechanistic world, force requires direct
impact by particles whereas for Renaissance naturalists, qualitative forces produced folds
in the fabric of the cosmos.
The problem is that trope works at a distance by collapsing that distance in what I
have been calling a fold. Or, rather, tropes name folds in the world that disregard
110 Similarly, Henry Peacham notes that, through amplification, the Orator
prevaile[s] much in the drawing the mindes ofhis hearers to his owen will
and affection: he may winde them from their former opinions, and quite
alter the fonner state of their mindes; he may moue them to be ofhis side,
to holde with him, to be led by him [...] and finally to be subject to the
power of his speech whither soeuer it tendeth. (121)
As with Wilson's Hercules, Peacham's Orator "draw[s]" his listeners; unlike
Puttenham's, Peacham's persuasion is not "violent"; rather it "moue[s]," "holde[s]" and
"le[a]d[s]" men.
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distance. When we accept that distant planets affect one another through naturalist
"sympathies" and "attractions," we must reconsider what "distance" means since it does
not seem to obtain in a world defined by sympathies. On one hand, planets are distant
from one another, but on another hand, their qualitative connections eliminate distance
and challenge the notion that such planets are discrete. At the same time that figures
violate the mechanist elimination of force at a distance, then, they also violate the law
that prohibits two discrete entities from occupying the same place at the same time. III
Puttenham's treatment of synonym plays out the implications of the phyiscallaw
prohibiting coincident entities on figure. For Puttenham, synonym is the only "proper"
figure because all other figures wrench words from their proper places and superimpose
them. Puttenham notes that the term "mechanicalI [ ... ] answereth" the word "scientifique
[... ], which no word could have done so properly, for when hee ["th'author in this
present treatise"] spake of all artificers which rest either in science or in handy craft, it
followed necessarilie that scientifique should be coupled with mechanicall: or else neither
of both to haue been allowed, but in their places" (158). Only synonyms share the same
"place"; all other figures draw together words that have their own, separate places.
Proper synonyms (rather than "inkhome" -- foreign or intellectually presumptious --
ones) literally are the same thing in that they do not require separate places. (We will
return to ways Early Modem authors work out the places of rhetoric and literature in
chapter five.) In his treatment of sinonimia, Puttenham notes that synonyms have "one
III Cf. Edward Casey (FP 152) on Descartes' contributions to the theory of coincident
entities.
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effect" and one meaning (223). Puttenham anglicizes the Greek term as "the Figure of
store" "because plenty of one manner of thing in our vulgar language we call so";
synonyms "are in sense all one." Puttenham condenses the multitude, the "plenty" of
synonyms, into a singular "one." And this "one" constitutes the only "proper" figure
because it does not violate the law restricting different entities (words, concepts) to their
individual places.
It is not simply that metaphor is "crooked," then, because even crookedness can
be measured. Rather, Puttenham's Arte suggests that trope disrupts mechanistic
numbering systems altogether in that it introduces a kind of "doubleness." Tropological
"doubleness" is not the concrete, countable metric doubleness that produces an iamb,
spondee, or any other kind of "proportion poeticall"; rather, the "doubleness" of trope is
its "duplicity": the ability of trope to bring together different, distant things, to say
multiple things at the same time, to lie and tell the truth at the same time, to turn language
against itself. For Puttenham, tropological "doubleness" signals linguistic equivocation,
which is dialectically opposed to the physical world of pure extension.
For all of its scientific, mathematical claims, Book II has a peculiar ending: two
fables about linguistic equivocation and ambiguity. In the first tale, Polemon accepts a
royal reward for his services to the King; in the second, the Rattlemouse (or bat) escapes
being drawn into the war between the fowls and four-footed beasts by being a convincing
orator. The tales reveal Puttenham's unease about the duplicity of language, specifically
127
the linguistic capacity for equivocation. 112 Both Polemon and the Rattlemouse succeed
because of the slipperiness of language, because they master the linguistic "trick" of
equivocation.
The Rattlemouse escapes from having to take sides in the war between the four-
footed beasts and the birds by claiming the opposite allegiance requested of him; he both
"excused himselfe for that he was a foule and flew with winges," and he "said he was a
foure footed beast" (148). The bat appears to be a warm-blooded mammal at the same
time that he flies like a bird, and his ability to say two apparently mutually exclusive but
equally true things (that he is a bird and that he is a beast) allows him to trick his
companions and escape battle. Here, equivocation arises because categorical distinctions
meant to distinguish between beasts (with no left-over) fail to obtain.H3 Thus the bat
avoids his duty.
In the second story, Polemon interprets an oracle to mean that his daughter will
find favor with the King; he sends her to court and is rewarded. Puttenham notes,
however, that "hosoeuer [howsoever] the oracle had been construed, he could not have
receiued blame nor discredit by the success, for euery wais [ways] it would have proued
[proved] true" (147). Because the oracle equivocates -- that is, it can be interpreted a
III These stories, examples of what Marcy L. North has identified as Puttenham's
repeated bids for patronage, can he interpreted to establish his rhetorical mastery. But
these stories are also consistently anxious about linguistic equivocation.
l13 In the coda of this dissertation, we will return to the ways that categorization changes
in Early Modem rhetoric, logic, botany, and zoology affect the ways that language
works in the world, or out of it.
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number of mutually exclusive ways -- it offers a number ofmutually exclusive truths and
yet claims to tell the truth.
Your best way to worke -- and marke my words well,
Not money: nor many,
Nor any: but any,
Not weemen [women}, but weemen beare the bell (147)
This cryptic remark could be interpreted to mean that not many will find favor with the
king, nor just anyone, but one of the multitude might (not "weemen" but a woman), or
maybe "any" woman might. This interpretive multiplicity covers all possible outcomes.
The oracle calls attention to the multiplicity and numeric inconsistency at the
heart ofPuttenham's sense oftropological equivocationy4 The oracle's indeterminacy is
specifically a numeric one -- it is unclear how many women, or which one, will find favor
with the king. Moreover, the oracle's specific figures call attention to the numerical flux
that marks Puttenham-esque equivocation. Aphaeresis (omitting the first letter) changes
"many" to "any"; antisthecon (substituting letters) changes "money" to "many"; and
epanalepsis (repetition) produces the second "any" (whose referent is different from the
first). The oracle's equivocation is coded as the failure of quantities to solidify into
determinate numbers; this failure results from the instabilities that the passage's figures
introduce.
114 The oracle is a fine example of the "darkness" the characterizes Puttenham's trope.
Indeed, "Enigma" ("the riddle") is a means by which "we dissemble againe vnder
couert and darke speeches" (198).
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In his treatment of the figure antanaclasis, or "the rebound," Puttenham attempts
to explain equivocation in mechanistic terms; the ways he fails clarify how tropological
equivocation violates his science. Antanaclasis is the "repetition of a word or phrase
whose meaning changes in the second instance" (Silva). As such, equivocation is a form
ofhomonym. As an example, Puttenham offers: "To prayfor you euer I cannot refuse, /
To pray upon you I shouldyou much abuse" (216).115 Figural equivocation lies truly; it
prays at the same time that it prays [preys]y6 Puttenham explains antanaclasis thus: the
rebound "allud[es] to the tennis ball, which being smitten with the racket rebounded back
againe [...]; this [figure] playeth with one word written all alike but carrying diuers
senses" (216). The tennis ball (word) changes its trajectory (meaning) as it deflects off
another object (word, syntax); by this definition, the multiple sense of "pray" is entirely
unproblematic -- meaning simply changes over time. I 17 But Puttenham's confusing
statement that antanaclasis is "one word written all alike" reveals his difficulty adapting
equivocation to the numeric system that underlies mechanism. "Alike" suggests a
comparison of at least two terms, but his metaphor offers only "one word" (or ball). This
115 Note that, because spelling had not yet been regularized (it would be some years
before the creation of the first English dictionary), spelling "prey" as "pray" is not a
mistake.
116 Such religious connotations can only remind Puttenham's readers of the damnable
Jesuits lying truly in order to protect their own. As Christopher Devlin illustrates in
The Life ofRobert Southwell: poet and martyr (1956), some Catholics were instructed
to use equivocation when questioned about hiding priests in their homes in order to
escape having to sin fu~d tell a lie.
117 As spelling becomes standardized in the seventeenth century, this change in meaning
is reflected in a difference in spelling: the homonym becomes a homophone. This
transition also reflects the shift from an oral to a written culture.
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definition is numerically inconsistent; Puttenham's metaphor explains equivocation as a
single word that travels through time, but "alike" reveals the multiplicity this trajectory
attempts to hide at the same time that "one word" resists such temporalization. The word
means two (or more) things at the same time, but Puttenham tries to excuse this
equivocation with a temporal example. The temporal arc by which Puttenham attempts
to regularize equivocal duplicity into straightforward singularity helps us to understand
equivocation's doubleness as a problem of temporality -- that is, such temporality is
missing from an equivocal statement. Unfortunately for Puttenham, equivocation offers
multiple meanings at the same time; indeed, the only way that the oracle becomes
unequivocal is with the passage of time that reveals, or, more precisely, constitutes the
oracle's truth. The duplicity oftropological equivocation, it appears, is not simply that
tropes lie; rather, tropes exhibit "doubleness," violate the numeric terms of the physical
world, to the extent that they equivocate by locating two (or more) things in the same
place at the same time through a distance-bridging force.
(DIS-)COUNTING THE FORCE OF FIGURE
The "force" of figure is not simply a pun on the violence Puttenham identifies
with figure. Rather, it speaks to the real energy that naturalist tropes possess (by virtue of
chiasmatic relationships) and to the "metaphoric," merely imaginary energy trope has for
Puttenham. For Renaissance naturalists, forces between entities are structured
tropologically. For Puttenham, the force of trope is limited to its persuasive power and to
the violence it does to otherwise discrete, different things. There is a long history of
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talking about trope in terms of force and energy. Before the term "energy" migrated into
physics in the nineteenth century to name "the power of doing work possessed by a body
in virtue of the stresses which result from its position relatively to other bodies" (OED 6),
energy referred to the "force or vigor" of rhetorical expressions (l). For Aristotle, Cicero,
Quintilian, and later writers, enargia is the "vivid," "animate" "actuality" produced by
rhetorical figures.
Traditionally, enargia is associated with sight; it refers to the lively, visual
descriptions that figures (especially metaphors) can produce. It is not to be confused with
energia, "a general term referring to the 'energy' or vigor of an expression" (Silva). The
difference between energia and enargia is twofold: enargia has stronger visual
associations and an attendant emphasis on actuality. Aristotle regularly uses the term
enarges (e)nargh/v) to signal vividness (Poetics 1462a, 1455a) and explicit, clear activity
(Nicomachean Ethics 1095a, 1097b, 1145b, 1173a, 1179a). In the Odyssey, Homer
invokes enargia when describing the awesome appearance of gods, such as when Athena
appears to Penelope (4.841, 8.77). This vivid visuality signals animate actuality;
Aristotle notes that the objects in Homer's metaphors, "appear to be alive because they
are moving [e)nergou=nta]" (Rhetoric III.xi.3).118 Hundreds of years later, such energetic
actuality is a primary goal of Tudor rhetoricians. Although English rhetoricians rarely
use the term, critics remark nonetheless that enargia is "the supreme excellence of
118 Aristotle cites examples such as "[the spears] were set in the ground, longing to gorge
themselves with flesh" (II. 11.574) and "eager, the spear point darted through his
chest" (II. 15.541) (Rhetoric III.xi.3). All translations of Greek texts in this chapter are
Britta Spann's.
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Elizabethan dramatists" (Doran 242) and praise Spenser, Sidney, and Dryden, among
others, for their poetic and prosaic enargia (Thompson, Dundas, and Benson
respectively). English rhetoricians such as Peacham, Wilson, Sidney, and Puttenham
regularly use enargic qualities such as light, color, and motion when describing tropes.
Italian Giraldi Cinthio exemplifies the early modem emphasis on the visual nature of
enargia when he remarks in his sixteenth century Discorso intorno al comporre dei
romani that enargia "[resides] in putting the thing clearly and effectively before the
reader's eyes" (135). Consistently, rhetorical energy or enargia signals vivid liveliness
and animate actuality; it is the power of figures to make an image seem to appear in front
ofusy9 Enargia names the degree to which trope is actual, an actuality to which bodily
senses testify.
From Aristotle onward, enargia characterizes a vibrant, vivid, figural image that
seems to take place before our eyes. The energy of a text is a function of the rhetorical
relationships its figures name; enargia makes a scene so actual that readers bear witness
to it with their senses. Puttenham, however, transposes enargia and its cousin energia, a
curiosity that has long plagued critics. For him, the near-homophones enargia and
energia, which crystalize tropological equivocation, figure trope's departure from the
mechanistic world and its relocation in a distinctly mental one. 120 In essence, Puttenham
119 Early modem rhetoricians are far more likely to emphasize the visual components of
enargia than are their classical counterparts, a change I attribute to the shift from an
oral to written culture.
120 The distinction that I draw here between the material and mental worlds, and
elsewhere between the physical and social worlds, should not be taken to ignore the
long critical history that troubles such categorical divisions.
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associates the energy of trope with mental activity in explicit opposition to bodily
experience, effectively removing tropological energy from the physical world and instead
identifying it as a product of cognition and of meaning. Not only does his transposition
speak to the division between body and mind upon which Descartes would so famously
insist, but it also speaks to a consequence ofhis dislocating figure from the physical
world: the energy generated by equivocation and named by trope no longer signals a
personal experience of rhetorical presence; instead, it indicates merely an intellectual
engagement with meaningful words.
In contrast to his classical predecessors, Puttenham shifts enargia to scheme and
energia to trope. At first, it seems that he merely transposes enargia with its cousin
energia. Energia (e)ne/rgeia) is a classical term for lively writing in general; it is not
specific to figures and does not denote visuality. Puttenham describes enargic figures as
those that "satisfie and delight th'eare." Energia, on the other hand, characterizes those
figures "inwardly working a stirre to the mind" (155). Mistakingly identifying enargia
with the ear, rather than the eye, seems to be a small oversight. Claud A. Thompson
observes that "there is some confusion and conflation of the two terms in later [Early
Modern] rhetoricians and critics," and so he implies that Puttenham simply exemplifies
the Early Modern "conflation" of the two terms (24).
However, Puttenham does not merely switch the two terms; his treatment of
energia and enargia newly emphasizes distinctions between bodily senses and between
physical and mental work. Unlike classical rhetoricians, who divide figures between
schemes and tropes, Puttenham classifies figures as either enargic or energic. Near the
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beginning of Book III, he observes that "ornament Poeticall is of two sortes" (155); one
sort of figure serves
to satisfie and delight th'eare onely by a goodly outward shew [show] set
vpon the matter with wordes, and speaches smoothly and tunably running,
another by certaine intendments or sense of such wordes and speeches
inwardly working a stirre to the mind: that first qualitie [figure] the Greeks
called Enargia ofthis word argos, because it giueth a glorious luster and
light. This latter [figure] they called Energia of ergon, because it wrought
with a strong and virtuous operation.
Energic and enargic figures are divided further into three categories. Some figures "serue
[serve] th'eare onely, some serue the conceit onely, and not th'eare," and a third category
serves both the ear and the "conceit" (or "minde.") For Puttenham, enargia stimulates the
ear and the eye; these he calls "auricular figures." Energia, in contrast, characterizes
those figures that affect the mind -- "figures sensible" (that affect the mind only) and
"figures sententious" (that affect both the mind and the ear). By and large, Puttenham
classifies schemes as auricular figures and tropes as figures sensible and figures
sententious, although he does include a few more complicated schemes in the category of
figures sententious. As energic, tropes are primarily mental.
For Puttenham, schemes are the "actual" figures the body registers; schemes alone
belong to the physical world, the world of mechanistic science. He reiterates the actuality
of schemes by describing them in numeric, mechanistic terms. He alleges that the
ancients called schemes "numerositie," and he classifies schemes according to different
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kinds of "proportions" including "tune and harmonie and meter" (173), "order" (175),
"repetition, and iteration" (183). That his numeric schemes are enargic is consistent with
his sense that only those poetic proportions that can be numbered reside in the "actual"
world described by physical laws. The "numerositie" of schemes locates them in the
world ofphysical, mechanistic objects that alone evince sensory qualities -- enargic
aliveness. The rhetorical objects that count are those which are sensible, palpable.
Weight, speed, the motion of pictures: these alone are measured as things in the world.
No longer consisting ofenargic liveliness and the vividness of actual encounters,
Puttenham's trope is markedly distant from the physical world. Tropes are energic, and
he defines energia in terms of mental work, of thought. By classifying tropes under
energia and limiting sensory experience to enargia, Puttenham eliminates the sensory
valence oftrope and makes it a figure of the "conceit" or "minde" (155).121 Trope's
(actual) sense has become its (meaning) sense. For him, tropological equivocation no
longer figures the actual force that appears at the relational intersection of otherwise
distant entities (and between humans and texts); rather, tropes have energia or a general
sense of "efficacy" because of the mental work they stimulate.
Although it appears to be a small transposition of a single vowel, Puttenham's
treatment of energia and enargia speaks to the mechanistic science that structures his
rhetoric. The energy of trope, the force it constitutes, becomes mental. No longer a
tension and relationship, trope is reduced to meaning (and a troubled, equivocal meaning
121 Thus, we can see that the distance between the physical and mental worlds, develops
in new ways with the shift to Renaissance mechanism.
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at that). Trope is not actual in a phenomenological way but rather in a strictly intellectual
way. For earlier rhetoricians, the force of trope includes the fundamental relationships
between entities, relationships based on an inherent likeness that acts regardless of
distance. The unity or relationship of the cosmological entities obtained even though the
entities were distant. Metaphor was a statement of unity within distance and difference.
With Puttenham and numeric mechanism, however, distant things remain distant and
disjointed. Metaphor might "force" them together through comparison, but otherwise the
two are distinct entities. The force between them is no longer actual; it is merely figural.
As the universe is defined as extension that can be plotted on a Cartesian graph, distant
entities no longer have a unifying force; impact is the only force permissible in the
Cartesian universe. The universe is defined according to numeric plots, points on a grid.
It can be measured. Figure, however, cannot. It is inherently crooked, duplicitous. It
doubles the world back upon itself in a "comparison" (metaphor) that is, by definition,
improper (more on this later). Parts of rhetoric can be counted: meter, rhythm and the
like evince the numeric regularity that describes Puttenham's mechanistic world. But
figure becomes the merely linguistic doubling of equivocation. (In chapters five and six,
we trace out the implications of the increasing identification of equivocation with lying
and fiction.) The chiasm, the fold that depends upon identity in distance, cannot obtain in
a universe defined as pure extension.
Philip Sidney, the only English rhetorician besides Puttenham who uses the term
explicitly, characterizes enargia as a force; he notes that "certaine swelling phrases"
demonstrate "forciblenesse or Energia" (I3r). Such force and energy had long indicated
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the "actuality" oftrope, figure, and even rhetoric itself. But the shift from natural
philosophy to mechanism limits what is actual to what is measurable. Trope becomes
unnatural and deceitful because it evinces two forces eliminated by mechanistic science:
force at a distance and the tensive energy of two things occupying the same space at the
same time, an energy produced by equivocation. (Curiously, Early Modem
understandings of metaphor and other tropes in terms of force and energy help to clarify
what was right about New Critcism; both LA. Richards and William Wimsatt, for
example, understand metaphor to create "tension.") Puttenham shifts the actuality of
rhetoric from trope to proportions (scheme, meter, and so on), to those things that can be
numbered. The rhetorical objects that count are those that are sensible, palpable,
measurable. Puttenham's rejection of trope and the energy it figures from the physical
world is consistent with mechanistic philosophy's gradual disassociation of matter from
movement, forces, and relationships (particles have no inherent force or relationship with
each other; they simply react to the impact of other anonymous particles).122 As
movement is no longer an essential part of the cosmological entity, the tensions and
forces trope names become merely figurative.
Puttenham's rejection of trope and its energy from the physical world is consistent
with mechanistic philosophy's gradual disassociation of matter from movement, forces,
122 Galileo argues that bodies are indifferent to motion and thus separates "motion from
the essential nature of bodies" (Westfall 19); Descartes, and eventually Robert Boyle,
characterize mechanical philosophy as an investigation into matter and motion.
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and relationships.123 For Renaissance naturalists, "matter" is bound up in systems of
tropological influences and relationships that account for cosmological movement. For
Puttenham's colleagues, "words are things" to the extent that tropological structures
inhere in the physical world. But for Puttenham, "a word is a thing" insofar as accent,
meter, rhyme, and scheme are things that follow mechanistic, numeric laws. Rather than
presenting an alternative to seventeenth-century ways of thinking about language
linguistic quiddity, then, Puttenham actually looks forward to the linguistic changes de
Grazia locates in the seventeenth century. By the second half of the seventeenth century,
language is, ideally, a transparent reflection of an extralinguistic world. As Foucault
notes, "instead ofexisting as the material writing of things, [language] was to find its area
of being restricted to the general organization of representative signs" (42). Robert
Watson's recent Back to Nature provides one narrative of the tum away from words and
to the world; he argues that, in the Early Modem period, truth "departed on its amazing
modem itinerary [...] from meaning to matter" (20), from language to the physical
world.124 Indeed, the scientifically defined physical world becomes a source of truth in
new ways in the seventeenth century. Watson's inquiry into linguistic meaning and his
123 Galileo argues that bodies are indifferent to motion and thus separates "motion from
the essential nature of bodies" (Westfall 19); Descartes, and eventually Robert Boyle,
characterize mechanical philosophy as an investigation into matter and motion, two
separate things.
124 Such an epistemological shift informs, for instance, Francis Bacon's claim that
language is one of the four "idols" that muddy our perception ofreality. Watson
identifies a number of agents responsible for this shift: "[U]rbanization, capitalism,
new technologies, and the Protestant Reformation each contributed to anxieties about
mediation and the lost sensual past" and "focused and magnified" "nostalgia for
unrnediated contact with the world of nature" (5).
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emphasis on epistemology lead him to assume a distinction between "language and the
physical world"; but we have seen here that sixteenth-century words are more complex
than mere carriers of truth or meaning. Certain linguistic structures -- tropes -- inhere in
the world as the forceful, energetic relationships between distinct entities. Such
tropological force is actual for earlier rhetoricians; it is the life of the universe. But with
the mechanistic emphasis on "counting," on seeking numerical and meaningful
equivalences, tropes become mental representations, preoccupied with meaning, and
distinct from the actual world. The "trope" or "doubleness" of seventeenth-century
language is the degree to which it reflects the world. 125 As a mirror, language is distinct
from that which it reflects -- the physical world. Language reflects a billiard ball world
of extension and impact, but that "reflection" is not governed by rules of physics. No
longer part of the physical world, language loses its quiddity by the time of the Scientific
Revolution, a movement that not only sought to eliminate synonyms and homonyms, to
standardize spelling, and to regularize dictionaries, but also worked to establish a
universal language untainted by connotation (cf. Sprat's History o/the Royal Society,
1667). This seventeenth-century tradition, which dissolves "the profound kinship of
language with the world" (Foucault 43), grounds modem day ecocritical assumptions
about the relationship between language and the world, an assumption that Watson and
de Grazia duplicate.
125 As Shakespeare's Hamlet notes, drama "holds the mirror up to nature" (3.2.20).
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CHAPTER V
THE GEOGRAPHY OF FICTION FROM MORE'S UTOPIA TO SIDNEY'S DEFENSE
OF POESY
Thomas More's Utopia (1516/1518) is a problem for many reasons. In her
introduction to Three Modern Utopias (1999), Susan Bruce asks: Why does Utopia try to
convince its readers of its truth? Why present ideals in fictional narrative? (xi) Michael
McKeon notes of Utopia a fundamental "uncertainty about how to separate 'fact' from
'fiction,' 'true lives,' from 'romance,' 'history' from 'literature'" (Bruce xv, McKeon 20-22).
And Stephen Greenblatt reads Utopia to emphasize the self-contradictions More is forced
to live out as a courtier negotiating deadly political situations (Self-Fashioning, 1980).
Indeed, the text calls attention to its own problematics. Not least of which is Hythloday's
praise of Utopia's "few laws" (195), which is subsequently by details such as the fact that
Utopians' clothing and table places are all legislated. The message of the book is equally
confounding: which opinions are we supposed to think are More's own, and, if Utopia
utterly fails to describe the free society More desires, then what are the solutions for the
social problems the text so poignantly diagnoses?
For Utopia, these problems are also rhetorical; the primary figures in the text are
irony and litotes. Both of these figures are an example oflanguage "turning" against
itself (recall that "to trope" also means "to turn"). Each says -- or does -- something more
than what it says constatively. The text folds over on itself in a declaration of self-
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difference. The names in Utopia highlight the self-difference of irony; the More in the
book is not the author exactly, "Hythloday" means speaker of nonsense, the Abraxa River
is the river "without water," and so forth. Each name is an example of crystallized irony:
self-contradiction. For Utopia, self-contradiction is ultimately a question officticity;
irony is the means by which More diagnoses fiction. By fiction, however, More does not
mean something unreal. Steven Greenblatt observes that, since he too had to act roles in
his life, "the category of the real merges with that of the fictive" (31) for More. Utopia
provides an early look at the developing genre that would come to be called prose fiction.
The text's inquiry into irony reveals that fiction is not unreal; it takes place through
rhetorical figures of self-difference like irony.
The text explicitly inquires into the place of Utopia; the very name of the book
suggests that the text is "no place" or maybe "the best place." The letters appended to
some of the early editions continue the joke and examine the place of Utopia (and
Utopia) in geographic terms. Writing to Thomas Lupset, William Bude remarks that "I
personally, however, have made investigation and discerned for certain that Utopia lies
outside the limits of the known world. Undoubtedly it is one of the Fortunate Isles,
perhaps close to the Elysian Fields, for More himselftestifies that Hythlodaeus has not
yet stated its position by giving its definite bearings" (13).126 Bude's reference to the
Elysian Fields emphasizes the myth-like place of Utopia; but Bude also notes that Utopia
126 This letter appears in the March 1518 (Basel) edition ofthe text. This edition "appears
to be the last edition in which More is likely ever to have a direct hand" (Surtz
clxxxvii). For more on the editions and the epistolary apparatus associated with each,
see Edward Surtz' "Editions of Utopia" in the Yale.
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should appear on a map and in the world to which "definite bearings" apply. It does not,
however, because More is unsure of the coordinates. Giles remarks that "More's
difficulty about the geographical position of the island" is due to a whisper and cough
having interrupted the dialogue in which this information is conveyed (23). The ways
that fiction, as irony, engages geography and cartography are emphatically linguistic, and
problematically so, as the interrupting whisper (an obsfucating utterance) illustrates.
Peter Giles' letter to Busleyden also highlights the geographical tradition in which
Utopia -- and Utopia -- appear(s).127 The geography of Utopia (and Utopia) typify
Medieval cartography.128 Not only do the two maps included with the text exemplify the
early map style (see Appendices A and B), but the text also adheres to the conventions of
Medieval cartography. As D. K. Smith notes in The Cartographic Imagination in Early
Modern England (2008), even local maps in the Medieval tradition were organized
according to narrative; for example, they suggest itineraries: both the itinerary the
cartographer himself followed and itineraries that the viewer might follow when visiting
places of interest. Medieval maps of this sort depict the places on the itinerary (or in a
travelogue) without regard for scale; destinations are depicted as close together when, in
fact, they might be quite far apart. Utopia illustrates the cartographic techniques of the
Medieval tradition by emphasizing proximity and the narrative that links together places.
127 This letter accompanies from the 1516 (Louvain) edition onward (ibid. clxxiii).
128 This tradition is not monolithic, nor is it exclusively Medieval. However, for sake of
simplicity here, I treat the Medieval tradition ofT-O and local mapping practices. This
style offers a counterpoint to the "New Geography" that develops around the tum of
the seventeenth-century.
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In contrast, Philip Sidney's Defense a/Poesy (1579/1595) maps the world ofpoesy
(Sidney's term for literate, courtly writing) according to the New Geography. Around the
turn of the seventeenth-century, New Geographers assume extended space plotted on a
newly invented Mercator projection map, a flat map of the globe useful for navigators
because its straight lines of constant course create a grid on which individual points in the
world can be plotted. What is at stake in the difference between these two cartographic
methodologies is the relationship of prose fiction and poesy to the world. Medieval
cartographers understand maps as narratives, as journeys that take place; the map draws
the viewer into a narrative in which he or she participates. But the New Geographer's
emphasis on pure extended space carefully isolates poesy from the "real world." Plotting
space according to a Cartesian grid, the new maps are devoid of narrative, of things
taking place. Rather, the Cartesian grid offers a timeless slice of mathematically defined
positions.
The place that More and Sidney map out is a literary one. In this period, as
narrative is separated from the physical world (because it does not have a location
chartable in that world) -- as it becomes fictionalized -- its place, and thus the place of
figure, is called into question. For previous authors, figure takes place because words are
out of place: when we recognize that words are not in their proper places (as in
metaphor), we know that something (figure) is happening. But there is no longer a place
for figure in the world when narrative is written out of it. Narrative is a defining quality
of figure; as Patricia Parker notes, there is a story about how the metaphoric word came
to occupy a place not its own. This story might be ofan interloper, a lacking word
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(catachresis), a qualitative relationship between entities, and so forth. For More, it is
imperative that narrative have a place in the world because if it does not, then irony -- the
fundamental figure of Utopia -- cannot exist and, without irony, the text's call for social
change does not obtain. Narrative provides the elements that create the internal
contradiction we call irony. When the text folds back against itself in irony, it invites
judgment: the internal difference created by irony requires the reader to take up a position
in relation to the material. Like Medieval maps, which situate their geography in
relationship to the map viewer (who is also enmeshed in the narrative world the map
traces), Utopia hails the reader and solicits his judgment. This judgment is a necessary
condition for social change, More's primary concern. Irony provides a means of drawing
attention to social problems; as readers, we know that Utopia offers elicits social
commentary because the text is ironic. So, for More, preserving the place of irony is
paramount because as cartographic practices eliminate narrative from the physical world,
they eliminate the basis for making judgments on that world. Without narrative, the
world no longer calls for judgment through irony, and thus the primary mechanism for
social change vanishes. When fiction and narrative are no longer part of the world, no
longer means for mapping that world, then they can no longer affect that world. Only if
narrative takes place does it invite judgment (including the judgment of something being
out ofplace, like metaphor).
Sidney plays out the failure of fiction/narrative to enact change in the world in
terms of failed performatives. When narrative and fiction are completely separated from
the physical world, then they are no longer performative and thus are no longer the
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engines of social change: fiction cannot affect the world if it does not have a place in it.
Men who read the text can bring about changes, but the text itself is no longer
performative. Indeed, it is precisely this point that Sidney emphasizes in the Defense; as
we see below, he notes that the writer, not the text, "conjures" the audience. Poesy,
Sidney emphasizes, is not real: it does not take place, nor does it have a place in the
actual, physical world; it is limited to the realm of fiction. Questions of falsity and verity
do not apply to poesy; therefore, the world ofpoesy is not the world of historians. It is
foreign, always distant, and straightforwardly delineated against the place ofthe real
world. Poesy is, Sidney observes, a "passporte" between foreign countries. But these
countries, the worlds of the historian and of the poet, do not occupy the same map. The
strict spatiotemporal extension of the New Geographer is unconcerned with narrative and
prohibits the coincidence of opposites (or of cosmological entities). In the Defense, the
presence of opposing viewpoints does not produce a coincidence of opposites; rather
these different ideas simply reflect that anything is possible in poesy. Although Ron
Levao argues that Sidney's poesy is like More'sficta because both are ironic, are-reading
of Sidney reveals none of the tension of More's irony.129 The opposing opinions Sidney
offers are not ironic, do not create a coincidence of opposites. Rather, Sidney's poesy is a
homogeneous space of sheer possibility. Anything could happen, but nothing does.
Among other things, Sidney's commentary on conjuring emphasizes that language is not
performative; ultimately Sidney demonstrates that poesy cannot conjure and that
129 We will return to the differences betweenficta and fiction below.
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performative utterances are offpoesy's map. Whereas, for More,jicta take place, for
Sidney, poesy does not.
PLOTTING IRONY
In Literary Fat Ladies (1987), Patricia Parker details what she calls "the
metaphorical plot." For Parker, the term plot encompasses the wide range of associations
metaphor encompasses. Classically, metaphor is spatialized insofar as it signals a word
that occupies a place other than its own. It is also temporalized in the sense that it
involves a narrative of an alien word displacing a local one. Out of place, metaphor
invokes nostalgia for a retreat back to Eden, a garden plot of originary meaning. 130
Finally, it also seems to plot against the reader to the extent that it interpolates specific
subject positions
The etymology ofmetaphor denotes movement from a place near by. The Greek
word meta/fora is comprised of a prefix meaning "beyond" or "over" and a root verb
meaning "to carry"; similarly, translatio, the Latin equivalent of the word "metaphor,"
means "to carry across." Metaphor travels through nearby territories, revealing their
boundaries by transgressing them. In the Poetics, Aristotle defines metaphor as "the
application of a strange [a)llo/triou] name either transferred [e)pifora/] from the genus
and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one
species to another or else by analogy" (1457b). Aristotle emphasizes the "strangeness" of
130 Cf. Northrop Frye, who argues that metaphor suggests a "return" back to an idealized
(Edenic), more primary (more "real") place (Ae 124).
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metaphor; he praises metaphor in the Rhetoric because it lends "a foreign air" (3.2.3.).131
Metaphor should come from nearby, but it is nonetheless alien to the place it occupies.
But the distance metaphor covers is constrained by a sense of decorum and
propriety. Because metaphor appears in a place to which it does not belong, it must be
careful to attend to local conventions. Aristotle emphasizes that metaphors must
"observe due proportion; otherwise there will be lack ofpropriety" (3.2.9).132 Similarly,
the ad Herennium cautions that metaphor must have good manners because it
incorporates new places. Like Cicero (de Oratore 27.92), the ad Herennium remarks that
"metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a kindred
thing, and not seem like an indiscriminate, reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike
thing [translationem pudentem [...] esse oportere, ut cum ratione in consimilem rem
transeat, ne sine dilectu temere et cupide videatur in dissimilem transcurrisse] " (4.34.45).
The spatialization ofmetaphor is clearest in metaphor's failure, its "precipitate leap"; the
need for metaphorical "restraint" only emphasizes the distance a metaphor not bound by
decorum could cover.
Decorum delineates the place ofmetaphor, the rhetorical figure in which
something is out of place. For Cicero, the "self-different" place of Aristotle's metaphor
131 J. H. Freese cautions that the word xe/nov, translated here literally as "foreign," is
difficult to render when it describes writing style. The word does not have the negative
connotations that "foreign" and "alien" sometimes carry in English. Richard C. Jebb
renders it as "distinctive" in his translation ofRhetoric.
132 The mathematical sense of the Aristotelian metaphor is grounded in ratios, harmonies,
proportions; these mathematics speak to natural philosophers' preference for a
mathematics of relationships rather than discrete measurement. See, for instance,
Kepler's work with musical ratios in the Harmony.
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applies to trope in generaL Cicero remarks that "the man of perfect eloquence should,
then, in my opinion possess not only the faculty of fluent and copious speech which is his
proper province, but should also acquire that neighboring borderland science oflogic"
(32.113). Eloquence, one of the five divisions of rhetoric and the one that governs
figures of speech, has its own proper place. 133 And this place is defined by reference to
what is nearby: the field oflogic. 134 For Cicero, proximity gauges the quality of figure
and rhetoric. Like his classical predecessors, George Puttenham observes that figures
denote words that are out of place. He asserts that either two words are synonyms "or els
neither of both to haue been allowed, but in their places" (158). All figures are
fundamentally indecorous; all words should be in "their own place," but none are when
figurative. All figures (save synonym) violate the physical laws that define what comes
to be called Cartesian space: the law prohibiting coincident entities (no two things can be
in the same space at the same time) and the law prohibiting coincident locations (nothing
can occupy two different places at the same time). Only synonym treats words properly;
because the words say the same thing, they are the same thing and are thus permitted to
occupy the same place.
133 According to classical tradition, rhetoric is divided into inventio, disposito, elocutio,
memoria, and pronuntiatio. Because rhetorical invention is like logical invention in
that both use "places," topoi, to obtain their material, rhetorical invention seems to
describe the same world logic defines. But when inventio migrates to logic with
Ramus (a sixteenth-century French philosopher), rhetoric is reduced to "mere"
orn~mf"ntat1('\n (elnc flO '.),1"\r1 n-Jon-Jll ..... irr c.,:::t.~T1""'nd1",,1"""'; Clhad .f"nc+;"""ns l·n n s~nl· -:,!!hy...... _.a. ...._.a............... "-'....... "V U.,,, ,u...l..J.-..... ""~II"VI "w, ~"",,.L v .1.11-5 l-.l.l.l.l.l.l.l..:l.Ll\,,1 J.U-.l L.LU.l a v,"" ~l)'
depending upon books. Cf. Walter Ong, Ramus.
134 The neighbor logic, however, plays the ultimate "alien" by colonizing inventio and
rendering rhetoric merely ornamental.
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Because figures are, for Puttenham, out of place by definition, rhetorical
proximity becomes less about the place of words than about foreign countries and
languages. Illustrating the means by which a courtier chooses between synonyms,
Puttenham remarks that even though the word "Maior-domo [is] borrowed of the
Spaniard and Italian and therefore new and not vsuall," it is still preferable to the English
tenn because it is customary "to them that are acquainted with the affaires of Court"
(158). The decorum that defines the proper word is a specifically social, courtly decorum
rather than a purely linguistic one. The foreignness of figures, Puttenham suggests, stems
from geopolitical reasons rather than from a place proper to rhetoric. Preachers, scholars,
secretaries, merchants, and travelers introduce "inkehome tennes" and the "straunge
tennes of other languages" into English. Decorum is a function of national (rather than
rhetorical) expectations. "Maistre d'hostell" might be pennitted in France, but it is not
the preferred tenn in England or Italy.
Puttenham tums the indecorous coincidence of opposites, or self-difference, of
figure into duplicity and lying. The self-difference that, for him, is trope or figure and
that, for Aristotle, is metaphor, is, for More, irony. And it is fiction. More takes a
complex view on the place of rhetoric as marked by decorum and context as self-
different; this place is both irony -- an instantaneous self-difference that can be said to
take place -- and narrative -- a spatiotemporal dimension that takes place over time (the
story). Irony takes place. It is also structured like place: it has a narrative and connects
with other nearby places. The place of irony is spatiotemporalized through narrative;
this is consistent with Patricia Parker's observation that, as alien, metaphor comes with a
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narrative ofhow it came to be in a place to which it does not belong. So, too, Utopia
demonstrates the scale on which irony can take place by extending it throughout the
narrative. This extended irony, or coincidence of difference, for More, characterizes
fiction.
More, of course, does not use the term "fiction"; writing in Latin, More refers to
the fictitious elements ofhis tale as ''jicta'' (248.5). Ficta, according to CT Lewis'
standard Latin Dictionary, have a history (stretching back through Terence) throughout
which they maintain the sense of deceit that continues in modem day connotations of
fiction, particularly in political contexts. Translators regularly translate More's ''jicta'' as
"fiction," but this translation misses the complex ways that More defines the relationships
betweenficta, fiction, and irony. Exploring the place (or "no place") officta, More
participates in a lengthy discussion that stretches back through Nicholas of Cusanus,
Ockham, and S1. Augustine to its roots in classical philosophy. Ron Levao's Renaissance
Minds and Their Fictions (1985), the authoritative work on Early Modem fiction, traces
the transition fromficta, or mental constructs, to fiction both in terms of fiction as "lying"
and as a distinct genre. This transition occurs because sixteenth-century readers
secularizeficta by rejecting earlier assumptions that mental fictions provide access to the
Divine. That is, whereasficta are "real" in the sense that they offer an experience of
Godhead, fiction is dialectically opposed to reality. In particular, Levao focuses on
fifteenth-century German theologian and philosopher Nicholas ofCusa (1401-1464), who
considers the experience of coincidentia oppositorum (the coincidence ofopposites) to be
the primary method by which one might witness the ineffable Divine. For Cusanus,
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coincidentia oppositorum is a product ofjicta, which are often mathematical, logical, or
rhetorical in nature. Even poetry is a kind ofjictum. But by the end of the sixteenth-
century,jicta has become fiction: coincidentia oppositorum becomes part of an entirely
different classification ofthings outside the physical world. For Cusanus,jicta produces
an experience and provides access to the Divine, which is far more real and true than the
physical world. For Puttenham and his Italian contemporaries, on the other hand, fiction
is "make believe"; it is, in essence, nothing but lies. As the sixteenth century progresses,
the philosophical and theological benefits ofjicta disappear, and the narrative structure of
fiction is all that remains. The account of fiction that Levao narrates has three points that
are particularly relevant to this chapter: first, internal contradiction or equivocation,
which Puttenham associates with figure, also characterizes Levao's account ofthe
developing sense of fiction. Self-contradiction, figured in Utopia as irony, marks the
place of fiction. Second, the coincidence of opposites becomes temporalized as fictional
narrative. Utopia reads like a travelogue, like an itinerary. As such, it is an example of
the Medieval T-0 maps (whereas Sidney's Defense, we will see below, exemplifies New
Geography cartography instead). Third, fiction and coincidentia oppositorum take place.
More traces this place through decorum as he remarks on context. More notes that his
life is, too, a series ofroles dependent upon courtly context. More's fiction is not entirely
"not real" because it belongs to the world of events, performances, and occurrences.
For Cusanus,jicta produce a coincidence of opposites. Coincidence happens. In
particular, it happens as an experience of God, who contains all opposites. Mental
thought experiments (especially mathematical ones) can produce an experience of the
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ineffable because God contains all opposites (Levao 20). Unlike Abelard and Ockham,
for whomficta are always more "real" than poetic fiction (even through they draw
analogies between the inherent structure ofintellection and artistry, 60-61), for Cusanus,
poetry is a kind officta, andficta are poetic; the process of reason is no less creative than
the work poets do. Both poetry and philosophy "promote the invention of forms of
intelligibility, neither strictly true nor false" (Levao 86). Poetry and philosophy are
equally valuable insofar as they can surpass the present world of fact and make contact
with Divinity through the use officta. Levao concludes that Cusanus "read[s] all forms
ofhuman cognition as kinds of poetic making" (86). For Cusanus, Levao observes, the
divine accessficta provide is an inherently poetic process; both poesie and itsficta
generate valuable "act[s] of apprehension" that reach beyond the fallen world towards
God. Insofar as poetry and literature produce the coincidence of opposites, they take
place as an instance officta.
However, by the end of the sixteenth centurY,ficta and the coincidence of
opposites are little more than fiction and explicitly are not part of the actual world
described by scientific processes. As "not-true," sixteenth-century fiction becomes
"verisimilitude" and "lying"; ultimately, fiction is not real (Levao 121). The anxiety that
Orlando Furioso (1516) produced with its flying dragons and trips to the moon is
indicative of the concern that fiction-making has loosened its tethers on theological and
philosophical truths as well as on productive moralism. By the end of the sixteenth
century, authors like Lodovico Castelvetro, Jacopo Mazzoni, and Torquato Tasso no
longer justify ficta for their allegorical revelation. Tasso explicitly rejects the theological
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underpinnings that medieval theorists use to justify jieta; he argues that poetry can't be
purely fictive (or it wouldn't move us) and that it shouldn't treat the "sacred or
unalterable" (129). That which moves us, Tasso assumes, must be real; therefore
unalloyed fiction is useless. In contrast to the productive, divine experiences of Cusanus'
jieta, fiction is, for Tasso, an obstacle to the practical uses ofpoetry. Levao suggests that
Tasso's increased interest in regulating poetry, such as his insistence that it maintain
"unity," reflects a mounting anxiety that poetry -- particularly its fictive dimensions -- is
out of control (130); no longer self-regulating,jietion requires stringent social
restrictions. The sixteenth century ends with the concern thatjietion, identified with
poesy (as Sidney defines it, below), is more dangerous than useful. The Renaissance
shift from verity to utility, and the period's anxiety about the purely fictive nature of
poesie (and the poetic nature of fiction), leads Levao to conclude that the Renaissance
sees "an increasing awareness of the mind's power and freedom to create fictional worlds
that outstrips its ability to justify them" (132).
The self-contradiction ofjieta manifests in Utopia in two ways: first, across the
narrative as an irony of 'Judgement," and second, through the irony of names. The
biggest joke of the book hinges on the fact that Utopia, a no-place or best place, is
fictional. More claims to describe a real place; he just can't remember the coordinates
(and neither can anyone else). If truth be told, More's attention to the fictional nature of
the book is strangely overdetermined. Not content to rely on the name of the place and
the name of his interlocutor to signal the ficticity of Utopia, the letters More appends to
the text repeatedly raise the question of its location, challenge an unnamed reader for
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being so stupid as not to believe Utopia is real, and debate its location. 135 More
establishes that the text is fictional through irony. In a letter to Peter Giles appended to
the 1517 (Paris) and 1518 (Basel) editions, More begins his letter by acknowledging a
criticism already known to you, made by an unusually sharp person who
put this dilemma about our Utopia: If the facts are reported as true [si res
vt vera], I see some rather absurd [subabsurda] elements in them, but if as
fictitious [sin ficta], then I find More's finished judgment wanted in some
matters. (249)
This letter offers two options: either the text is true and absurd, or if it is fictitious, then
More should have been more judicious. We have already noted one way that judgment
seems lacking in Utopia: the opinions in the text are often at odds with data presented.
For instance, just after a story in which Hythloday describes greedy, immoral, favor-
currying priests, he refers to "some abbots, though otherwise holy men, who are not
satisfied with the annual revenues and Profits which their predecessors used to derive
from their estates," and so they enclose and develop church properties (67). "Otherwise
holy" indeed; here Hythloday offers a pious "judgment" or opinion on clergymen, a
judgment they clearly do not deserve. He goes on to condemn enclosure as the
fundamental problem with English society, and the seat of poverty (64-71). Such
contradictions between the judgment the text offers and the details the narrative includes
mark the text as fiction, as suspect, as non-self-identical.
135 The letters appended to each edition change; consult the Yale edition for specific
notes. The letter in which More declares that, if the work was fictional, he would have
indicated it in some way accompanied the 1517 (Paris) and 1518 (Basel) editions.
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Mimicking this methodology, More overtly praises the reader's critical acumen,
but his response reveals that More actually thinks this reader is a dolt. He writes
Now when he doubts whether Utopia is real or fictitious, then I find his
finished judgment wanting. I do not pretend that if I had determined to
write about the commonwealth and had remembered such a story as I have
recounted, I should have perhaps shrunk from a fiction whereby the truth,
as if smeared with honey, might a littler more pleasantly slide into men's
minds. But I should certainly have tempered the fiction so that, if I
wanted to abuse the ignorance ofcommon folk, I should have prefixed
some indications at least for the more learned to see through our purpose.
Thus, if! had done nothing else than impose names on ruler, river, city,
and island such as might suggest to the more learned that the island was
nowhere, the city a phantom, the river without water, and the ruler without
a people, it would not have been hard to do and would have been much
wittier than what I actually did. Unless the faithfulness of an historian had
been binding on me, I am not so stupid to have preferred to use those
barbarous and meaningless names, Utopia, Andyrus, Amaurotum, and
Ademus. (251)
Although More's "if" ("si" 250.6) suggests that he did not so warn his readers (and thus
that the text is not fictional, that More is "a historian" rather than a creative writer), the
passage actually details one strategy by which More reveals the text's ficticity: irony and
self-contradiction. He does those things he claims not to have done; the stupid,
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meaningless names indicate both an attempt at historical realism (the names could only
be real life) and fiction (the names might not be meaningless).
There are thus two ways that More figures the fiction of the text through irony:
first, fiction takes place across narrative, and second, it can take place instantaneously
like in a name. In terms of the temporal and spatial narrative of fiction, Utopia has both
a vertical axis (instantaneous irony; the coincidence of opposites in a name) and a
horizontal axis (irony is revealed over the course of a narrative). Both are consistent
with Levao's account. Coincidentia oppositorum is both the instantaneous effect of
logical paradoxes and the narrative over which theficta are constructed. For Utopia, the
text's narrative offers the raw materials that constitute context (and thus decorum), from
which irony (self-contradiction) is diagnosed. When Hythloday and More consider the
place ("locus") of Hythloday's philosophy, they debate whether a decorous place for
Hythloday's beliefs exists in the context at hand: a courtly society. Hythloday argues that
he will not betray himself and moderate his beliefs; "there is no room [locus] for
philosophy with rulers" (99). Like Utopia (and Utopia), philosophy has "no place."
However, More-the-character observes that it is merely evidence of good taste for
Hythloday to say things he may not mean; he should moderate his philosophy to fit the
context in which he finds himself.
"Right," I declared, "that is true -- not for this academic philosophy
fphilosophia scholastica] which thinks that everything is suitable to every
place [locum]. But there is another philosophy, more practical for
statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself to the play [fabula] at hand,
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and perfonns its role neatly and appropriately [cum decoro]. This is the
philosophy which you must employ. Otherwise we have the situation in
which a comedy of Plautus is being perfonned and the household slaves
are making trivial jokes at one another and then you come on the stage in a
philosopher's attire and recite the passage from the Octavia where Seneca
is disputing with Nero. Would it not have been preferable to take a part
without words than by reciting something inappropriate to make a
hodgepodge of comedy and tragedy? You would have spoiled and upset
the actual play by bringing in irrelevant matter -- even if your contribution
would have been superior in itself. (99).
Hythloday's interest in the proper locus or place for his philosophy assumes an answer
shaped in the fonn of decorum.136 The place of decorum, More-the-Character suggests,
is in the roles one plays. In this passage, role playing and theater figure decorum, which
detennines the right "places" for speaking the right things. More's treatment of decorum
is grounded in an assumption that words have proper places. Hythloday's position, More
suggests, is indecorous insofar as it violates social order, like mixing the trivial jokes of
household slaves with a passage from Octavia. The theatrical metaphor More offers has
two readings. First, it suggests that Hythloday believes that his philosophy is as grand as
Octavia, a play in the lofty mode oftragedy. The court, by comparison, is made up of a
bunch of PIautine fools and lechers. In this reading, More is sympathetic to Hythloday's
136 Logan and Adams' Cambridge edition notes that More's (the character's) "position is
infonned by the rhetorical and ethical doctrine of decorum, propriety ofwords and
actions" (34 fn.77).
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problem; presumably, More appreciates intelligent philosophy and good rhetoric.
Second, the metaphor could mean that Hythloday's philosophy is as ridiculous as a
Senecan speech would be in one ofPlautus' plays. In this reading, More thinks
Hythloday something of a fool, unable to judge context.
Hythloday and More debate whether fiction is appropriate for the situation.
Decorum might call for honesty, or it might call for role playing, shifting from Seneca to
a Plautine character. This role, the "place" into which Hythloday and More inquire, is
also fiction. Is there ever a place for lying, for fiction, for modifying one's viewpoints to
fit the context? More is also asking if there is ever a place for irony, for the performance
of Octavia as an ironic counterpoint to a Plautine comedy. Based on context, the only
role available is a fictional one, one that takes an ironic stance on the Plautine debacle: he
can either adopt the role of Seneca, an ironic juxtaposition to the salacious comedy, or he
can playa Plautine character ironically: he can become a coincidenta oppositorum, a
philosopher acting the fool. And yet, irony and fiction are defined as those things that are
out of place - irony as contradiction and fiction because Hythloday is supposedly a moral
person. The irony of irony is that it has place (though it is diagnosed by being out of
place). As a kind of irony, a recognizable departure from proper/non-fictional places,
fiction takes place by transgressing place. 137 Because irony intrudes into a place not its
own, it and the fiction it reveals are, for More, the best examples ofthe alien self-
difference classicists treat as trope and metaphor.
137 The Yale edition notes that More's irony derives from a context he and his audience
share: "this kind of irony depends not on any express hint but on a secret and shared
sympathy of reader and author" (cHi).
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For Stephen Greenblatt, the discussion of Hythloday's social responsibility is
particularly telling of More's own lived experience as a courtier forced to adapt to wildly
incongruous situations. 138 Greenblatt argues that More experienced his own life as a
series of roles; he observes that "the historical More is a narrative fiction" (31). What
Greenblatt means here is that More lives his life as fiction to the degree that he
experiences it as a narrative of a series of roles he adopts to fit the situation in which he
finds himself. In this sense, Greenblatt suggests that fiction, at least for More, may not be
categorically opposed to the actual world. Fiction includes More's experience of his life,
one structured by decorum and thus revealed to be ironic and self-contradictory. (We
will return to the trope of theatricum mundi, the theater of the world and life as a series of
roles, in chapter six.) The correct fictional role for each moment is determined by
context and decorum; ultimately, the roles are a function of the place in which the actor
finds himself. These roles are "fictional," Greenblatt suggests, because they are self-
contradictory; Greenblatt notes, for instance, that the deeply private, religious, and ascetic
More had to attend deeply lavish spectacles in his official capacity. Greenblatt concludes
that as decorum forced More to take on self-contradictory roles, More's is an historical
narrative.
The geography traced by narrative is a primary concern of Medieval
cartographers. Consider the T-O map (see Appendix C). Asia forms the continent at the
top, with Europe and Africa the two continents below. The rivers that split the continents
138 For instance, More was in the unfortunate position ofhaving to live in the Tower
(prison for aristocrats) because, as a staunch Catholic, he refused to take the First
Succession Act (1533) denigrating the Pope and Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of
Aragon.
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form a T, which is surrounded by the 0 of the world's oceans. The T-O map is less about
geographical accuracy than the biblical narrative it illustrates. Asia is at the top of the
map because it is in the East, and East is the direction ofParadise; Paradise is located at
the "top" of a T-0 map. Demons, dragons, and other hellish creatures, on the other hand,
often colonize the lower regions (Sanford 8, Smith 3-4). Jerusalem, ofcourse, is the
navel of the world (Sanford 5). As D. K. Smith notes in The Cartographic Imagination
in Early Modern England (2008), the "primary function [of Medieval maps] is not to
measure space, but to impose on the template of the physical world a constant reminder
and organizational outline of the events ofChristian history" (2). Local maps represent
buildings "in relationship to their fundamental purpose and imagined significance" rather
than to scale. For example, the "Cityview of Wells," drawn by Thomas Chaundler in the
early 1460s, pictures an enormous central church with tiny buildings around the wall (5).
Even maps for pilgrims, who arguably depended most on representational accuracy,
"reduced the route to an imagined straight line" to a series of local sites. That is, mapped
places include narrative, history. For instance, the maps included in the 1516 and 1518
editions of Utopia (see Appendices A and B) include a gigantic boat roughly 25% the
size of Utopia (Hythloday's transportation), and a circular river the eye travels in
clockwork direction from the fount of the river Anydrus to the mouth of the river at the
ocean. The irony of the river's name (meaning "without water") is highlighted by the
repetition of the name on the banks ofthe river. Another example of the narrative
dimensions of the Medieval map appears on the 1518 map, which includes along its
bottom frame the characters Hythloday, Giles, and More (who are far larger than the
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buildings the map illustrates) pointing at Utopia. And because the viewer pieces together
the pieces of the picture into a story, his eye literally traveling the course of the river, the
viewer of the Medieval map is an active participant in the mapped narrative.
The ways of thinking about space that ground Medieval cartography shape the
verbal narrative of the text. For instance, Hythloday describes his stops along the way to
Utopia, and he defines places in relationship to those nearby. For instance, the Macarians
are a "people not very far distant from Utopia [non longe admodum absunt ab Vtopia]"
(97). The place and the people are defined by proximity to nearby countries, rather than
in terms of latitude. So too is Utopia. Hythloday reaches Utopia by traveling through a
series of nearby countries; we can infer a general region where Utopia might be located
(it is many days' travel from Calcutta), but Hythloday forgets to report "in what part
[parte] of the new world Utopia lies" (43). Hythloday locates Utopia and other countries
in relationship to their neighbors. These relationships are emphatically linguistic. For
instance, Utopians scorn those who fail to observe treaties, linguistic markers that both
establish and emphasize local relationships; it is as though these men "divided by the
light interval of a hill or a river were joined by no bond of nature" (199). The Utopians'
mockery suggests that these landmarks are less signs of absolute difference than natural
features that highlight peoples' social and geographical nearness.
Just as Utopia is located with reference to the places nearby and the journey
Hythloday took to get there, so too the places in the "second world" of the text arise
through a linear narrative from one place to the next. For instance, More-the-Character
details the business that leads him to Antwerp, his trip to church, meeting Giles outside of
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the church, walking with Giles to meet Hythloday, walking together to More's house,
sitting in the garden to talk, going inside to eat, and then returning to the garden. The
places in Utopia are contextual; they are located in relationship to other places nearby.
This emphasis on context, on local and near-by places, that characterized Medieval
geography is strikingly parallel to classical understandings of the place ofmetaphor. For
instance, Wilson and Peacham, whose works are classical in origin and style,
for instance, treat metaphoric decorum through a geography of context; when
appropriate, they "passe ouer such words as are at hand" and, instead, use "a word
translated." Metaphor is nearby; although not immediately "at hand," a metaphor that is
"farre fetcht" is an "abuse" (Peacham 14). The geographies of metaphor and Utopia are
spatialized according to context, to the places near by. The horizontal axis of narrative
provides the context necessary to identify when something is not in the right place, like
Hythloday's conclusion that there are few laws in Utopia. More draws on context, the
horizontal axis of narrative, to create irony and locate fiction.
In addition to this horizontal axis of the ironic place of fiction, there is also a
vertical axis in which time is not a factor. The "coincidence of opposites" takes place
instantaneously as a coincidence. In this sense, irony seems to collapse the distance
narrative entails. Although irony requires narrative for discovery, the temporal extension
of narrative is not necessary for irony itself; as we read the narrative, we learn that
Hythloday's claim that there are few laws in Utiopia is retroactively ironic in the very
moment he speaks it. The tension of irony is generated, in part, between its vertical and
horizontal axis. The fact that, for Utopia, irony collapses temporal extension is apparent
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in the text's obsession with ironic names. We have already observed that names such as
Utopia and Abraxas, More and Hythloday, are ironic. They are different than what they
claim to be at the same time they claim to be. These names are instances of the
coincidence of difference. The name "Utopia" signifies both a literary text about a city
and the city itself, and both a city and a no place, and a no place and a happy place, all at
the same time. So, too, the name "More" signifies both a person and a fictional character
at the same time. Indeed, More's audience would have been particularly sensitive to the
irony of the name "More" given the recent publication ofErasmus' Praise ofFolly
(1511), whose Latinized Greek title Moriae Encomium could also be interpreted to mean
"Praise ofMore." (Critics generally agree that this "More" refers to Thomas More,
Erasmus' good friend.) The point here is that, as Utopia deploys them, names such as
"Utopia" and "More" are self contradictory in the manner of the coincidence of opposites,
a coincidence that is, by definition, atemporal. The coincidence of opposites in ironic
names constitutes a "no place" in which self-contradiction is atemporal, although it
requires conventions of decorum and attention to localrules for its recognition. In More's
Utopia, the place of rhetoric, as crafted through considerations such as decorum, is
produced by the instantaneous event of coincidentia oppositorum. That is, irony and the
fiction it indicates take place. Not only does the narrative of the place of irony suggest
the contradictory nature oflived roles; it is also performative in terms ofbeing a
coincidence of opposites to which Levao brings out attention. This "coincidence"
collapses the narrative into one performative moment of disjuncture. Although the
narrative spatializes the place of fiction, "coincidence," irony, and self-contradictory
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names localize fiction as something that takes place in an instantaneous event of irony.
Like metaphor, irony depends upon tension: the tension of words meaning other than
what they say, the tension of meaning spread across words distant from one another and
yet happening instantaneously in a "coincidence" of opposites or difference. Its very
structure -- as ironic instantly and across time -- enacts the same coincidence as the story.
FROM PLACE TO SPACE
Edward Casey observes a shift from place to space in the broadest structural levels
of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century physics. Casey argues that the fifteenth-century
breaks with Scholasticism and rejects Aristotle's "where" (pou), one often metaphysical
categories to be considered alongside "relation," "quality," etc. "Where Aristotle took for
granted the power ofplace -- a special noncausal power found in its containing character,
its qualitative differentiation, its heterogeneity as a medium, and its ainsotropy of direction
-- Western philosophers and scientists ofthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries assume
that places are merely momentary subdivisions of a universal space quantitatively
determined in its natural homogeneity" (FP134). One of the most obvious contributions to
the developing enthusiasm for space is the Cartesian grid.139 Sixteenth and seventeenth
139 Casey claims that Descartes is "on the verge of discovering an intrinsic property of
place" (158) although he fails. Descartes offers three corrolaries of space: 1. "The world,
though not strictly infinite in extension, is indefinitely extended' (154), 2. "No vacuum or
void can possibly exist" (155), and 3. "Place is a subordinate feature ofmatter and
space" (156). In Newton, place survives somewhat (in terms of "absolute" and
"relative" place) but it hasn't "agency" or "power." Newton performs a "triple
reduction" ofplace: 1. "in its relative character, it is nothing but a means of
measurement" (143), 2. "he subsumes place under space by making it (much in the
manner of Bruno) 'a part of space'" (144), yet 3. "on the other hand, Newton collapses
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century space is measurable, and three-dimensional; it is pure homogeneous extension and
detachable from the physical substances that give it dimension. Such space ultimately
finds its expression in the Cartesian grid (126). Space is abstract, homogeneous extension
in which bodies just happen to exist.140 Place, on the other hand, is experiential, particular,
and delimited according to proximity. And as we see above, cartography mirrors the
changes in physics, by shifting from mapping places (local areas defined by narrative) to
spaces (discrete and contained political units as seen from without).
These radically different scientific ways of understanding place and space shape
the place of rhetoric, fiction, and poesy. We have already examined how Medieval
cartography shapes the place of fiction the Utopia describes: it offers a narrative of
proximate locations. Around the turn of the seventeenth-century, cartographic practices
shift. Places are mapped to scale -- place became homogeneous space, Edward Casey
might say -- and in relation to one another instead of sharing a narative with the viewer of
the map. This New Geography arises because of many changes such as the "rediscovery
of Ptolemy's classical exposition of geography and map projection" in the fifteenth
place into body: theplace of a body is none other than the totality of the places of the
parts of that body and is thus 'internal' to this body" (144).
140 If space is infinite, it can't be made of (qualitiative) places; "some other factor must
account for such things as distance and extension, indeed anything sheerly quantitative
that refuses to be pinned down to place" (134). Cf. Pierre Gassendi's belief that "spatial
dimensionality is [...Jstrict measurability" (139). Not only is space empty of things (cf.
Giordanno Bruno et al.) "but ojplace itself" "According to the new physics, space is
something self-sufficient and wholly independent of what is in space, including
partiuclar places. Space is thus 'an emancipated concept, divested of all inherent
differentiations or forces'" (139, qtg. Jammer Concepts ojSpace 90). "Modem
mechanism has two ultimate terms: extension and motion" which equals "sheer
quantifiability" of the heavens (137).
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century (Klein "Tamburlaine" 143), the need to include the New World on world maps,
and the humanist "shift from the sacred to the secular" (Sanford 9). New Geography
privileges representational accuracy; "the growing expectation was that 'the objects in the
world to be maped are real and objective, and that they enjoy an existence independent of
the cartographer'" or pilgrims making ajourney (Smith 8, qtg. Harley 4). Rather than
being oriented around its viewer and through narrative, the early modern map offers a
bird's eye view; "[t]he invisible body in front of the map is recast as the omsiscient, all-
seeing observer, but in the image itself the body no longer plays a constitutive part.141
The early modern map is divorced from narrative and history and instead offers an image
of timeless, measurable accuracy.142 The champions of the New Geography include
sixteenth century Flemish cartographers Abraham Ortelius and Gerard Mercator. Ortelius
is recognized as the author of the first modern atlas (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum 1570),
and Mercator developed what we now call the Mercator Projection Map, a flat grid
showing nautical routes as lines of constant course.
Bernhard Klein's "Imaginary Journeys: Spenser, Drayton, and the poetics of
national space" illustrates these changing cartographic practices by contrasting William
Harrison's Historicall Description ofthe Island ofBritayne (1577) and William Camden's
141 In contrast to Jerusalem as the "navel" of the medieval map, there is no center to the
early modern map. Indeed, the need to include the New World and the "transition in
science and understanding from a Ptolemaic geocentric universe to a Copernical
heliocentric lliiiverse further called centers into question" (Sanford 9).
142 Cartography is yet another field in which mathematics triumphs; Smith notes the
increasingly "Widespread belief that space could be measured, represented and
manipulated with mathematical precision" (11).
167
Britannia (1586), the "two most substantial national chorographies to be written in the
latter half of the sixteenth century" (206). Harrison's Description blends the medieval
approach with sixteenth-century innovations. The purpose of the Description is to
narrate the history of the island, and it does so by bringing together a huge number of
resources. In a manner following medieval models, Harrison prefaces each section with a
relevant topography. Klein observes that the text as a whole "is organised around an
account ofEngland's rivers, a dominant descriptive convention in the chorographical
tradition" (207). Within the sections dictated by rivers, Harrison further clarifies his
subject "through a loose sequence of thematic sections: 'of cities and towns,' 'ofpalaces
belonging to the prince,' 'of the building and furniture of our houses,' 'of prouisions made
for the poore,''' and so forth. These sections are organized according to narrative rather
than an objective, detatched series. Harrison's Description is patterned like an itinerary;
as such, its spatial structure is generated by "exploring space through movement and
operative action" (208). Modem "mapmindedness" (P.D.A. Harvey) makes it difficult
for us to imagine an era in which individuals did not see the world in panoramic view, but
the Description illustrates the earlier way of seeing the world. Rather than presenting a
unified nation whose geographical shape is the central focus, the Description focuses on
heterogeneous, local experiences of place. The landscape is marked by travel, history,
and use; it is not a unified island from a bird's eye view. (Christopher Saxton's Atlas of
England and Wales, published a year after Harrison's Description, offers the first view of
the country as a unified whole.)
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Camden's Britannia diverges sharply from Harrison's Description. Britannia
belongs to the order ofseeing rather than going. The county, not navagable rivers, is the
"central unit of chorographical description" (Klein 208). As Camden moves through
each county in a systematic fashion, he shapes the country as a political unit. History
remains a fundamental part of the Britannia, although Camden "streamlines" this
"information into the celebration of a landscape shaped by successive generations of the
leading families in the gentry" (209). As Camden narrates the soil quality and "places of
antiquity," he focuses on "'what Dukes likewise or Earles have been in ech one since the
Norman Conquest'" (citing Camden 182). For Klein, Camden's emphasis on ruling
families gives his topography the "stability of a political order and allows its translation
into the static coixistence of individual plots on the imaginary place surface of
cartographic projection." In otherwords, Camden's Britain appears to be a "static,"
unified political state as viewed from a disembodied point above. The effect of Camden's
methodology is that Britain appears to be a unified geographical and political unit as
viewed from the outside, rather than as traveled from within and experienced locally, as it
is in Harrison's Description.
These two different kinds ofmaps -- the medieval T-0 map ofplace and the early
modem external perspective of extended space -- suggest two different geographies of
rhetoric. Aristotle and Cicero concentrate on local places as experienced from within in
terms of boundary violation. Puttenham, on the other hand, treats figure as a broad
category characterized by the same universalizing rule. The distinction between
Puttenham and his classical sources becomes even more clear in light of the ways that his
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contemporary colleagues make use of classical material. Henry Peacham and Thomas
Wilson use similar terminology as Aristotle and Cicero; when discussing metaphor, they
emphasize what is near at hand and local decorum. They also draw on the tradition of
talking about metaphor in terms of topoi or places, categories from which one might draw
comparisons. 143 These places are organized as a series of stops through which one
travels. For Peacham and Wilson, rhetorical place is conceived in terms of narrative.
This narrative gives rhetoric the spatiotemporal specificity Casey calls place. For
Puttenham, on the other hand, figure occupies a general space characterized by violation
of the physical law prohibiting coincident entities. As we see in chapter three, this is the
same space as fiction for Puttenham. Figure, and by extension fiction, occupy a
homogenous space distinct from the physical world. Figure and fiction are off the map.
Puttenham's Arte is in the same vein as Camden's Britannia. Like Britain, proper
language is a homogeneous lump grounded in a unified geopolitical nation. And the
space that metaphor and other figures occupy is homologously fictional. "Foreign"
language is emphatically geopolitical. Continuing to define "inkehome termes,"
Puttenham defines "proper" language in broad nationalistic terms and in contrast to
improper, "foreign" language driven into linguistic boarderlands. The large, discrete,
static countries to which Puttenham refers suggest the kind of expansive topographical
and political maps developed in the late sixteenth century. They are emphatically visual -
- as viewed from without -- rather than something through which a rhetorician would
travel.
143 We will return to topoi, the places of invention, in the coda.
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This part [idioms] in our maker or Poet must be heedyly looked vnto, that
it be naturall, pure, and the most vsuall of all his countrey: and for the safe
purpose rather that which is spoken in the king's Court, or in the good
townes and Cities within the land, than in the marches [marshes] and
frontiers, or in port townes, where straungers haunt for traffike sake, or yet
in Vniuersities where Schollers vse much peeuish affectation of words out
of the primitiue languages, or finally, in any vplandish village or comer or
a Realme where is no resort but of poore rusticall or vnciuill people. Our
maker therefore at these dayes shall not follow Piers plowman nor Gower
nor Lydgate nor yet Chaucer, for their language is now out ofvse with vs:
neither shall he take [talk] in the termes ofNorthern-men, such as they vse
in dayly talke, whether they be noble men or gentlemen, or of their best
clarkes all is a matter: nor in effect any speech vsed beyond the riuer of
Trent, though no man can deny but that theirs is the purer English Saxon
at this day, yet it is not so Courtly nor so currant as our Southerne English
is, no more is the far Westerne mans speech [appropriate]. (156-57).
Here, I quote Puttenham at length to emphasize his sense of England as country oriented
around a central (although southern) London. Puttenham passes over the "marches and
frontiers," the "corner[s]" of the realm, as well as outlying counties because they
introduce difference into an otherwise unified language. 144 Puttenham writes off the very
144 In the section directly following Puttenham's remarks on proper English language,
.Puttenham discusses "stile" which is likewise a unified composite rather than a series
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nearby geographical features that would define a place. Instead, Puttenham treats
England as one country in extended geographical space. The geography Puttenham
offers in this passage is that of a whole, centralized political unit; he rejects the local
"colors" that distort this unit in favor of a homogenized nation. Puttenham's linguistic
sense ofEngland is of a country viewed in its totality. Moreover, Puttenham seeks to
isolate his country against the foreign intrusions of travelers and university men. His
England is not one that is "traffike[d]"; instead, it is still, static. At the same time that
Puttenham reduces the experiential sense ofmoving through place, he also rejects the
narrative ofmoving through time; Puttenham's England, and his sense of proper
language, is the eternal here and now (rather than the days of Chaucer).
Against "proper" language, Puttenham posits figures, "abuses or rather trespasses
in speech, because they passe the ordinary limits of common vtterance" (166). Metaphor,
for instance, is "an inuersion of sense by transport." Puttenham retains the terminology
of "transport" common to his classical predecessors' descriptions ofmetaphor, but his
characterization ofproper language as a unified, common country under "[un]common"
assault gives metaphor quite a different flavor. The "forraine" (foreign) metaphor
emphatically is not a local transgression as it is in Aristotle; rather, for Puttenham, it is a
general, external attack on a spatialized national language. Metaphor and other figures
are isolated in foreign countries (such as France and Italy), countries whose attempts to
trespass on English soil solidify the sense of a unified England rather than emphasize its
ofpoints. Style "extend[s] to the whole tale or processe of the poeme or historie, and
not propertly to any peece or member ofa tale" (160).
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permeable boundaries. Puttenham's England rejects variations, the noteworthy places in
an itinerary, in the name of national unity. The effect of Puttenham's cartography is to
isolate figure in a bounded, externalized area emphatically distinct from "proper" English.
Figurative place becomes a generalized rhetorical space, and this space is located outside
of the "real" here and now.
THE SPACE OF POESY
Sidney, like Puttenham, treats poesy in terms of space. Sidney's poesy is a
homogenous extension of pure fiction; there are no local places dictated by decorum.
Certainly, some authors write trash, Sidney concedes, but this is a fault of the man, not
poesy. In contrast to place-based narrative, context and irony, the space of Sidney's
fiction is featureless other than a couple of ground rules: 1. poesy is not about what is but
about what might be, 2, poesy is categorically distinct from the real world of Sidney's
England, and 3. performative utterances do not pertain. These three rules apply to the
realm of fiction, of ultimate possibility (though never reality). Save these basic rules,
fiction is, for Sidney, an extended space ofpossibility, equally able to accommodate
whatever fiction happens to appear. This space can accommodate so-called contradictory
statements and other linguistic self-differences without problem; because fiction is
always in the future and includes everything that is possible, there is no tension or irony
in Sidney's poesy. Sidney's poesy neither takes place nor has a place; rather, it is a
generalized space as Casey describes it. It is the pure expansion ofpossibility. Sidney's
poesy maps more readily onto the New Geography than the Old. Presumably, poesy has
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narrative as More'sficta do. The difference is that Sidney's narrative fails to produce a
coincidence or other performative utterances. Instead, the Defense suggests that the
author grounds linguistic performativity of, among other things, defending and
apologizing. Poesy does not take place nor does it have a place of its own. Rather, it is
simply the pure extended space of possibility.
Sidney's Defense responds to Stephen Gosson's The Shoole [School] ofAbuse
(1579), which Gosson dedicates to Sidney. Gosson argues that theater encourages
immoral behavior in its audience members; Sidney's response makes a broader argument
about poesy in general. In chapter five, we will consider in more detail how theater
figures linguistic performativity more generally in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
discussions of poesy. Here, the more salient point is that Gosson frames his inquiry in
geographic terms, and Sidney responds in the same. Gosson complains that theater (or
poesy) violates carefully delineated geopolitical boundaries. Sidney, on the other hand,
describes posey as a passport to foreign countries, countries which remain distant and
whose boundaries appear eternal. Even though Sidney portrays poesy as a gateway to
real places such as Turkey and Thebes, poesy is nonetheless wholly separate from the
physical world. Responding directly to Gosson, Sidney exasperatedly complains "[w]hat
childe is there, that coming to a play, and seeing Thebes written in great letters vpon an
old docre, doth beleeue [believe] that it is Thebes?" (Glr). For Sidney, there is no
productive equivocation contained in the name Thebes; the name is not ironic. It simply
refers to a place from long ago, a place clearly not in the real world of the child in the
theater.
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In his Shoole, Gosson echoes Plato's condemnation ofpoets as liars and seducers
from virtue. As Gosson sees it, the fundamental flaw with theater is that it authorizes
licentiousness. Gosson characterizes theater as a play house, in which "euery wanton and
is Paramour, euerye man and his Mistresse, euery John & his Joane, euery knaue & his
queane" conduct their illicit buisiness (C2r); these immoral individuals are like unto
"wormes whe they dare not nestle in the bescod [peasecod] at home, find refuge
abroade." Gosson describes theater as foreign and immoral. Space is polarized into "us"
and "them," although the two slide together uncomfortably. Not welcome in the small,
closed peapod that is the "home" territory, profligate bawds travel "abroad" to undertake
their filthy deeds. One of the most striking features of Gosson's Shoole is the consistency
with which Gosson characterizes literature, reading, and theater in terms of breaking
geographical boundaries. For instance, Gosson condemns reading as "a iorney [journey]
to fetch learning beyonde the fielde" (A5v).145
Although immorality is "out there," it still invades "in here." Gosson likens
theater to an army demolishing city walls. Gosson warns that women who attend the
theater "haue already made [them] selues assaultable, & yelded [their] Cities to be
sacked" (F2v). Individuals visit theater, and theater visits the real world, seducing
attendees. For Gosson, the problem is that theater is not carefully distinguished from the
145 Human faculties break cosmological, as well as geographical boundaries. Whereas
"Fire and Ayre mount upwardes, [a..lld] Earth and 'Vater sinke dovme, and euery
insensible body els, neuer rests til it bring it selfe to his owne home," human "sense,
reason, wit, and vnderstanding" violate the natural order; they "are euerlasting, passing
our bounds, going beyond our limites, neuer keeping our selues within compass, nor
once looking after the place from whence we came" (Dl v-D2r).
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"home" world; theater is invasive and contaminating. The question is not how figure,
metaphor, or irony take place in the real world. The question is how can we keep theater
further at bay?
Gosson offers his text as a hygenic and safe "conduit" for information otherwise
located in the dangerous realm of theater. Gosson cites the maxim that "Euripides holds
not him onely a foole, that being well at home, wil gadde abroad: y hath a conduit within
doore, & fetcheth water without" (B6r). Gosson condemns those who would travel out
rather than accept a hygienic conduit of information. The home place, "within doore," is
the real world theater invades all too easily. The text Gosson offers is a safe alternative
that keeps immoral theater at a distance. Not all books work like theater and infringe on
the homespace; Gosson's text provides a safe medium. And insofar as Gosson's text is
generic, we could say it is a combination ofliterary theory and school-primer. In his
"Dedicatory" and "Letter to the Reader," Gosson notes that "The Schoole which I builde,
is narrowe" (3v). For Gosson, proper language is a small and delimited place. Gosson
translates the classical emphasis on the movement of metaphor into bodily journeys of
those who return from dangerous territories. Gosson hopes to "pull" misled "mindes
from such studies, drawe [their] feete from such places" (np [2]) as theater offers.
Gosson preaches "let us but shut vppe our eares to Poets, Pipers, and Players, pull our
feete backe from resorte to Theaters, and turne away our eyes from beholding of vanitie"
(D3r). Turning away from theater and reading in general is, for Gosson, a tum towards a
virtuous, properly delimited, local place. In contrast to his "narrowe" space, Gosson
characterizes theater as a "large field to walke in" (AIr), an external space through which
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one journeys, morally threatening in its theatrical actuality. And the movement through
space in returning home has nothing to do with metaphor or figure; rather, it is the return
from the fantasy of a separation between theater and the real world and recognition that
theater is part of the world, morally. Cartographically, Gosson's description shuts down
the journey, the narrative abroad; instead, it advocates a decorous, nontheatrical "here."
The performativity of theater is not de to a coincidence of opposites, nor does Gosson
discuss metaphor, figure, or irony. There is simply one world that contains everything,
one expanse of experience (thus the problem with theater).
Sidney's Defense responds to Gosson's Shoole point by point and in Gosson's
terms. Sidney agrees that poesy is foreign, and like Gosson, he treats rhetorical
foreignness in terms of a moralized geopolitical context. Neither author interrogates the
kind of rhetorical foreignness of interest to Peacham, More, Quintilian, and Aristotle, a
productive foreignness causing a self-different rhetorical figure to emerge. No, poesy
never is in the now. It has narrative, but this is merely the narrative of a story, an
imaginative exercise. Poesy is forever in the future, the possible.
Posey occupies a temporally different universe. Perhaps the most famous remark
in Sidney's Defense is that the poet "nothing affirmeth, and therefore neuer lieth: for as I
take it, to lie is to affirme that to bee true, which is false [... the poet does] not labor[] to
tel you what is or is not, but what should or should not be" (GIr). The historian, Sidney
notes, is tied "to the particular truth ofthings" (D1 v). Not so poesy, which concerns itself
with what "should" and "could" be. Sidney emphasizes this temporal difference when
highlighting different verb conjugations and moods that apply to the poetic world rather
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than the historical one. He writes that poets "borrow nothing of what is, hath bin, or shall
be, but range onely reined with learned discretion, into the diuine consideration ofwhat
may be and should be" (e2v). Unlike the real world, the world of verity and falsity with
which the historian is concerned, poesy operates through modal verbs; poesy is not
concerned with what is, was, or will be but rather with what could and should be. Sidney
underscores the verb-al difference between the poetic and historical worlds; two
additional times in this relatively brief treatise, Sidney notes that poesy considers a thing
"as it should be" not "as it was" (D3r), not with "what they did [... ] what they had done,
[... and] what they would doo" (Fl v). When Sidney distinguishes between the different
structures of the physical world and t~e poetic one, between verity and possibility, he
repeatedly emphasizes their different temporal structures, structures which locate the two
in two entirely different universes. Its unique temporal dimension of poesy is one way
that poesy is categorically distinct from the real world. Deploying modal verbs, poesy is
different and distant from the physical world of truth. The world of poesy is distant and
distinct from Sidney's historical world. The world historians treat is structured differently
than poesy, which exists as a general space of possibility.
Sidney emphasizes the categorical distinction between text and real world in his
suggestion that poesy is essentially foreign. Famously, Sidney describes poesie like a
passport. Philosophers and historiographers could not delight and instruct the common
person, Sidney argues,
if they had not taken a great pasport ofPoetry, wich in all nations at this
day where learning flourisheth not, is plaine to be seene: an all which, they
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haue some feeling ofPoetry. In Turkey, besides their lawgiuing Diuines,
they haue no other writers but Poets. In our nieghbor Countrey Ireland,
where truly learning goes verie bare, yet are there Poets held in a deuout
eruerence. Euen among the most barbarous and simple Indians, where no
writing is, yet haue they their Poets. (B3r)
Citing this passage, Roland Green notes Sidney's is a "fiction ofembassy. ,,146 For Green,
embassy suggests contact between the home land and foreign ones, and thus concludes
that Sidney's poesy is markedly material and "real." Taken in the context of Sidney's
debate with Gosson, however, Sidney's language takes on a different valence. In contrast
to Gosson, Sidney argues that all poesy can be a carefully regulated linguistic document
like a passport. It does permit travel to foreign places, to such barbarous countries as
Turkey and Ireland, but it does not bring these countries home. Turkey, Ireland, and the
New World all remain distant, geopolitical entities on an eternalizing Mercator map.
Each country occupies its designated space, and there is no possibility of those spaces
moving. Boundaries might change, but Sidney is relatively unconcerned with this face.
Linguistic foreignness is not intrusive; like the countries on a map in the new style, each
place remains static, distinct, and hygenically external.
One reason that the real-world and poesy do not occupy the same map is that
performative language does not apply in poesy. Sidney highlights this fact with his
146 In contrast to Puttenham's "fiction of immanence." Hopefully, the previous chapter is
sufficient ammunition for my suggestion the Greene seriously misreads Puttenham.
Indeed, the examples Green cites tend to be classical examples which Puttenham lifts
from his sources, rather than the innovative sections Puttenham offers.
179
discussion of conjuration. He notes that "the Poet neuer maketh any Circles about your
imaginati5, to coniure you to beleeue for true, what he writeth" (Glr). Here, Sidney
emphasizes the distinction between poets and magicians, a distinction that, Deborah
Willis notes, often fails to obtain between the sixteenth-century stage and the magic circle
(140).147 In this passage, Sidney emphasizes the difference between make believe and
the real world; "conjuring" is a speech act that does not obtain in poesy. But in a fit of
seeming self-contradiction, Sidney concludes the text by remarking "I conjure you all that
have had the euill [evil] luck to read this inck-wasting toy of mine, euen in the name of
the nine Muses, no more to scorn the sacred misteries of Poesie" (Kl v). This conjuration
clearly is magical in form as it invokes the powers ofthe Muses and refers to "sacred
misteries." The apparent contradiction between Sidney's claim that poet does not conjure
and his claim that he explicitly seeks to conjure his audience appears to suggest a
paradox, but this is not so. Sidney clarifies that he is the one who conjures, not poesy.
The author is the one who performs, not poesy.
The Defense is suggestive ofAustinian utterances in that it claims that poesy
neither lies nor tells the truth. The kind of "fiction" that characterizes poesy is not the
fiction of lies. Sidney mocks those who would criticize )Esop for lying; even though "he
telleth them not for true, he lieth not" (Glr). Instead, poesy is fiction because it is
imaginative; it is concerned with what is possible or can be thought of but not what is or
147 See her article "Magic and Witchcraft" in A Companion to Renaissance Drama. For
an excellent example of a sixteenth-century inquiry into the relationship between the
stage and the magic circle, see Marlowe's The Tragicall History ofDoctor Faustus (ca.
1589-1593).
180
ever was. Only the human speaker can lie (or conjure); the lie is distinct from fiction
because lies presume the intention to deceive (an intention that calls attention to the
speaking subject) whereas fiction simply signifies something possible.
Here, Sidney sounds like Austin, who similarly notes that questions of verity and
falsity do not apply to performatives because performative language does something. But
Sidney and Austin agree that performative utterances do not include poesy. Unlike
Austin, Sidney notes that there is poetic kind of language concerned with neither truth
nor lies. This is the language of the future, the possible. But this possible is never here,
never a coincidence, a figure taking place. For the Defense, the coincidence of opposites
does not create the place of poesie; it merely indicates the fictionality of a text. The
apparent contradiction of poesy that both does and does not conjure does not cause a self-
different figure to arise. Rather, the contradictory claims are attributable the space of
possibility that is poesy. Nonetheless, he power behind the linguistic performative of
conjuration lies solely with the poet; "1 conjure you," Sidney writes (emphasis mine).
Sidney's repetition, flawed as it is, calls attention to the author, the "maker" (as he
reminds us).
This space of poesy is expansive. The Defense regularly stresses the freedom the
creative poet enjoys. Sidney notes that the Poet is "not enclosed within the narrow
warrant ofher [Nature's] gifts, but freely ranging within the Zodiack ofhis owne wit"
(elr). Here, the figure of the Zodiac works two ways. First, it establishes the world of
poesy as a kind of nature; indeed, Sidney notes that "Poetrie [... ] hath the most
conueniencie to nature" (E2r). By conveniency, Sidney uses the terminology of natural
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philosophers for "likeness in kind" and suggests that poetry is "like" nature, in this case,
by being unique. Unlike the natural philosophers, only the poet "doth grown in effect
into an other nature" (B4v); poesey is the only "Art deliuered vnto mankind that hath not
the workes of nature for his principall obiect." Poesy exceeds the restraints of the real
world. In fact, it offers nearly infinite possibilities. Sidney treats poesy as something that
looks outward rather than hem in. Poesy offers a view on an infinite universe. Sidney
notes that poesy "goe beyond them [history and philosophy] both [...] not only for
hauing his scope as far as far beyond any of these, as eternitie exceedeth a moment"
(C4v-Dlr). The "moment" invokes historical specificity; poesy, however, has no
moments; it just extends into "eternitie."148
As Sidney puts it a few pages later, Poets have "all fro Dante his heue [heaven] to
his hell" (D4r). Here, Sidney invokes Dante's journey as a marker of the breadth of
poesy's vastness. However, the journey here does not suggest a medieval geography. His
traveler does not walk through the circles; rather, Sidney refers to the breadth of space
over which the journey can (possibly) take place. This is a "flat field" approach to
fiction. Like Cartesian extended space, the eternally possible place of poesy is pure,
featureless extension. Poesy is fiction, is the generic space of genre. Any internal
difference is dismissed as a necessary effect of the fact that, in the possible anything is
148 CF. Sidney's take on the relationship between the general and the universal. (E3v)
Sidney says that, in addition to "decipher him [Poet] by his workes," he "will examine
his narts": "narts. kindes_ or Snecies" include TraQicalL Comic::!lL Tr::!p"icomic::!lL
.I. ,/.1.,/ -,/ - -.1..- - - - - ------.-<- ----0------7 - -.---------, ----0------------,
"wholesome Iambick, who rubbes the galled mind" (E4r), Comedy, Lyricke = "height
of heavens" (FIr); "kindes," "formes" (F2v); "seuered dissections" (F3r).
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can happen. Like the maps ofNew Geographers, at the turn of the seventeenth century,
Sidney's space of fiction appears from a birds' eye view. Countries appear timelessly
distinct from one another. And traveling from one place to another does not suggest that
the places are "nearby"; indeed, it is poesy's very distance that delights Sidney. For
Sidney's poesy, this cartographic shift reflects the careful boundaries he draws between
poesy and the world of the historians.
With Sidney's Defense the literary fold now has a place (called poesy), carefully
isolated from the real world precisely because the text is not performative. Sidney treats
fiction like a generic expanse, as the space of possibility. Not only does fiction have
place, it doesn't even take place. The Defense does not cohere as an ironic tension nor do
performative utterances pertain to poesy. Mirroring changes in cartographic practices,
the place of Sidney's fiction is carefully delimited, spatial, and timeless. Instead of irony
taking place, Sidney's fiction is located in the limitless expanse of space structured as
"fiction." Poesy does not produce coincidence, and is thus is not performative; it does
not take place. The multitude of observations Sidney offers, some in contradiction, does
not provide the context for a literary performative. Rather, for Sidney, contradictory
statements are simply par for the course because the future, as possible, includes
everything that can be thought. Sidney inherits the traditional association of self-
difference with fiction, although for Sidney, the frame of fiction neatly separates it from
the real world. For Sidney, fiction is demarcated clearly from the world, and its self-
contradiction is no longer performative.
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Like More, Sidney offers a text full of contradictions. For instance, Levao calls
attention to the fact that Aristotle provides the material for Sidney's most famous claim,
"that poetry is more philosophical than history," in the same text that mocks and ridicules
philosophers (143). For Levao, the effect of the contradictory points ofview that the
Defense offers is similar to that ofthe Utopia; Levao argues that the text is self-
contradictory (148-52), ironic, and that "his poetic fictions are likewise the result of a
coincidence of opposites" (148). But what would be contradictory or ironic statements
for More are simply a series of the infinite possibilities of the space of fiction for Sidney.
Unlike the difference irony holds in tension, these contradictory statements they simply
indicate the wide range that fiction might take.
Unlike More's irony, Sidney's generalized, metaphoric poesy encompasses
difference without producing producing an incidence of coincidentia oppositorum.
Sidney works through the phenomenon of coincidentia oppositorum through the
relationship between general and specific. He offers at least two opinions on the
importance of particular examples to the general point being made. On one hand, Sidney
complains that philosophers are too preoccupied with "defmitions, diuitions [divisions],
distinctions" (C4r); later, he claims proudly to examine the "parts, kindes, or Species" of
poesy (E3v). Not only does Sidney thoroughly defend poesy from Gosson's accustions
by cOlisidering the specific virtues and shortfalls of all gemes ofpoesy (from tragedy and
comedy to heroic and lyric), but he also notes that poesy offers more particulars than does
history; it provides the "pasionate describing of passions, the nmany particularities of
battles which no man could affirme, or if that be denied me, long Orations put in the
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mouthes of great Kings and Captains, which it is certaine they neuer pronounced" (B2v-
B3r).
The multiplicity ofopinions Sidney offers on the relative values of species and
genera leads Levao to conclude that, like the Utopia, the Defense offers a series of
mutually exclusive roles. Emphasizing the contradictory nature of the wealth ofpoints of
view Sidney offers, Levao concludes that "[h]e presents us with 'something for
everyone'" (151). For Levao, the effect ofthe contradictory points ofview that the
Defense offers is similar to that of the Utopia; Levao argues that the text is self-
contradictory (148-52), ironic, and that "his poetic fictions are likewise the result ofa
coincidence ofopposites" (148). Levao identifies a number ofplaces in which Sidney
seems to contradict himself. For instance, Levao calls attention to the fact that Aristotle
provides the material for Sidney's most famous claim, "that poetry is more philosophical
than history," in the same text that mocks and ridicules philosophers (143).
But for all that Sidney's text includes contradictory statements as does More's,
there is an important difference: poesy does not take place in the world in the Defense. In
particular, as Sidney develops it, fiction is distinct from irony. The Defense is not ironic
as is Utopia; it does not suppose that its points ofview take place at the same time,
coincide, or constitute a narrative that will ultimately reveal textual irony. Rather, Sidney
writes off such contradiction as simply the condition ofpoesy belonging to the realm of
the possible. Possibilities are often mutually exclusive, such as the different possible
things Kings and Captains might have said. And yet, they do not happen at the same time
or from the same people. As such, a coincidence of opposites (or difference) does not
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take place in tenns of fiction. Moreover, other utterances that could be considered
pefonnative, like Austin's perfonnative utterances, are explicitly not the product of poesy
but rather the author himself. Poesy is not perfonnative; it does not take place; it is never
now or here.
Sidney eliminates performativity, figures taking place, from poesy. He notes that
poesy isa "figuring forth to speake Metaphorically" (elv). This metaphor is not an
occasion for tension, a self-different figure taking place. For Sidney, a metaphoric claim
is simply one to which questions of truth and verity do not apply. Poesy "will neuer giue
the lie to the things not Affirmatiuely, but allegorically and figuratiuely written" (G1v).
The terms metaphor, allegory, figure, and poesy refer to a kind ofwriting distinct from
literal writing. It is in this moment that we see "metaphoric" opposed to the real world
rather than something that takes place in that world. By metaphoric, allegorically, and
figuratively Sidney refers to the generic structure of fiction. All figures are subject to the
same totalizing rules that define poesy. Sidney lists a number of figures, including the
figure of repetition (Bv), similitudes (Bv-I4v), and superlatives (K2r). None is
privileged, not even metaphor; they do not take place, nor do they occasion the
coincidence of entities. They all simply follow the same general rules that apply to
fiction: they are non-performative, what could be but not what is, and distinct from the
real world. As metaphoric, poesy is unlike -- and segregated from -- the historical, literal
world to which questions of truth apply.
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LITERATURE: THE FUTURE OF POESY
No literary work from the early modern period is explicitly as interested in the
place of rhetoric and literature as Thomas More's Utopia. Increased publication
contributes to a sense ofthe literary text as text -- as commodity, product, and entity--
early modern authors are anxious to define literary places and their relationship to the
sCientifically-defined physical world. But whereas irony takes place in Utopia, poesy in
general is distinct from the real world. With Sidney's Defense, the literary fold is a
general expanse called poesy, carefully isolated from the real world precisely because the
text is not performative. Sidney emphasizes this point with his remarks on conjuration.
The text, he notes, does not conjure; poesy is not performative. But the author, Sidney,
is; he concludes the Defense emphasizing that conjuration, and apologizing or defending,
is a product of the author, not poesy or fiction. Thus the author function is important for
the Defense in a way it is not for Utopia; the author becomes the ground of linguistic
performances. The geography of poesy is homogeneous, pure extension of a limited set
of rules. The particulars of poesy are mere examples, not occasions, instances, or
coincidence. Sidney's place of fiction, the separate space created by a fold in the real,
sets the stage for sixteenth-century discussions of the place ofliterature. Jonson's
Bartholomew Fair, for instance, returns literature to the world from which Sidney
separates it, but purely as a commodity. As Jonson demonstrates, literature comes to be
defined as that to which performative, Austinian utterances do not apply. Jonson
addresses most explicitly the changes to the place of literature due to mass publication,
rising literature, and developing technology.
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CHAPTER VI
STAGING LITERARY CONTRACTS IN JONSON'S BARTHOLOMEW FAIR
Sidney's use of conjuration to emphasize the illocutionary power of the author
speaks to a general trend for Early Modem authors to consider the relationship between
oaths and promises and the literary text. Sidney's poesy, at least at the time he wrote it,
was for a privileged coterie ofaristocrats. Publication certainly happened, but that was
not the ultimate goal like it was for Ben Jonson and his generation. Jonson's First Folio
(1616) was one of the first whose editing and publishing was controlled exclusively by
the author. Plays generally belonged to the playhouse, but Jonson himself gathered
together his plays, at times making extensive revisions, and putting them to press '''not a
line, or syllable' [..] changed 'from the simplicity ofthe first Copy'" (Butler 3). By
fashioning himself an author and authorizing the publication of his texts, commodities for
the newly literate population, critic Martin Butler notes, "Jonson seizes on the ability of
print to empower the author, validating himself as sovereign voice by controlling the
minutest details of textual production, and conferring legitimacy and identity upon
himself as writer by virtue ofhis controlling interest in his text" (1). Jonson works out
authorial identity trough recourse to illocutionary utterances, like Sidney. For instance,
Jonson's Bartholomew Fair (1614) begins with the Scrivener reading the Articles of
Agreement between author and audience. Curiously, Jonson does not include
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Bartholomew Fair in his 1616 Folio; presumably, something about the play did not fit
right with the product Jonson decided to offer the public.
Ultimately, Jonson's Bartholomew Fair suggests that the place ofliterature is like
a failed performative utterance, Austin style. Bartholomew Fair fails to take place, to
support performative utterances, because it works like a de futuro contract, a contract to
be redeemed in the future. But the future never arrives for Bartholomew Fair. Of course,
the play is performed, and on October 31, 1614 for the first time. But the play also has a
history as a literary product, a carefully regulated commodity controlled by the author, a
novelty in Jonson's time. So for Jonson, the place of the literary text reflects a history of
commodification and marketing as an object of art, entertainment, and reading pleasure.
Whereas Sidney focuses on the distance between poesy and the real world, Jonson returns
the text to the world as an object on the capitalist market. The consequences, for Jonson,
are serious. The "value" of the play will fluctuate with the market. The Articles attempt
to control this problem; they are largely preoccupied with establishing the rules by which
a playgoer or reader can pass judgment on the play. These judgments are what Austin
calls "verdicative"; they include things like the decisions of a judge such as finding
someone guilty. But these judgments are troubled by the fact that they're never complete.
The Articles long for a well-behaved fellow who "will swear Jeronimo or Andoronicus
are the best plays yet" (109-10) some twenty-years later. Of course, such steadfastness
bespeaks a "virtuous and staid ignorance" (113); the author appreciates him because
"Such a one the author knows where to find him" (114-15). In this bit of irony, the
Articles reveal both a longing for "steadfast" value and a dismissal of those who don't
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change their minds over time. The judgments the Articles long for stretch out over time
and remain constant. But for Bartholomew Fair, the problem of contracts, judgments,
warrants, marriage licenses, and other performative documents is that they degenerate
over time: they are misplaced, stolen, restructured, and radically different than intended.
The temporal dimension of literary texts renders them problematic in terms of
performatives.
Like More, Jonson equates "judgment" with the place. of the play. For More, we
should remember, the unnamed literary critic who condemns his fiction finds More's
judgment somewhat wanting. But is the judgment on the play that Jonson seeks to
secure. For Bartholomew Fair, judgment works like decorum to locate the place of the
text and of the author. The problem is that the place of the text is never fully complete, it
never quite culminates into a performative. Rather, the text is structured like contract
whose future conditions have not yet been fulfilled. In Bartholomew Fair, illocutionary
utterances fail for two reasons: first, as de futuro contracts, they are never complete (like
Shakespeare, Jonson frames such contracts in marital terms). Second, written documents
attesting to these promises (or themselves serving as the promise) always go awry; these
documents are stolen, lost, re-written, and re-acted. Jonson interrogates these written
contracts through the names attached to them, the names that guarantee promises. Jonson
problematizes a dimension of the illocutionary act that Austin takes for granted: that the
promiser and promisee remain the same over time. For Bartholomew Fair, this is not the
case, at least in terms of the performative dimension of the literary commodity. Anyone
can pick up the text at the same price, resell it, give it away, lose it, and so forth.
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The problem of time for the performative dimension of the place of the
commodified text is a linguistic matter. Promises and oaths, Bartholomew Fair suggests,
rest on names, on the people who underwrite them. But names, for Bartholomew Fair,
are also puns. The characters tum each others' names into jokes, into puns based on
equivocation and the multiplicity of meaning. Names are puns, but names also guarantee
oaths. If these names are indeterminate, than the oaths, the performatives these names
guarantee, go awry. The one name that the plays and oaths reference that remains secure
is the author's. Jonson capitalizes on Sidney's suggestion that the author, rather than his
poesy, can conjure. It is the author, ultimately, to which performative utterances and
literary texts refer. Unfortunately, while Jonson remains responsible for text, for the
linguistic contract he offers, the fulfillment of that contract, in the figure of
readerly/audience judgment, remains forever in the future.
THEATRUM MUNDI: PLAYING THE WORLD
Jonson's inquiry into the performative dimension oftheater as a way to reflect on
the relationship between text and world is one step in a larger movement. Theatrum
mundi is the doctrine of the "theater of the world." In general, from the classical period
on, it assumed a structural binary between "this world" and "the golden world," be it the
world of the gods, Christian truth, or the inner self. For Early Modem thinkers, theatrum
mundi opposed this world with the ideal (Shakespeare), contrast irony with
communicative meaning (More), and bifurcated the theater into 1. the roles humans play,
2. a space distinct from the "first world" ofthe author and audience (Sidney). Sidney
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divides theatricum mundi between this world and that (fictional, linguistic) one. Harry
Berger Jr. famously observes that a "second frame" develops in the Early Modem period,
a secondary level of fiction. Berger offers a second layer after the theatrical split in the
world William Egginton observes in How the World Became a Stage (2002). Egginton
argues that, in terms ofdramatic productions, late Medieval plays realized a distinction in
the space of the stage and that off the stage. Early Morality and Cycle Plays took place
with local actors or incorporated the town space into the plays, but increasingly ironic
performances frame the theatrical space; that is, theater takes place inside of a socially-
negotiated frame, and its differences from the real world included things like irony
(Chaucer), representation (of something in the "first world"), suspended performative
utterances, roles we play (More), Bakhtin's carnival, and so forth. This first world/play
world binary, theatricum mundi takes on a third split in the Early Modem period, Berger
observes. Plays, fiction, and other pieces ofliterature can have a "green world" to the
second world. Examples include Shakespeare's Midsummer Night's Dream (ca. 1594)
and As You Like It (1599); both plays have a "green world" to which characters in the
second world escape. Berger remarks that characters slip into the green world to problem
solve, work through solutions, take on new possibilities not ordinarily found in the first or
second worlds (i.e., Bottom becoming an ass). He concludes that the second world / green
world relationship is instructive ofthe possibilities of the first world / second world
relationship.
Sidney's Defense offers a different perspective on Berger's "green world." Sidney
draws on the figure of theatrum mundi strictly to emphasize the difference between the
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first and second worlds precisely because the second world has a more fluid relationship
with the green world. Things that happen in stories, in magical places like Utopia,
Thebes, and the fairy world, might cross over into the second world, but, for Sidney, both
are categorically different from the real world, the first world. Sidney emphasizes the
roles that men play precisely to distinguish them from the second/green worlds, from
poesy. The frame that "Theebes" over the stage door establishes straightforwardly
demarcates the fictional world of poesy from the real world of the child. The figure of
theatrum mundi emphasizes, for Sidney, the divergence of the real world from whatever
happens in poesy. It is against these traditions -- Sidney's emphatic separation of the play
world/world of poesy from roles in the real world and Shakespeare's use of theatricum
mundi to diagnose the dimensions of personal identity -- that Jonson poses Bartholomew
Fair, a play that begs to be situated in relationship to Bartholomew Fair, the historical
market that took place in Smithfield, every August 24 for hundreds of years, and in
relationship to Bartholomew, a character in the play.
.The Stoic and Christian doctrines of theatrum mundi respond to earlier Classical
notions on the theater of the world. Larry W. Riggs notes that Plato counterposes
theatrum mundi against the higher world of the Ideal. For classical authors, the conceit
suggests that the trials and tribulations we face are orchestrated for the entertainment of
the gods. Later, Christian thinkers "associate theatrical seeming with delusion and with
desire for transitory objects" (266). For Medieval Christians, theatrum mundi refers to
the allegorical relationship between biblical truths and the physical world. The "theater"
of the world is the fact that it mirrors the eternal, Biblical one. This world, however, is
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fallen. The theater of the world is the world of vanity, of the mundane, of the roles
humans play in their social relationships. At stake for Medieval Christians was the ways
this world reflected the higher world: well or poorly. Plays during this time period such
as Cycle Plays enact Biblical stories understood to allegorize the present circumstances.
During the same period, Morality Plays dramatize the general struggles the fallen man
undergoes. For instance, The Castel ofPerseurence [Perserverance] and Everyman, for
instance, had generalized characters such as Vice, Virtue, Sloth, Forgiveness, Christian
Charity, Everyman, and the like. Local characters would play parts in plays that took
place in town or even as a journey through own.
In contrast to the "sense of immediacy" of Cycle Plays and Morality Plays,
William Egginton notes the development of what he calls a "theatrical" experience of
space. Or, rather, he details how the meanings of theatrical change in Late Medieval and
Early Modern periods. In How the World Became A Stage (2003), Egginton argues that
the structure of reality develops a separable "frame," which distinguishes the theatrical
performance from daily life. These frames separate "this space" from "that space," actor
from audience, the play world and the real world, and ultimately, Egginton argues, word
from thing. Such a frame also distinguished the inner world from the outer world, the
man from the player. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century thinkers consistently investigate
identity through the figure of theatrum mundi. Fifteenth century philosopher Pico della
Mirandola, for instance, celebrates men's "chameleon nature," their ability to try on new
roles, because it allows men to move up the chain of being and become more like
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angels. 149 Desiderius Erasmus, roughly Mirandola's contemporary, also delights in
theatrum mundi; but for Erasmus the fact that men play roles makes the world a kind of
comedy.
what is all this life but a kind of comedy, wherein men walk up and down
in one another's disguises and act their respective parts, till the property-
man brings them back to the attiring house. And yet he often orders a
different dress, and makes him that came but just now off in the robes ofa
king put on the rags of a beggar. Thus are all things represented by
counterfeit, and yet without this there was no living. (44)
In this metaphor, man's life is nothing more than a series of "disguises," of "respective
parts" he plays. Man continues to play his part until God, "the property-man," orders a
change in fortune (and attending change in costume) or calls him home for good. For
Erasmus, the pleasure of such "counterfeit[ing] " outweighs its "falsity." Even more, the
fact that life is nothing but such a comedy suggests that there is no option but to
"counterfeit." For Erasmus, shifts in character are not only divinely ordained (or the
effect of Fortune), but are simply a fact oflife, the life oftheatrum mundi. As we have
149 "Beasts as soon as they are born (so says Lucilius) bring with them from their
mother's womb all they will ever possess. Spiritual beings, either from the beginning
or soon thereafter, become what they are to be for ever and ever. On man when he
came into life the Father conferred the seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of
life. Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear in him their
own fruit If they be vegetative, he will be like a plant. If sensitive, he 'will become
brutish. If rational, he will grow into a heavenly being. If intellectual he will be an
angel and the son of God. [...] Who would not admire this our chameleon? [... M]an
has no semblance that is inborn and is his very own but many that are external and
foreign to him." Oration on the Dignity ofMan (1486).
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seen, More agrees with his friend Erasmus; he also notes that life is like a series of roles.
And as Greenblatt reminds us, More had to take on a number of, sometimes
contradictory, roles in order to negotiate the difficult political atmosphere in which he
found himself. For More, these roles are not as fun and funny as Erasmus suggests. For
all that the world is a play, for More that play is deadly serious.
Theatrum mundi is, for Early modem playwrights and poets, an issue of identity.
The theater of the world suggests an internal self whose acts comprise the theater of the
real world. The theater or role playing enacted in the world was that of an interiorized
subject. For Pico dell Mirandola, Desiderius Erasmus, and Thomas More the fact than
men change roles does not present an ontological problem. Neither does it for Ben
Jonson, who commends his own poesy for its clarity and realism. Jonson staunchly
believes in an essential self beyond all theatrical change. In his '!Epistle to Katherine"
(1616) he notes
Because that [which] studies spectacles, and shows,
And after varied, as fresh objects goes,
Giddy with change, and therefore cannot see
Right, the way: yet must your comfort be
Your conscience, and not wonder, if none asks
For truth's complexion, where they all wear masks.
[...]
Let them on powders, oils, and paintings, spend,
Till that no usurer, nor his bawds dare lend
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Them, or their officers: and no man know,
Whether it be a face they wear or no
[...]
Madam, be bold to use this truest glass:
Wherein, your form, you still the same shall find;
Because it cannot change, nor such a mind.
(65-70, 77-80, 121-23)
Katherine, Jonson suggests, has "truth's complexion," a true self unsullied by cosmetics.
This self "cannot change," and because Jonson's poetry rejects "spectacles, and shows," it
can be her "truest glass." Some poets, Jonson insinuates, paint her "theatrically,"
"spectacularly," and other than she is; but Jonson's poetry is unique in that it accurately
represents her.
This faithfulness in the constant self beneath the costumes is not consistent across
Jonson's colleagues, however. Montaigne welcomes such shows. He claims that he
comes to know his true self only by being an actor.
"And if no one reads me, have I wasted my time, entertaining myself for
so many idle hours with such useful and agreeable thoughts? In modeling
this figure upon myself, I have had to fashion and compose myself so
often to bring myself out, that the model itself has to some extent grown
firm and taken shape. Painting myself for others, I have painted my
inward self with colors clearer than my original ones. I have no more
made my book than my book has made me.
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("On Giving the Lie" 1579-80)
For Montaigne, the expression of thoughts reveals the thinking self. In "painting
[himself] for others," Montaigne reveals his "inward self." Life cannot be anything but
theatrical, and this theater is the discovery of an authentic self because the self is a
performance. Montaigne suggests that theatrics and role playing are the only access we
have to an otherwise unknowable "authentic self." Montaigne's optimism about the
creative and epistemological consequences of the theatrical self is absent in Shakespeare's
As You Like It. Jaques offers a standard interpretation of the trope, remarking that
All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts[.]
(1.7.139-42)
For Jaques, theatrum mundi signifies the changes offate and the ultimate triviality of our
lives. The "last scene" of each life "is second childishness and mere oblivion, / Sans
teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything" (165-66). For Early Modem writers,
theatrum mundi figures personal identity, the relationship between inside and outside,
and the ways we all "act" (linguistically and otherwise). The Early Modem uptake of
theatrum mundi stressed its insights into personal identity, in a world increasingly
identified with role playing.
Sidney acknowledges the theatrical world into which men find themselves thrust,
the role-playing they perform working through daily social interactions. Real life is, as
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Sidney notes, a series of "parts." Sidney's use of the figure of theatrum mundi
emphasizes the reflective distance between the actual and poetic worlds, a distance that
permits moral instruction. He notes that"[A] busie louing Courtier, and a hartlesse
threatening Thraso; a selfe-wise seeming Schoolemaister, a wry transformed Traueller:
these if we saw walke in Stage names, which we plaie naturally, therein were delightfull
laughter, arid teaching delightfulnesse" (I2v). (We will return below to the relationship
for Sidney between names and theater.) Although "we play naturally" the roles that we
condemn in plays, seeing these "in Stage names" allows us to laugh at ourselves.
Reading poesy is like "in a glasse see[ing] his own filthinesse" (E3r). When reflecting on
one's own behavior, one can make a "judgment" (like the one lacking in Utopia,
according to the "sharp" reader) and choose not to occupy that role. Or at least to feel
distant enough from that role not to identify with it. When men "seeth these men
[players] play their parts" (E4v) they can decide they don't want to "dance the same
measure." For Sidney, theater figures the decorum men observe when they make moral
choices. Sidney notes that poesy is like theater in that "if euill men come to the stage,
they euer goe out (as the Tragedie writer answered [...J) so manicled as they litle animate
folks to follow them" (D4v). Reflecting on theater, then, allows one to make choices
about the roles one plays in life. When Sidney notes above that "we plaie naturally," he
accepts that men play roles in their lives, roles modeled on theatrical ones. Sidney paints
everyday, actual life as role-playing. We also see role playing in the playhouse, but in a
more distant way, through a frame that permits reflection. The theater constitutes an
imaginative space. Ifpoesy has the power to dissuade, then it also offers the ability to
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imagine. This is the right use of poesy, given that things are named for the good things
they offer. Sidney notes that poesy instructs men to behave well, and it is according to
this that we know poesy to be beneficial "vpon the right vse, ech thing receiues his title"
(G2v). And the name or "title" poesy signals its beneficence to and its distance from the
real world.
Sidney emphasizes that stories in plays offer men opportunities to reflect upon
their various virtues and vices. However, the fairy world of the play is markedly distinct
from the first world. The worlds have different structures, rules that pertain in one but not
the other. For instance, Sidney notes that the two worlds differ in how names work.
Historians, Sidney notes, are tied to honesty when using names. History is concerned the
"particular" man, and consider "whether Alcibiades did or suffered this or that" (D3r).
Names tie historians to truthful particulars about the individual carrying the name. The
second world of poesy, however, uses names to indicate general types. Poets are
concerned with the "vniversall wayes what is fit to be said or done, either in likelihood or
necessitie, which the Poesie considereth in his imposed names"; in poesy, names signal
virtues and other "universal" things; they are not limited to a particular individual. The
historian is concerned with "the true Cyrus" (D3r), but the poet works "not onely to make
a Cyrus, which had been but a particular excellency as nature might haue done, but to
bestow a Cyrus vpon the world to make many Cyrusses" (C1r). The conceit here is that
he historian describes the historical personage Cyrus whereas the poet creates a man for
all nations, a man who will inspire others to be like him. The name Cyrus works
differently for the historian and the poet. Questions of falsity and verity apply to the
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historical Cyrus, but not to the poetical one. Rather, names in poesy signal certain types
or characters from whom we can learn lessons. Considering Medea, "the Terentian
Gnato, and our Chawcers Pander," Sidney notes that "we now vse their names to signifie
their Trades" (D2r). That is, the names signify a certain kind of behavior. Whereas, for
More's Utopia, the name crystallizes the ironic utterance in whichficta come into contact
with the real world, Sidney observations on that the different ways names function in
"history" and in "poesy" serve to distinguish between the real world and poesy.
Sidney's Defense draws on the conceit of theatrum mundi to emphasize the
distance between the real (first) world and the poetic (second) one. Although he agrees
with his colleagues that men play roles, he nonetheless distinguishes between this kind of
role playing and the kind that poesy offers. Sidney bifurcates theater into the roles men
play and the dramatic performance ofa set piece on stage or a piece of poesy. For
Sidney, theater isn't just one mode among many types ofpoesy. Rather, because it is
performative, it is the ultimate figure for exploring the ways that poesy does -- and does
not -- take place. Poesy, Sidney notes, never takes place except insofar as it is framed
like Thebes; not even a child imagines that the frame between the world ofpoesy and the
real world ever breaks down. Theater, Sidney observes, Theater, he suggests, is
hygienically distant from the real world in which men must act. Sidney certainly answers
Gosson on his own terms (theater), but the long history of the frame separating theater
from the real world, a frame that includes things like different ways names work and the
suspension of some kinds of performative utterances, helps Sidney to emphasize the
clear-cut distinction between theater and the real world.
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The theatrical frame has, Sidney notes, been negotiated through rules like
preserving the unities. Unfortunately, Sidney observes, most contemporary playes are
"faultie both in place and time, the two necessarie Companions ofall corporall actions.
For where the Stage should alway represent but one place, and the vttermost time
presupposed in it, should bee both by Aristotles precept, and common reason, but one
day" (H4r). Here, Sidney notes that "corporall actions," those in the physical world, must
be accompanied by the "Companions" place and time. But in theater it is always possible
to suggest one moves through space or time in a in a way that marks the text as fictional.
One might reject the unities for precisely this reason; naysayers "ask "how then shall we
set foorth a storie, which contains both many places, and many times? And do they not
know that a Tragidie is tied to the lawes ofPoesie and not of Historie: [... ] many things
may be told which cannot be shewed" (H4v). The problem facing directors, Sidney
notes, is the difficulty unity causes to stories that cross both time and space. The
solution to this problem, Sidney suggests, is to rely on "reporting" rather than
"representing" (llr). The narrator may speak ofPeru, for instance, "But in action, I
cannot represent it without Pacolets Horse," a mythically swift horse whose appearance
would only draw attention to the fiction that is theater. Theater can reduce its fictional
appearance by "reporting" what it cannot represent by adhering to the unities. The
"corporall" world is marked by the unity of time and place whereas the play world is not
necessarily so since it can represent fictions.
Playwrights should observe the unities, but this is only because they don't have to,
because there are other options, because the unities are not a given like they are in the
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real world. The theater of Sidney's poesie is spatially distant from the actual world
insofar as it reflects on that world. This distance is the precondition for change. And the
difference between the two is that poesy precludes any poet from truly observing the
unities; as we have seen, performatives and names don't work the same way in theater, in
the performative dimension of poesy, as they do in the real world. The poet may conjure,
apologize, and defend; these are roles he takes on. But the joke ofpoesy-as-theater is that
performative language is suspended in poesy. For Sidney, theater figures the ways that
poesy is, and is not, performative.
CONTRACTING PERFORMANCE
It is against this history of theatrum mundi that Jonson offers his play
Bartholomew Fair. Jonson has available the figure of theater as the roles we play in life,
as an inquiry into interiority and what is called "the Early Modem Subject," and as the
difference between the real world and poesy. The ways that theater / performative
language fail is, for Jonson, the diagnostic condition ofliterature. Situating his Folio in
relationship to the book-buying public, Jonson explicitly engages the defining
characteristics of a literary commodity, of a text of literature. In distinct counterpoint to
Sidney's emphasis on the geographical distinction between poesy and the real world,
Jonson brings literature back into the real world but as product. For Jonson, the literary
text is marked for publication, and publication under the author's name. So, for Jonson,
theatrum mundi figures the way that the text plays on the market. Its place in the world is
as a linguistic commodity and a failed de futuro contract. Or, rather than failed, a
203
contract that depends upon some additional completion in the future (like a betrothal).
The literary product is, Jonson discovers, structured like.a contract whose fulfillment is
ever deferred. Theatrum mundi is the system oftrade, of economic exchange, of a
literary text, a marketable commodity, goods underwritten by the author. As a de futuro
contract, literature never takes place, although it promises to do so.
Jonson turns the figure oftheatricum mundi on the developments in mercantile
capitalism. Theater and economics together work out ways of representation and judging
value: For critic Jean-Christophe Agnew, whose Worlds Apart (1986) remains the
authoritative text on the mutually influential developments of theater and the market in
the Early Modem period, sixteenth century theatrum mundi refers to the developing
world of. The theater of the world, Agnew argues, was capitalism; "The deepened
resonance between commerciality and theatricality transformed the ancient Stoic and
Christian doctrine metaphor of the theatrum mundi from a simple, otherworldly statement
on human vanity into a complex, secular commentary on the commodity world" (12).
Agnew argues that the sixteenth-century "commodity world" is theatrical in the sense that
theater figures the many "exchanges" that take place on the market. In particular, theater
draws on marketplace for ways of thinking about representation; Agnew notes that "the
English stage developed formal, narrative, and thematic conventions that effectively
reproduced representational strategies and difficulties of the marketplace" (12). On the
market, strategies of representation would include justifying the value of the commodity
and drawing up legally binding contracts, for instance. And in the playhouse, the play is
the commodity being exchanged. The play is the representation of the process of
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representation itself, which then becomes a product on the market to be sold for fair
value.
Like Utopia, Bartholomew Fair is also interested in its cousin Bartholomew Fair,
a place in the world where people go about their daily business. The fact that the Fair is
the Fair calls attention to the ways that some places are structured with different rules;
because the Fair was outside the city limits, it had different laws than inside the city
limits; for instance, Smithfield was the site for executions and animal slaughter.
Literary performatives in the Early Modem Period have been interrogated most
substantially by Gail Kern Paster; Paster notes that the game of "vapors" in Bartholomew
Fair speaks to the emphatically material negotiation ofmasculine identity. Critical
attention to Bartholomew Fair tends to emphasize the text's inquiry into identity, into
making and breaking distinctions. One way the play looks into identity in linquistic
terms is through puns. Puns tum words against themselves instantaneously. "Vapors"
comes to mean so much that it ends up meaning nothing at all. The way words can mean
different things at the same time through pun signals a witty author, Bartholomew Fair
suggests. His interest in establishing the place of the author leads Jonson to consider the
importance of naming. Unlike Sidney for whom names are static and determinate
identities in the world ofhistory and simply suggestive for the world of poesy, Jonson
inquires into names through oaths and promises. Bartholomew Fair is overflowing with
future conditionals (If x, I would y) and oaths ("by 'r Lady). These oaths go horribly
awry, though. Revision means a marriage license endorses marriage between two people
not intended to marry, a warrant to do (whatever Troubleall wants) ends up authorizing
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an unintended transfer of property (the ward Grace), and the judgment Overdo passes on
the Fair is disrupted by his wife's violation of the peace (vomiting drunkenly). Both
written and spoken contracts (and oaths) fail to take place properly. The Induction of the
play, in which the Scrivener reads the Articles of Agreement between author and
audience, attempts to establish the rules of the economic contract that is the purchase of
Bartholomew Fair and its delivery. This Agreement reveals, however, how much the
author cannot control. Bartholomew Fair characterizes the indeterminate part ofthe play
in terms of place. In particular, the introduction reveals that the author cannot fix the
place of the audience (seats) or the judgments it makes about the play. For Bartholomew
Fair, literary decorum signifies the play's judgment or value. But the final judgment
never comes. The playas a literary commodity is structured like a failed de futuro
contract or oath; as Hemi Levebvre observes in The Production ofSpace (1974), "(social)
space is a (social) product."
The difficulties in summarizing Bartholomew Fair reflect the play's thematic
interests. The action in Bartholomew Fair is largely verbal sparring, puns, and witty
retorts. Bartholomew Fair is Jonson's last great comedy of humours. Like other
comedies of the period, the play diagnoses the divisive forces which undermine social
cohesion, forces which this play identifies as religious and class pretensions as well as
judicial blindness. The characters in Bartholomew Fair are dominated by humours, or
ruling passions, which results in the characters being somewhat two-dimensional types,
such as the impulsive aristocrat (Cokes), the hypocritical Puritan (Busy), the overzealous
judge (Overdo), and the chronically angry, self-important Wasp. Three groups -- one
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headed by Puritan Zeal-of-the-Land Busy, another of social gallants, and a third attending
the infantile aristocrat Bartholomew Cokes -- visit Bartholomew Fair to take part of its
pleasures. Justice Overdo also attends the fair in disguise in order to witness firsthand the
enormities that take place there. The center around which the action revolves is Ursula's
booth, a booth where fairgoers buy pig, beer and tobacco, play the quarrelsome language
game "vapors," as well as use the privy pot and visit prostitutes behind a curtain. The
end of the play finds the characters gathered in a playhouse to watch Littlewit's
adaptation ofHero and Leander. Overdo interrupts to accuse the fairgoers of atrocities,
but his poor reading leads to mistakes like identifying his wife as a prostitute. The
marriage license and warrant are responsible for negotiations which resolve the tensions
in the play. Quarlous obtains both the warrant through pretense, and he and Winwife
arrange for the theft of the marriage license; together, these result in Winwife's betrothal
to Grace and Quarlous' making money off the whole endeavor. The play ends with
Overdo's and Zeal Busy's changes of heart, and the company adjourns to Overdo's house
for supper.
The Jonsonian critic who focuses most on the performativity of language and
linguistic materiality in Bartholomew Fair is Gail Kern Paster. Paster argues that the
game of "vapors" the men play at Ursula's booth is a material negotiation of masculine
identity (Humoring the Body). 150 In their cups, the attendants at Ursula's pig-stall
regularly contradict one another and act generally disagreeable; this practice is referred to
150 See, in particular, chapter four, "Belching Quarrels."
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as "vapors." For instance, in full-blown game ofvapors in 4.4, Winwife, Quarlous,
Wasp, and other cranky fellows argue over the right to "have a vapor" or disagree with
those around him. Knockem responds to Winwife's complaint that he is not proud of the
place (the booth) with the question "Are you in vapours, sir?" (2.5.49-54); and he refers
to a "quarrel" as "foul vapours" (88-89). Although Mooncalf, among others, tries to
pacify the feisty crowd, pleading with Knockem "For the honour of our booth, none 0'
your vapours here" (56-57), Ursula insists that the men have a right "to be i' their
vapours" (59). Returning humoral theory to literary analysis, Paster reminds us that the
vapors are the hot air that a humoral body expresses. "Vapor is a liquid but especially the
living fluids ofplant and animal bodies" (237, cf. OED I and 2a); according to medical
treatises ofthe time, such as Elyot's Castelo/ReIth (1536) vapors rise up through the
body and their proper expression is necessary to regulate mental, emotional, and physical
health. For Paster, the humoral means of masculine identity demonstrates the materiality
of social negotiations and the social dimension ofmaterial expression.15 1 Throughout her
recent publications, Paster's project is to explore the intersection between linguistic and
material worlds in the sixteenth century. In her introduction to Reading the Early
151 For instance, Paster notes that, by the 1590s, the term "humors" signify "whims" or
"manners" which indicate gender and class privilege and thus distinguish a subject
from those around him (261). Paster argues that the game of vapors in Bartholomew
Fair is a means by which men establish their identities, assert themselves agains their
companions, and thus establish a social or relational position. Paster concludes that
vapors' and humors' expression in a social context renders material '.\That we nO\\T,
mistakenly see, as allegorical -- the physical impact of words. "The properly
deferential servant," she argues, ''feels the subjection required ofhis place" (211); and
that place is defined, in part, by one's verbal expressions, one's "vapors"; social place
is, in part, structured by the "humoral right ofway" (220).
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Modern Passions (2004), for instance, Paster argues that humors are a nexus of
body/language. They are not "internal objects" or "bodily states" but "an ecology or
transaction" (18). Along with Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Paster argues
that "the very language ofphysiology [...] helps us to determine phenomenology" (16).
We modems need to "literalize these locations that we have long presumed to be
figurative" (16) such as "hot blood." In this sense, Paster argues for the materiality of
words.
The performativity of language Paster reveals is the ability of verbal, humoral
expressions, physiologically to shape the individuals who speak, desire to speak, or hear
them. She returns our attention to the Galenic context of early modem thinkers' thoughts
on speech. (Galen popularized humoral theory in second-century Rome, and was an
authority well through the period under consideration there.) But while Galen (through
Paster) emphasizes the materiality of speech, neither have much to say about written
words. 152 Nor about figures of speech other than Paster's general observation that their
use encodes assumptions about class. What Paster does help us to see is that the
performative dimension of language -- including identity formation -- is material in a
physical sense. The game of vapors requires its participants to take up identities in
152 The oral tradition, while nonetheless ubiquituous, faded during the sixteenth century
with the rapid increase of literacy and the shift of oratory to letters. Residual orality
aside, Paster's observations on the degree to which the text's physical performance in .
the world is a fl_IDction of the fact that it is spoken out loud through the mediu..'TI of air
fail to provide a theory of the written text. In the newly commodified "literary" (as
distinct from rhetorical/poetic) "product" (as distinct from spoken language and the
sixteenth century musings we call poesie), the medium of transmission is quite
different: the text itself.
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relationship to one another and through language; in this sense, one might characterize
the speech in Bartholomew Fair as performative, theatrical, and material.
If we return to the game ofvapors, we also discover a way to read the witty banter
as commeritary on linguistic equivocation. In particular, the game depends on the ability
of "vapors" to mean virtually anything. The rules of the game are quite simple; as the
stage directions define them, "each man is to oppose the last man that spoke, whether it
concerned him or no" (143). Each man playing the game ofvapors "fight[s] for himself'
(95-96), he emphatically establishes his difference from those around him. But at the
same time, these differences are purely contextual; the men must listen to their fellow
quarrelers and adapt their claims correspondingly.
Knockem: To what do you say nay, sir?
[...]
Wasp: to anything, whatoseover it is, so long as I do not like it.
Whit: Pardon me, little man, dou musht like it a little.
Cutting: No, he must not like it at all, sir; there you are i' the wrong.
(4.4.30-35)
These men react to one another and the positions they take up depend upon those already
established; their opposition links them together and holds them in tension with one
another. Not only are the men's identity under negotiation here; so too the word vapor's.
Consider, for instance, the movement in the game in which the characters debate whether
the character Wasp "utters a sufficient vapour" (4.4.53), whether he "has sense" when he
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grants that the participants in the game may have reasons for disagreeing with on another
(4.4.51-52).
Cutting: Nay, it is no sufficientvapour, neither. I deny that.
Knockem: Then it is a sweet vapour.
Cutting: It may be a sweet vapour.
Wasp: Nay, it is no sweet vapour, neither, sir, it stinks and I'll stand to 'to
Whit: Yes, I tink it doesh shtink, captain. All vapour doesh shtink.
Wasp: Nay, then it does not stink, sir, and it shall not stink.
Cutting: By your leave, it may, sir.
Wasp: Aye, by my leave, it may stink; I know that.
(4.4.54-63)
What is at issue in this debate is what stance to take on vapors -- whether they are
"sufficient," "sweet," or "stink[y]" --, whether a quality is necessary, and whether it
extends to future instances. B'ut the only way to make any kind of sense of the debate is
to compare lines word for word in order to see where each man departs from his fellows,
what specific point each man takes issue with in order to establish his own unique
position on the nature of "vapors." The game of vapors strips language of its content and
down to its structure; it is pure relationality.
The game of vapors points to the play's rhetorical figures, the most common
being puns and similes. The word "vapor" has so many possible meanings -- from
argument to opinion to individualism to air -- that it simply signals the author of that
meaning, the individual who holds the opinion. The wordplay in the game of vapors
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exemplify the ways puns work in the play, puns being perhaps the most frequent
rhetorical figure in Bartholomew Fair. Puns demonstrate the "wit" of the author of the
speech. The play begins with Master Littlewit, proctor, discussing the marriage license
for Cokes and Grace, and his particular talent for word play. Littlewit jokes
"Bartholomew upon Bartholomew!" (1.1.8), Bartholomew Cokes receiving the license on
the day the Bartholomew Fair takes place. Littlewit chuckles at his word play, and he
continues in the same vein. He notes that he (himself) is "one 0' the prettiest wits 0'
Paul's, the Little wit.of London (so thou art called)" (12-13). Drawing on rhymes and
puns, Littlewit establishes his identity (his name) in his ability to be witty, as a "pretty
wit." A few lines later, Littlewit boasts that he is so good at manipulating words that he
can "make a Jack of thee instead of a John. (There I am again, lal)" (18-19). "Jack" is a
nickname for "John," and John is Littlewit's first name; in this passage, then, Littlewit
identifies his creattive power with the ability to make himself through puns and witty
language. Like vapors, the word "Littlewit" becomes so overdetermined that it is both
everything (Littlewit is the sole author of the play at this point, and the only author in the
play) and nothing (the witty remarks and puns are nothing more than hot air).
The first scene ofBartholomew Fair consists almost entirely of word play
punning on names. Littlewit repeats his wife's name (Win) both to emphasize that he
directs his speech at her ("good morrow, Win" 1.1.20) and his ability to make jokes (he
thanks his good "fortune to win him such a Win" 1.1.32). After this joke, Littlewit laughs
at himself "(There I am again!)" Littlewit identifies himself with the puns he makes on
names.
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I do feel conceits coming upon me, more than I am able to turn tongue to.
A pox 0' these pretenders to wit, your Three Cranes, Mitre, and Mermaid
men! Not a com or true salt nor a grain of right mustard amongst them all.
They may stand for places or so, again' the next witfall. (32-37)
Littlewit's "conceits," the puns and figures he uses, assumes Littlewit as an authorial
presence. These figures are made possible by the fact that they are written down, that
Bartholomew Fair is a printed text. The capitalization in "Win" helps signal the pun John
makes on his wife's name, and the capitalization in "Three Cranes, Mitre, and Mermaid"
indicate that they are both the names of and animal images for local taverns (Gosset 45,
fn). Moreover, capitalization and commas, which are printed not oral figures, indicates
the puns Littlewit makes. Littlewit claims to be better to those who pretend "to wit" (that
is, those who pretend to be witty) and to those who pretend in general, for example the
men from London taverns. 153
Across the acts, Bartholomew Fair plays on names relentlessly. The "name" and
"names" occur over 40 times (without a single occurrence of the word as a verb,
curiously). The effect is two-fold. First, names highlight the identity of the author, both
as a speaker (an identifiable individual) and a writer (as signaled by puns, punctuations).
Names distinguish individuals from one another. 154 "Win" is named "Win-the-Fight," a
153 This latter sense is OED "wit" (/) II.lO.b (archaic) "that is to say, namely."
154 It is not just names upon which the characters in Bartholomew Fair pun. After
Littlewit's introductory remarks, for instance, Winwife jokes that "None i' the earth"
live up to Win's example (1.2.11); Littlewit, he observes "ha' the garden" wherein his
"delicates" (delights, delicacies, wife) grow (12-13). "A wife here with a strawberry
breath, cherry lips, apricot cheeks, and a soft velvet head like a melicotton" (13-15).
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name that signals her Puritan upbringing rather than the local busybody "Winnifred"
(1.3.128-29). Cokes also jokes about his name; he announces that he will show Grace his
fair, so named "because ofBartholomew; you know my name is Bartholomew and
Bartholomew Fair" (1.5.67-69). Cokes capitalizes on his name again later in act four,
when he laments "Bartholomew Fair, quoth he! An ever any Bartholomew had that luck
in 't than have had, I'll be martyred for him, and in Smithfield too" (4.3.70-73). Having
had his pocket picked twice and even losing his sword, coat, and hat, Bartholomew
claims that the Fair isn't fair at all. He's had no "luck" in it. In fact, neither have many
others; Cokes' reference to the martyrs of Bartholomew Fair would remind the audience
both of the assassination of French Hugenots on St. Bartholomew's Day in 1692 and of
the Protestants that Queen Mary burned in Smithfield during her reign (Gosset 136 fn).
In each of these instances, the speaker establishes himself to be a witty speaker; he points
to himself by playing word games with names. Punning on names demonstrates a wit, an
author, in the equivocation of language, the ability of words to mean multiple things, to
be self-different.
Win's virtues are the "delicates" in Littlewit's garden; so too is her velvet cap, the
"Velvet head!" (18) that occasioned Littlewife's jokes a scene earlier (1.1.20-27). In
this exchange, puns, word play, and metaphors come together in Winwife's defense of
himself as a man in whom there's "no harm" (1.2.10). Puns and word games help
Littlewit, Winwife, and Win to distinguish themselves as wits, as witty. The emphasis
on names in the early puns of the play emphasize that puns and other rhetorical figures
establish identity. As Quarlous emphasizes to Winwife, Ursula's identity is a function
of her rhetorical figures. "I find by her similes she wanes apace" (2.5.133), Quarlous
. notes in an attempt to prove to Winwife that Ursula is calming down. It is through her
similes Quarlous identifies Ursula. In Bartholomew Fair, rhetorical figures
(specifically word play) point to the author, perform an identity.
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That puns and wit emphasize the speaking character is consistent with the critical
reading ofBartholomew Fair as concerned with individuation and identity. For instance,
James Robinson argues that the people who attend Bartholomew Fair must learn the
lesson that they all share a basic "animal nature," including the needs for food, drink, sex,
and urination. George Rowe agrees that the play is an investigation into identity although
he extends identity more broadly than Robinson; Rowe finds that the play is unusual
because the distinctions Jonson so avidly seeks in his other works fail to obtain in
Bartholomew Fair. Puns, then, speak both to the play's interest in individuation -- the
speaking wit -- and failure oflinguistic individuation -- the effect of the word "vapors"
meaning practically anything.
Vapors, and puns, point to the witty author. The author takes place through self-
different, ironic, equivocal language. And yet, the names (or identities) of these speaking
wits also become puns; the supposedly unequivocal moniker becomes, for Bartholomew
Fair, simply another opportunity for punning. The ability to pun on names, and the
linguistic self-difference to which puns point in Bartholomew Fair, has significant
consequences for the play's version of performative language. People's names arise at
two key points in Bartholomew Fair: first, they are a source of puns, second, they
underwrite oaths, promises, and contracts. The names that are supposed to guarantee
identity become, in the play's treatment of oaths and contracts, just as exchangeable as
puns. Bartholomew Fair discovers that names work like puns: they are exchangeable.
All of the written contracts in the play go awry in some fashion Of another as the names
on those contracts change over time. The fact ofexchange structures the text as a whole.
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Words and names are changed through punning. The linguistic exchange to which
punning -- particularly punning names -- refers also infects oaths, promises, and contracts
in Bartholomew Fair. Ultimately, as we shall see below, the way that these contracts fail
indicates the performative dimension of the literary commodity. Jonson's theatrum
mundi is the failed (or incomplete) performance, the unfulfilled contract, of the literary
text.
Other than puns, names come up in Bartholomew Fair most often as mild oaths.
In his first lines on stage, Overdo begins his story pledging to "justice's name, and the
King's, and for the commonwealth!" (2.1.1-2). After stating his purpose -- to be a better
judge by donning a disguise and finding out corruptions and "enormities" for himself--
Overdo closes his oath to uphold justice with the same invocation: "And as I began, so I'll
end: injustice's name, and the King's, and for the commonwealth" (1.2.48-50). As a
character, Overdo embodies the power of the name to underwrite performative
statements. When under siege from local personalities, Mistress Overdo repeats
(drunkenly) "in Master Overdo's name I charge you" (4.4.151) and "I thank you, honest
friends, in behalf 0' the Crown, and the peace, and in Master Overdo's name, for
suppressing enormities" (176-78). These oaths serve to bolster the validity of Mistress
Overdo's statements; the name justifies the promises. The name guarantees the
performativity of the oath.
Bartholomew Fair emphasizes the authorizing name of oaths in the form of
Justice Overdo's warrant. Local madman Troubleall intrudes into the play action
periodically to demand whether characters possess a "warrant" or permission for their
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actions. He himself seeks a warrant signed by Overdo; having been stung by the hand of
justice in the past, he refuses to do so much as make water without the Judge's permission
(much to his wife's distress; see 4.2). Troubleall continually demands of other characters
to see warrants from Judge Overdo -- "show it me" (4.6.154). Justice Overdo, "glad to
hear my name is [his] terror" (2.2.73), gives Troubleall a blank warrant; he authorizes
whatever Troubleall needs to do in the future. Unfortunately, the Troubleall to whom
Overdo gives the warrant is actually a disguised Quarlous, who uses the warrant to claim
Grace as his own ward (rather than Overdo's) and thus have the right to her property upon
her marriage. As a character, Troubleall draws attention to the troublesome fact that the
contracts authorized with a signature fail to perform as intended in this play. The play
offers several examples of contracts ofnames that go awry: the wedding license,
Overdo's warrant, the contract by which Quarlous and Winwife determine who between
them would marry Grace, the play itself (which is framed by the Acts ofAgreement), and
the puppet play that takes Hero and Leander radically awry.
Each of the contracts in the play (more about the Induction shortly) "misfires" or
is "unhappy" in some way. As J.L. Austin defines it, a performative utterance is
"infelicitious" or void when it "misfires." Misfires arise when any of conditions A
through B are not met.
AI) the conventional procedure must exist, A2) the persons involved must
be appropriate, B1) the procedure must be executed by all parties
correctly, B2) and completely, r1) when appropriate, the person must have
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the implied internal feelings and so intend to conduct themselves further,
and r2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (15)
In contrast to the infelicitious misfires indicated by the Latin alphabet, violations of the
Greek alphabet (here r) result in "abuses": "insincerity," "bad faith," and "lying." When
A or B are unfulfilled, the performative is null and void; the contract fails to be fulfilled.
When r is unfulfilled, the contract is fulfilled but badly, incorrectly, uncontrollably.
Bartholomew Fair demonstrates both. Characters make promises that they intend to keep
and do keep, they intend to keep promises but are unable to (misfire), and have shifty
intention while promising such that the completion of the contract is inconsistent with its
declared intention and does something that the author does not intend it to do. In
Bartholomew Fair, the contract or "motion" by which Quarlous, Winwife, and Grace
determine Grace's husband is both felicitous and happy (although Quarlous himself is
unhappy that he loses). The marriage license shifts from a happy to an unhappy contract
when the names are rubbed out, and the text suggests that the license is an "insincere"
contract insofar as Cokes fails to do what is necessary to keep up his part of the bargain
(he loses Grace partly by his inability to keep anything and partly by his sheer inability to
pay attention to anyone other than himself).
For Cokes, the inability to follow through on his promise is the fundamental
cause of his undoing. The wedding license illustrates one kind of performative utterance
-- and signed contract -- that was at issue in Early Modem England: the marriage vow.
The temporal problematics ofthe marital "will" surfaces in a number ofliterary works.
Shakespeare's sonnet 113, for instance, notes that "The world will wail thee, like a
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makeless wife; / The world will be thy widow and still weep" (4-5). In line 4, the Poet
remarks on the way that "will" plays out in marriage. In the sixteenth century,
individuals could still marry one another without the intermediary of a priest; a
"handfast," agreement to be married, or consummation all signaled the marriage. I55 But
the problem with the world "will" when considered in a marriage contract is that it may
also refer to the future; "I will marry you" could mean either "I am now marrying you,"
or "I will marry you at some time in the future." In sonnet 113, the Poet laments that the
young man never fulfills his "will" and the (promised) wife remains "makeless." The
temporal problematics of the "will" is important to church officials because they want to
sanction as many unions as possible, and it is also important to the aristocratic system
because it is invested in keeping genealogies tidy and inheritances in line, and thus far
more likely to insist that "will" referred to an as-yet-unfulfilled marriage; thus the
dalliance of the nobleman with the local milkmaid need not necessarily disrupt the
lineage. But the "will" of marriage is only one of many de futuro contracts of interest to
Early Modem thinkers. The notion of credit, for instance, depends upon promises being
fulfilled in the future. In fact, the Early Modem marriage contract is also an economic
one, including the transfer of ineritances, dowries, and so forth.
The marriage contract is a particularly apt figure for the temporally problematic
performative. The play begins with Quarlous, Winwife and Littlewit discussing the
previous evening's antics. Having drunk a good deal, the men speculate on possible
marriage contracts. As the play opens the next morning, Quarlous worries to Quarlous
155 For more on specific changes in Renaissance marriage law, see Subha Mukherji's Law
and Representation in Early Modern Drama (2006).
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worries to Littlewit nifyou have that fearful quality, John, to remember when you are
sober, John, what you promise drunk, John, I shall take heed of you, Johnn (1.3.32-35).
Here, Quarlous' repetition of John's name associates the promise he made with his name,
reminding us of the fact that the power of contracts are in the names that underwrite
them. Quarlous specifically hopes that John will not keep his promise, claiming that if
John remembers promises made when drunk, he (Quarlous) will be more careful of what
he says in the future. That the men were drunk, Quarlous suggests, nullifies or brackets
whatever promises were made and agreements reached. J.L. Austin notes a series of
conditions that must be satisfied in order for a performative utterance to be valid and to
come off as intended. The situation of drunken promising is both a misfire and abuse.
Drunken promises misfire because the men making them 1Jlust have been heard and have
been understood by him to be making a promise. Quarlous draws on the hope that
drunken promises are null and void. The conditions for making a promise recognized as
such have not been met. Like the majority of the oaths and name-taking in the play, the
promises to which Quarlous refers fail to meet the initial conditions of following
procedure and having the intention to go through with the promise. The first problem is a
misfire; the performative simply doesn't mean anything, or at least, it doesn't constitute a
performative utterance in the fullest sense of the term. As Austin notes of the misfire,
nwhen the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport to invoke is disallowed
or is botchedn (16). Bartholomew Fair thus describes a space where performatives are
suspended according to a social agreement. The spoken oath, in Bartholomew Fair, is
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largely a joke, a tool in the game ofwits. The failure ofthis performativepoints to the
witty author; theatricum mundi is the spectacular way that a wit -- an author -- puns.
In general, the mild spoken oaths misfire because the speakers fail to follow up
and fulfill the oaths. Conditional verbs emphasize the future conditions ofpromises.
Interrogating Edgeworth, whom Quarlous hires to steal the marriage license, Quarlous
inquires "But look you do it now, sirrah, and keep your word, or --." To which
Edgeworth replies "Sir, if I ever break my word with a gentleman, may I never read word
at my need" (3.5.275-78). Here, the two men negotiate the possibility that Edgeworth
will not keep his promise (that he made in the past about the future), and Edgeworth
defends himself with a promise of fidelity based on a future conditional: if Edgeworth
breaks his promise, may he be executed (if the situation comes up). Here, Edgeworth
emphasizes his role as the author of the promise when protesting its sincerity; he is the
"I" who reads "my words." Yet, Edgeworth is actually joking here; both the reader ofthe
play and Quarlous know Edgeworth's reputation, and that he is not to be trusted.
Grounding the performativity of the oath in the author here does not provide the
guarantee it professes. We know that, should he be imprisoned for his crimes, Edgeworth
would use all means possible to excuse himself. The particular problem with
Edgeworth's oath here, then, is that the future oath, the guarantee of society, is neither
believable nor achievable at this moment, and so the performative cannot yet be fulfilled.
The modals and future conditionals that fill Bartholomew Fair draw out the temporal
dimension of the contracts with which the text is concerned. They highlight the lack of
sincerity of Jonson's characters, a lack that brackets the oaths such that they're not
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expected to be performed as they would be in the "first world." These performatives are
always in the future, never fulfilled in the present.
The second way that contracts fail in Bartholomew Fair is specific to written
contracts. The two written contracts in the play -- Grace's marriage license and Overdo's
warrant -- are problematic because the names on then change. Bartholomew Fair reflects
on the assumption Austin merely presumes: the consistent identity of the person/people
involved in the performative utterance. Austin assumes that the individuals involved in
the initial promise must be the same as those when the promise is "fulfilled" (either
completely or continually). He remarks that performatives are in the first person and
leaves it at this (61). Bartholomew Fair, on the otherhand, exchanges characters for one
another; the first person changes: Winwife for Cokes on the license, Quarlous for
Troubleall on the warrant, and Palamon the word for Winwife the man on the paper
Grace holds. The problem with these written contracts is that there is an exchange of
names on each. Written contracts, for Bartholomew Fair, figure the exchangeability of
names, of names for their referents, and ultimately, the exchangeability of products on the
market. Quarlous discovers, quite to his dismay, how arbitrarily exchangeable names are,
the very names that are supposed to guarantee an oath, underwrite a promise. In this
curious episode, Quarlous and Winwife corner Grace away from Cokes and lament his
unfitness as a future husband. They offer themselves as surrogates. Grace agrees that
Cokes is less than desirable; she bemoans the fact that "rather than to be joked with this
bridegroom is appointed me, I would take up any husband, almost upon trust" (4.3.11-
13). However, Grace is not so coarse as to propose to accept Quarlous or Winwife
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specifically as replacements. She reproves them "I am no she that affects to be quarreled
for, or have my name or fortune made the question of men's swords" (3-5). Instead, she
makes the men promise to a totally random arbitration.
If you would not give it [the reason for her refusal to accept one over the
other] to my modesty, allow it yet to my wit. Give me so much ofwoman
and cunning as not to betray myself impertinently. How can I judge of
you so far as to a choice without knowing you more? You are both equal
and a like to me yet, and so indifferently affected by me as each of you
might be the man if you other were away. For you are reasonable
creatures; you have understanding and discourse. And if fate send me an
understanding husband, I have no fear at all but mine own manners shall
make him a good one. (30-39)
Grace claims that her modesty and manners prohibits her choice between Quarlous and
Winwife; here decorum is coded in terms of distinction, specifically between two
interchangeable objects. Their names become the simple mark of difference between two
things. Grace both claims and refuses to make a "judgement": she establishes that the
two are exchangeable but that she cannot discriminate between them. The solution to the
problem Grace poses is no less arbitrary than Grace herself is. She asks the two to pick
a word, or a name, what you like best -- but of two or three syllables at
most -- and the next person that comes this way (because destiny has a
high hand in businesses of this nature) I'll demand which of the two worlds
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he or she doth approve; and according to that sentence fix my resolution
and affection without change. (50-56)
Grace asks the men to choose substitute names or words, which will be distinguished at
random by the next passerby (who, it just so happens, is a madman who has trouble
navigating any scenario in which he finds himself). The names the men pick serve as
their agreement to the "motion" Grace presents (42). Although not their own in terms of
signature, the names the men choose (Argalus and Palamon) signal their agreement to the
contract. These names indicate their present intention (they agree to a particular method
of distinction) as well as a future one (to abide by that distinction). The name itself
authorizes the contract, not the referent of that name. The authorizing force behind the
performativity, however, gets lost in the potentially infinite exchange of names. The
future fulfillment of the promises the names make, however, is unclear, given the
arbitrary choice of names. The names that authorize this oath are liberated of
individuality and become pure exchangeability. The written contract of a de futuro style
promise is, for Bartholomew Fair, radically open to an unknown future in which it will
be exchanged.
The surrogate names point up the fact that any man could agree to such a contract;
the specificity of the men involved, while of utmost important to the characters, is
unimportant in terms ofhow the contract plays out. One man will win, the other lose,
and Grace wed. Any man can hold these contracts and, curiously, they pertain even when
transferred from one signer to another. This is the market contract, the promise to buy or
provide a certain amount of product in the future, the actually people fulfilling the
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obligation being those to whom this contract is traded in the mean time. 156 These
contracts can be exchanged so that new men hold them. Although the play emphasizes
the degree to which names, signatures, construct binding oaths, the fact that the people
who "ownll the contracts, who have traded place with the original signers, have the final
responsibility for the contract undercuts the inherent power of the name to guarantee an
oath. Quarlous calls attention to the apparently meaningless exchange of names when
lamenting Troubleall's choice; "Palamon the word, and Winwife the man?"(5.2.37 and
48). The individual name could be any other (under the same circumstances) and the
promise the contract records could still maintain. The written contracts in this play go
awry in that they perform other than as intended, and yet they still perform (or at least
promise to) nonetheless. Bartholomew Fair draws attention to the "ridiculous" (Ind. 142)
and "preposterous" (157) possibility that names -- and people -- be exchanged for one
another in the Induction. In particular, the Articles rebuff any critical attempt to read the
text as satire, as referring to one person by the name of another. According to the
Scrivener, the author of the play forbids the ridiculous "state-decipherer or politic
picklock" who "search[es] out who was meant by the gingerbread woman, who by the
hobbyhorse man" and so forth (142-43). The author, by means of the Articles, attempts
to forbid those who try to read too much into the play, to see it as a satire, a way to mock
individuals through secret names. Ultimately, the author condemns such a practice of
switching people and opinions (virtually the same things in this play). And yet, the
156 Note that this type of contract in its written form was a relatively new development in
the late sixteenth century. See Luke Wilson's Theaters ofIntention for more on the
ways that changing laws and market conditions frame Early Modem theater.
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author's need to make the prohibition highlights the fact that playwrights lambast each
other all the time under covert intendments like satire. The anxiety the author shows here
over the exchangablity ofnames, and therefore of men, is all over the Induction. The
Induction begins with the Stage-keeper, who excuses the late start of the show and then
offers his "judgement" (51) of the play. The play "is like to be a very conceited scury
one" (9), the Stage-Keeper opines. The fair does not include a "Kindheart" (dentist),
"Nor a juggler with a well-educated ape" (16-17). Indeed, the play fails to live up to the
expectations set "in Master Tarlton's time" some thirty-odd years earlier (37). The Book-
keeper interrupts the Stage-keeper and throws him off stage, introducing in his place the
Scrivener, who reads the
Articles of Agreement, indented, between the spectators or hearers at the
Hope on the Bankside, in the county of Surrey, on the one party, and the
author ofBartholomew Fair in the said place and county, on the other
party, the one-and-theireith day of October 1614 and in the twelfth year of
the reign of our Soverign Lord, James. (65-71)
The Agreement is rather straightforward. It consists offive main points. First, the
audience members "agree to remain in the places their money or friends have put them
in" for the duration of the play, which fills the "space of two hours and a half," the author
promises them (79-84). Second, the author "depart[s] with his right" and leaves it to the
audience members to judge the play according "to their free will of censure," provided
that they only judge as much as they paid for (a six-penny seat permits a six-penny
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judgement) (87_95).157 Third, every man must make his own judgement; he may not
"censure by contagion" (101) or change his opinion (he must be "fixed and settled in his
censure" 103-04). Fourth, the Author stipulates that "how great soever the expectation
be, no person here is to expect more than he knows or better ware than a fair will afford,
neither to look back to the sword-and-buckler age of Smithfield, but content himself with
the present" (117-20). Finally, the articles specify that no one shall look for satire nor
censure the play for the play's rough language (138-56). The Articles conclude with the
final terms of the performance by which the Articles will be signed and sealed: applause.
The Articles joke that, "preposterously," audience members "put to your seals already
(which is your money)" the arrangement; now they need only to "add the other part of
suffrage, your hands" (157-59).
The Articles bespeak the author's anxiety that the audience members have virtual
free reign aver the play. The author is limited to the fact that he must produce a play, at
Smithfield, for a set period of time. Audience members, on the other hand, are free to be
rowdy. The Articles hope to fix them in their seats, but the very anxieties to which the
Articles speak invokes the image of a loud, hooting audience, clamoring over seat backs,
scoffing at the action on stage. Indeed, the Articles themselves speak to the dirt, smell,
and noise ofthe place. The Articles' attempt to fix the audience "in [their] place[s]"
makes physical the anxiety the author has that the audience members will change their
opinions over time. The Articles long for a well-behaved fellow who will keep the same
157 Additional clauses here include that a man may judge for his friends if he paid for
their seats, provided that he sees to it that they keep quiet, and the stipulation that a
man's judgment "is not to get above his wit" (93).
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judgment of a play some twenty years later (109-10). Of course, such steadfastness
bespeaks a "virtuous and staid ignorance" (113), the author appreciates him because
"Such a one the author knows where to find him" (114-15). This curious expression
equates judgment, or opinion about the play, with the place of the author. The ruefulness
of this passage, though, reflects the author's recognition that judgment always changes
overtime. Ifjudgment of the play is shaped by the decorum, by the text's attention to
local circumstances, the literary place decorum delimits is never fully complete for two
reasons: first, playgoers may change their minds as circumstances change and theater
develops into its newest trend; second, the audience of the text is never determinate and
thus the judgment or place of the text remains forever open to future readers. If we treat
Bartholomew Fair as a printed text that can be reprinted for centuries to come, then the
place of the play, the reader's judgment of it, never fully takes place. The "place" of the
audience, its identity and opinion changes over time.
As the audience members change, so to do their names and their opinions. But
because Bartholomew Fair is a commodity on the market; it can be traded infinitely.
And because money is both anonymous and the great equalizer, the names on the other
end ofthe contract of exchange should be irrelevant. Given that Bartholomew Fair was
the first play Jonson wrote after Catiline (1611), which was a dismal failure but Jonson's
highest hope, the author's attempt to control the· audience members' judgments on his play
is understandable. But the play's larger interest in contracts and the identity of those who
fulfill the contracts asks us to read the Articles as a discourse on the problem of inability
of the author to fix the names affixed to the contract that is the text. The exchange of
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responsibility in the contracts in the body of the play, Winwife scratching out Cokes'
name and replacing it with his own, and the play's emphasis on the ways that contracts
are stretched out over time all magnify ten-fold in the Induction, which tries to come to
terms with the fact that any man might enter the audience or take up the text and enter
into contract with the author at any point in the future.
This exchangeability ofnames on the contract that is the text ofBartholomew
Fair is authorized by one significant fact: the play is a product on the economic market.
As a product on the market, the play is inherently "legitimate," underwritten by an
implicit promise and intent of the fact it had an author. But it can change hands ad
nauseum. And just like the purchasers of the product are replaceable and anonymous, so
too the product always "misfires" and fails to fulfill authorial intention. The Induction
mocks the Stage-keeper's complaints about what the play fails to include by explaining
what the play offers instead.
Instead of a little Davy to take toll 0' the bawds, the author doth promise a
strutting horse-courser, with a leer drunkard [...]. And then for a
Kindheart, the tooth drawer, a fine oily pig woman with her tapster to big
you welcome, and a consort of roarers for music. A wise Justice of the
Peace meditant, instead of a juggler with an ape. (121-27)
Here, the Articles note what the play substitutes for the certain qualities and personages
the Stage-keeper demands. Bartholomew Fair brings the play up-to-date, mocks those
who use Latin phrases (such as Overdo), and offers instead a "sweet singer ofnew
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ballads" (128). One must not expect the dead Tarlton or ancient "sword-and-buckler
age"; the present Fair offers modem equivalents, the going rate on the market.
The Induction insists that the play is a viable product on the market.
Appropriately, this claim is consistent with the fair and market ethics, in which systems
of equivalents are introduced by barter, exchange, and money economies. The Articles
conclude with a plea from the author, who
Prays you to believe his ware is still the same, else you will make him
justly suspect that he that is 0 loath to look on a baby or an hobby horse
here would be glad to take up a commodity of them, at any laughter or
loss, in another place. (164-67)
Here, the author condemns those who would mock the "hobby horses" his play offers yet
buy them another time in another place. His hobby horse, his play, is no different from
the others even though it is on stage. The play is a "commodity," a "ware" on the same
market as rIa baby or an hobby horse." Here Jonson rejects the frame that distinguishes
the play space from the real world. The play is a product just like any other on the
capitalist market. And the system of exchange insures that the hobby horse on stage is
subject to the same value system as a hobby horse sold in Smithfield or anywhere else.
One is no better (or worse) than another simply because it's on stage.
In fact, the author has gone to special lengths to ensure that his ware is just the
same as all the others on the market, as the Fair for which his Fair is supposed to be
exchanged. The Scrivener observes that,
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though the Fair be not kept in the same region that some here, perhaps,
would have it, yet think that therein the author hat observed a special
decorum, the place being as dirty as Smithfield and as stinking every whit.
(159-63)
The Hope Theater, having doubled as a bull- and bear-baiting ring (Gurr 120), is likely
saturated with stink just like Smithfield, a place teeming with animals executed and
dressed on the spot (as well as being a popular site for dueling and public executions).
Indeed, the Stage-keeper comes to the stage under the pretext of sweeping off apples
from previous bear-baiting episodes, blurring the lines between the play, the place in
which it takes place, and the fair world the play claims to represent. In context, the author
suggests that, because the Fair has the same bad qualities as the Fair, the audience
members get a good deal. For Bartholomew Fair, decorum reflects the kind ofdeal on
the market. Decorum signals a fair trade. This trade returns the text to the world as a
physical product on the market, a market that makes the playas open to exchange as
husbands, hobby horses, words, and names. And this exchange is infinite. The Articles
determine the terms of the exchange, but in so doing cast the play to a market of leveling
forces in which exchange is never ceasing. As a contract, then, the literary text is never
fulfilled. It looks to the future, but never finally takes place.
The Induction suggests that the text-as-commodity is in the world as a
performative failure (or perpetual incompletion). Although the literary text can be traded,
and revalued, ad infinitum, its place is still never entirely present. Judgment -- the play's
take on decorum -- is infinitely deferred into the future. The play never fully takes place.
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Even though the work of literature returns to the physical world in the form of a product
and structured as an economic contract, its place is still not in the real world. The puppet
play at the end ofBartholomew Fair clarifies exactly how the text-as-product relates to
the world of the audience. In short, Littlewit updates Hero and Leander for modem
audiences. Littlewit explains
As for the Hellespont, I imagine our Thames here; and then Leander I
make a dyer's son about Puddle Wharf; and Hero a wench 0' the Bankside,
who going over one morning to old Fish Street, Leander spies her land at
Trig stairs, and falls in love with her. Now I do introduce Cupid, having
metamorphosed himself into a drawer [tapster], and he strakes Hero in
love with a pint of sherry.
(5.4.122-28)
This updated version of Hero and Leander mocks the tastes of play audiences who prefer
trashy city comedies to noble Greek and Roman ones (such as Jonson's Cataline). It also
calls attention to the fact that, once it leaves the author's hands, it is loose upon the world,
transforming in ways over which the author has little control. Like the (absent) printed
text of Littlewit's play, the mockery of the Greek classic evokes as it laments the
inaccessibility of authorial intention. The play is simply one more product on the market
of exchange. IS8 But this does not mean that the play shares "the unities" with the present
lS8 And for all of his idiocy, Cokes is the one person to recognize this. Lamenting the
loss of the toys he bought from Lantern, Cokes finds their replacements in the play.
Hero shall be my fairing; but which of my fairings? Le' me see -- I' faith,
my fiddle! And Leander my fiddlestick; then Damon my drum; and
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world. The biggest joke ofthe puppet play is that the puppets transgress the play frame.
They beat the puppet master and audience members over the heads, debate (and trounce)
Puritain Zeal-of-the-Land Busy, argue with Cokes, and flash the audience. This behavior
is, we are to understand, truly bad drama, one that makes a mockery of the profession
(and gives dramatists such as Jonson such a bad name). And the puppet play also draws
attention to the fact that the audience always takes the literary text out of the author's
hands and mangles the contract he wishes to establish.
For Jonson, the second world does not take place, but it has a place in the real
world as a product. This product is in the form of a de futuro contract, so it is always
deferred; it never takes place. The text is in the real world insofar as it is a product on the
market. Like the marriage license whose "length and breadth" Cokes wishes to gaze
upon (1.5.39), the text is a physical product. The structure of this product, however, is
that of a failed performative. In specific, it is structured like an economic de futuro
contract. The futuricity of this contract, however, its iterability and the infinite exchange
of names the contract faces, means that the contract is never fulfilled, and the play never
finally takes place. Always a "bad deal" for the author, the text is nonetheless a contract
for which the author is responsible; his name guarantees the contract that is the literary
text on the open market, but the other end of the contract, the patrons, are infinitely
exchangeable. After reading the Articles, the Scrivner reveals to the audience that,
actually, it has already agreed to the contract he just read. He notes that they have put
Pythias my pipe, and the ghost ofDionysius my hobby-horse.
(5.4.133-36)
The other characters in the play mock Cokes for his inability to keep track ofhis
purchases as bad business sense; he is constantly losing money.
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their "seals already (which is your money)" to the contract (Ind. 157-58). Now they must
"add the other part of suffrage, your hands" (158-59) and clap, welcoming the play. The
signature signifying audience members' acceptance of the contracted commodity the
author offers is money. The contract that is the play is signed by the author and sealed by
the audience and yet, it never takes place, even though the play is performed time and
time again. In an analysis of the different epistemologies the play offers, Margaret
Tudeau-Clayton argues that only two things are "out of place" in Bartholomew Fair:
Justice Overdo and humanist education (for which Overdo stands). Tudeau-Clayton
argues that humanist learning is deflected into the printed text, where it presumably is "in
place." Certainly, given the play's inquiry into individuation, identity, and social place,
the play is deeply concerned with being in place and out of place. One thing it cannot do,
however, is to take place. And it is this tradition that Austin inherits when he notes,
glibly, that performatives simply do not apply in a poem.
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CHAPTER VII
"MELANCHOLY FOR THE MATTER"
In a characteristic fit ofpique, Cokes seizes upon the idea ofvisiting
Bartholomew Fair. Sensing that his chaperone Wasp is not enthusiastic about the idea,
Cokes insists that the visit is predestined; "Numps, I will see it, Numps 'tis decreed.
Never be melancholy for the matter" (1.5.89-90). In context, the "matter" about which
Wasp is (supposedly) melancholic is the visit to the Fair. However, given that Cokes has
just mistaken the (performative) point ofthe marriage license and demanded to see the
"length and the breadth on 't" (1.5.39), Wasp may be melancholy for another matter: for
the world in which language is something to be seen, something material with a length
and breadth.
The term "melancholy" appears four times in Bartholomew Fair. This is not
terribly surprising given that the play is preoccupied with the humors, one ofwhich
(black bile) is understood to be directly responsible for melancholy. However,
melancholy does not appear in the context ofhumors or the game of vapors in
Bartholomew Fair. Rather, the term exclusively refers to the inadequacies oflanguage.
Mooncalfthinks that Arthur Bradley (Justice Overdo in disguise) must be melancholy
because "nobody talks to him" (2.4.61). Likewise, Winwife assumes that Grace must be
melancholy because she stands alone, outside the circle of conversation (3.4.69).
Melancholy is not only a response to being left out of the conversation; it is also a
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function of the lack of words more generally. Observing an obviously uncomfortable
Mrs. Overdo, Captain Whit inquires "Art tou melancholy?" (4.4.191-92). Whit's
interpretation is reasonable, Mrs. Overdo concedes, given the chaotic "enormities" taking
place around them, but Mrs. Overdo's condition is due to another reason, one which she
"cannot with modesty speak of" (197). Fortunately for Mrs. Overdo, Whit interprets her
embarrassment correctly and helps her find a chamber pot. The sheer physicality of Mrs.
Overdo's troubles emphasizes how curious it is that, in a play preoccupied with humors,
vapors, and bodily effluvia, melancholia is a linguistic matter, not a bodily one.
There is a long history of literary melancholia. In her classic The Gendering of
Melancholia (1992), Julia Schiesari historicizes melancholia as a masculinist position
that values creative genius while denigrating women's depression. Petrarch, for instance,
finds creative inspiration in his unrequited love, and Ficino revises the Saturnine tradition
to signal the great, individualistic man who receives the desire to seek truth and the gift
of writing from the godS.159 Thus it is to be expected that an early modem text that
examines masculine practices of individuation ("vapors") would consider melancholia.
But in Jonson's Bartholomew Fair, melancholy suggests a new linguistic problem. It is
less interested in melancholy as a principle of individuation in terms ofhuman identity
than as an indication of the inadequacy oflanguage. For Bartholomew Fair, melancholy
signals a linguistic absence, particularly the absence of "matter" in language.
159 All humors have ruling planets, and melancholy's is Saturn. See Schiesari's chapter
two for more details.
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THE MATTER FOR MELANCHOLY
In his Anatomy ofMelancholy, Robert Burton (1621, 1651i 60 considers the
possibility that logic is medicinal. At the end of section 1.2.3.2, he asserts "And,
therefore, to conclude that which I first intended, to be base by birth, meanly born, is no
such disparagement. And thus have I proved what I had to prove" (507). This
announcement is no less surprising to Burton's reader than to mine; this starting
conclusion comes after a lengthy and meandering tirade, most recently about how the
many mental faculties a man might have. In eleven pages, Burton uses logic to persuade
men from being melancholy due to poverty or servitude. Emphasizing that he has proven
his point, Burton suggests he has cured young men of this malady. And yet, simply
because Burton can use logic to prove that poverty need not be a cause of melancholy
does not mean that listening to this tirade produces actual medical benefits to the reader's
body. In this lengthy text, a common book of every word of wisdom on the subject of
melancholy, Burton establishes that melancholia can be a medical condition, a humoral
imbalance (1.2.5.2.and the whole section on "particular causes"). And yet, he claims to
solve this disease with logic, by proving it wrong. The joke here is that logic and the
medicinal body are supposed to belong to two different systems; the medical body might
be arranged logically, but logic doesn't work a medicinal cure on a body. Burton invokes
the categorical distinction between logic and the body as carelessly as ajoke.
160 Burton's Anatomy went through several editions between the first 1621 Folio and the
1651 (post.) edition; for the sake of simplicity and the substantive editory apparatus, I
use the Dell and Jordan-Smith edition (1927) based on the 1651 edition. A full-length
scholarly chapter would compare the original 1621 with 1651 editions.
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At its broadest, this dissertation inquires into Early Modem methods of
categorization that determine relationships between rhetoric and literature and the world,
between logic and medicine. Just as these relationships undergo changes in fields we
now call physics, cartography, and economics, so too do they shift in the practice of
taxonomy itself, particularly as expressed in botany, zoology, and logic. Like
cartography, biological and zoological taxonomies lose narrative, their linguistic
dimension, in favor of purely visual characteristics and family relationships. As M.M.
Slaughter observes in Universal languages and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth
century (1982), seventeenth-century scientific taxonomies largely emphasize visual
characteristics (such as dissections) and abstract the specimen from its context.
Sixteenth-century folk taxonomies, on the other hand, include narrative, mythological
history, moral and mystical interpretations, emblems, and medicinal uses (see
Appendices Di and Dii.) The scientific and logical taxonomic methodologies themselves,
Slaughter explains, are stripped of narrative, of time, and of context. Ultimately, these
changes facilitate the project of developing a universal language based in Nature's own
divisions (Descartes), using self-defined words to define the anatomy and nomenclature
of "discrete objects" (43).
Arriving at such a clear categorical distinction as between the medical body and
logic, Burton's Anatomy reads like a scientific and logical taxonomy. (The difference
between the two is that logical taxonomy is, after Ramus, dialectical.) The Anatomy
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exemplifies the Renaissance encylopedic tradition. 161 Like Francis Bacon's The
Proficience ofAdvancement ofLearning (1605), the Anatomy is a compendium of
knowledge from across the disciplines. Burton's Anatomy progresses by systematically
and dialectically dividing the condition of melancholy into its constitutive parts: its
symptoms, causes, and cures; its causes natural and supernatural; its primary and
secondary natural causes; etc. Burton progresses by division and definition, and he
includes tables as visual aids for the categories he employs. This method leads critics
such as Karl JosefHoltgen, Walter Ong, and David Renaker to consider Burton as an
inheritor of the Ramist tradition.162 Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) was a French logician
who revolutionized logic and rhetoric by shifting inventio to logic and definitively
reducing rhetoric to ornamentation.163 For Ramus, dialectic is fundamental to all other
curriculum subjects -- even physics and mathematics -- because it provides the method
for revealing the truth about the natural world. Burton's dialectical, schematic
methodology would, for Ramus, exhibits the truth of nature by including all pertinent
details. Logical division systematically treats each category in which nature manifests.
As Burton's authorial persona Democritus Jr. remarks, "Proceed now from the parts to the
whole or from the whole to [the] parts, and you shall find no other issue, the parts shall be
161 See Samuel G. Wong's "Encyclopedism in Anatomy ofMelancholy" for a summary of
this tradition.
162 Walter Ong characterizes Ramus' dialectic as "a concatenation [... ] ofdefinitions and
A~"t:1;C1;-"nC'l" fl QQ\
\.H v ~'HV~" '- ~ 00).
163 As with Agricola, for whom rhetoric is only "concerned somehow with
ornamentation" (Ong 103), Ramist rhetoric is limited to "the variety of tropes, figures
and numbers" and poetry (189). Everything beyond "meaning" is "ornament" (191).
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sufficiently dilated" (64). Indeed, prefacing each book is a chart dialectically dividing the
condition of melancholy into its constitutive parts: its symptoms, causes, and cures; its
causes natural and supernatural; its primary and secondary causes; etc. (see Appendix E).
As thorough as the book and its charts claim to be, however, the Anatomy is more
than a little nervous about its methodology. The narrator is concerned both that he says
too much and that he says to little. The Anatomy reads like a commonplace book; it
includes virtually everything said about melancholy. At the beginning of Part II, Section
iii, Member i, the narrator remarks "I shall but repeat what has been done," citing a
profusion of sources from Plato to Xeoncrates to Boethius to Petrarch to Bernard (491).
The Anatomy is 826 pages long in the 1651 edition, and the introductory "Democritus Jr.
to the Reader" (nearly 100 pages long) is largely quotations (freely summarized) in Latin;
"Democritus" calls it his "Cento," "patchwork." The Anatomy could hardly be more
complete. And yet, the narrator is plagued by concerns of "tautological repetitions of all
particulars" (70), of "confounded" distinctions (349), that it is "indecorous" for him to
address love melancholy (356), and that, "anatomizing this surly humor, my hand [might]
slip, as an unskillful prentice I [might] lance to deep, and cut through skin and all at
unawares" (104). The Anatomy suggests that something about the taxonomic process is
deadly to the body under dissection. Ultimately, the Anatomy discovers that as the
infinite process of definition and division continues, and there are as many words as
things in the universe, there is still a fundamental deficit to language.
Moreover, like Sidney's Defense, the Anatomy contains a multitude of
contradictory opinions. For instance, the poem that prefaces the Anatomy offers two
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different kinds of contradictions. First, the concluding couplets of the sestets ascribe
mutually-contradictory attributes to melancholy. The couplets discover that nothing is as
sweet, sad, sweet, sour, sweet, damn'd, sweet, harsh, sweet, fierce, divine, and damn'd as
melancholy. The contradictions in the poem arise from the different dialectical
oppositions the poet suggests. Sweet is opposed to sad, but also to sour, damn'd, and so
forth, each opposition drawing from a different register (taste, theology, etc.). Second,
the poet offers two contradictory truisms: "I'll not change my life with any King" and "I'll
change my state with any wretch" (91, 99). The contradiction between these statements
are between underlying assumptions; the first remark suggests that the speaker's life is
too good to change with a king, and the second suggests that his life is so awful that he'd
change places with even a wretch. Whereas Utopia's contradictions indicate an ironic
judgment and thus a fictional -- or at least not straightforward -- text, and the Defense'S
simply indicate the breadth ofpossibility in a world of poesy, the contradictions in the
Anatomy are a function of logic and taxonomic practices. As he narrates the anatomy of
melancholy, Burton discovers that there is a context for every kind of melancholy; rather
than distinguish melancholy, delimit its place, context produces a virtually infinite
melancholy.
Melancholy is a universal condition, so it can be incongruous. For instance,
Burton notes that poverty can be an antidote to melancholy (507) and also a prophylactic,
whereas wealth leads to misery; "They spend their days in wealth, and go suddenly down
to HeIr Burton explains (512), and those in Hell are the most miserable of all. And yet,
poverty is also a cause of melancholy. Unlike unhappy poverty, "riches gather many
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friends; all happiness ebs and flow with his money" (296). Wealth, poverty, and even
happiness and unhappiness all fall under the same universalizing category ofmelancholy.
Instead ofdistinguishing between subjects, methods of classification produce a world in
which things are not themselves.
For one, Burton discovers that logic can produce absurd, but consistent,
conclusions. For instance, Burton offers 23 pages of observations on the "Misery of
Scholars" (259-82) and then, in an effort to cover the full spectrum of observations,
proffers ten pages citing copious authorities to the effect that nothing is "so fit and proper
to expell Idleness and Melancholy, as that of Study" (453). Taken with Burton's claim
that men are scholars (a version of Ramus' claim that men are dialectic) (60), these
opposed observations comprise a failed syllogism: all men are scholars, all scholars are
melancholy, study cures melancholy.
Burton's goal is to anatomize melancholy. So, he has to figure out the best way to
provide a comprehensive compendium. To this end, he compiles everything authorities
have said about melancholy. He also uses logical division and dialectic to organize his
material and to discover any categories still missing from the discussion, to round out the
corners and fill out the holes as it were. He discovers, however, that Ramistic/logical
dialecticis not sufficient; there are times when the details do not fallout in strict binaric
categories. As David Renaker notes in "Robert Burton and the Ramist Method," the
charts Burton provides have dialectic divisions for the first few branches, but then, he
"suddenly produces" three, seven, nine, etc. subclasses. "After this, confusion reigns. [... ]
The attempt to dichotomize everything is in ruins" (212). The chart at the beginning of
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Book I (Appendix 5) reveals, for instance, that there are seven "not necessary" natural,
outward causes of melancholy. And there are three general, supernatural causes: God
(immediately or secondarily), from the devil immediately ("with a digression of the
nature of spirits and devils"), and witches/magicians (110). The shift here from dialectic
to a more expansive method of categorization reflects a shift from Ramistic logic to the
kinds of taxonomies called for by zoology and botany, in which multiple categories
obtain: there are several subcategories ofmonkeys or oak trees.
Although both logic and science claim to define and describe the world, the two
methods of classification are incongruous. The first takes a subject and divides it into the
categories by which the subject may be defined fully. The second organizes already
known details (i.e., species) in relation to one another. The first deconstructs, the second
reconstructs. Logical division promises to partition the world into its appropriate
categories with nothing left over. 164 However, Burton finds that dialectic doesn't quite
work; things that would be categorized as sweet, as opposed to sour, are different than
those sweet things that would be opposed to sad things; considering all the possible
categories to which every piece of data might belong, the world becomes an
overwhelming tangle of interrelatedness that refuses pat dualisms. Frustrated that
dialectic does damage to a complex world, Burton worries about having to "rip them [the
164 Slaughter observes that "just as things are decontextualized and broken down into their
parts, so too is language. "The \~vords are objectified and anal)tzed into their
component parts, i.e. their simple elements, and each element is given a distinguishing
mark; they are then recomposed into the abstract paradigms of the taxonomic tables
and then into artificial words" (10). What used to be a universe of figures, of words in
relationship, becomes a world that particulate words can only attempt to represent.
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causes ofmelancholy] all up" into dialectic categories (156). Logial taxonomy assumes
that a whole can be cut into a number of discrete parts; a topic can be anatomized
according to set categories just as a body can be divided into its organs. But one cannot
cut a logical topic too deeply; division, dissection, promises the fullness of definition. A
biological body, on the other hand, can be wounded; some divisions are harmful and the
whole is not guaranteed to be restored. For Burton, this whole is the natural world,
forever the missing center of increasingly copious language.
Whereas logic may progress through dichotomy, biology is more complex,
requiring multiple categories (Slaughter 35-37). A biological or zoological taxonomy is
comprehensive, but here Burton runs into another problem. Confronted with an immense
pool of data, he is unable to create internally consistent categories. Burton notes that "no
rule is so general which admits not some exception"; therefore, "custom is all" (200). For
Burton, custom or decorum alone can construct the fundamental categories because, with
so many exceptions, categories are mere constructions. This is a very real problem facing
Early Modem biologists and zoologists. As Peter Fisher observes in "What's in a
Hippopotamus? A Problem in Renaissance Taxonomy and Description," taxonomic
categories are under reconstruction at the tum of the seventeenth century. The
hippopotamus, previously a "fish" like crocodiles and beavers, moves to its "correct"
classification as a quadrupedal beast only at the tum of the seventeenth century (194-
197). Even though a hippopotomus has clearly identifiable parts -- feet, a specific shape,
habitat, size, and need for air -- how those parts fit together to create a unified beast,
categorized systematically in relationship to other unified beasts, is unclear.
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Custom seems to be the only basis by which to make the judgment necessary to
identify the whole that unifies the parts. The problem that Burton discovers is, in part, a
problem of the relationship between examples and categories. How does one recognize
when one moves from the level of genus and species to individuals, to examples of the
category rather than a new division, a new branch of categorization? And after
deconstructing melancholy such that everything is potentially melancholic, how does one
reconstruct a picture of melancholy as a discrete category available for dissection?
Burton addresses these questions through the trope of a man's style.
"Democritus" observes that man is nothing but his style. Emphasizing the encyclopedic
nature of the Anatomy, Democritus Jr. observes that "We can say nothing but what has
been said, the composition and method is ours only" (20). Unique to each author, method
or style provides the one, fool-proof means for distinguishing between authors, for
identifying the Burtonian "I." Style actually reveals the author for who he is; Burton
notes that "our style bewrays us" as "hunters find their game by the trace" (21). The
"game" in this metaphor is the "I," the subject, and style is its "tracks," the particulars by
which we locate the individual subject. By analogy, one ought to be able to identify the
"whole," such as a hippopotamus or melancholy, by its style, the way it expresses itself in
the world.
Burton's sense that copia reveals style, which in tum reveals the "I," is consistent
with other Early Modem rhetoricians' treatment of style in terms of authorial identity.
Puttenham, for instance, notes that style is the "general" or "universal" that unites many
particular words. "Stile is a constant and continual phrase or tenour of speaking and
245
writing, extending to the whole tale or process of the poeme or historie, and not properly
to any peece or member of a tale: but is of words speeches and sentences together" (160).
From "words and sentences," the close reader can apprehend the "image of man," his
"minde. ,,165
There is a long critical tradition that links literary style with the author's subject
position. Morris Croll's observations in the 1930s that the Early Modem transition from
the "Ciceronian" to the "Senecan" style of writing occured in part because the "Senecan"
style is better adapted to the immediate, experiencing mind remain the foundation for any
investigation into Early Modem style. 166 The critical preoccupation with the Early
Modem linguistic subject continues to this day. Burton's very style reflects the argument
his introduction makes: the author's style is a reflection (Croll), a refraction (Fish), and
consititutive of (Fineman, Greenblatt) the writing subject. Recent critics have returned
attention to the material effect of reading The Anatomy, and continue to attend to the
ways that the subject materializes textual concerns. Mary Ann Lund, for instance,
165 Burton evinces a Puttenhamian, and Cartesian, subject; just as Puttenham notes that
"man is but his minde" (161), Descartes observes famously "cogito ergo sum."
166 Joseph Mazzeo calls the "Ciceronian" style the "Asian" one, in order to expand its
jurisdiction beyond Cicero. Mazzeo contrasts "Asian" style with the "Attic" one. The
"Senecan" style predominates after the seventeenth century; it is characterized by
parataxis, a "plain style," "brevity of [... ] constructions [and a] resolved and analytic
character" (4). Such a style is more appropriate, Senecan authors argue, for vernacular
texts, scientific inquiry, and individual experience. Senecan style includes stylistic
markers that indicate personal experience, and it is more faithful to the thinking mind.
For inst~'1Ce, parataxis works through spontaneous shifts, suggesting a mind in
thought; the Senecan style often employs figures of thought (rather than sound), end-
linking, and qualification (rather than the carefully balanced incremental progression of
ciceronian authors) (Mazzeo 113-115). Critics frequently cite Burton as an example of
the "loose" Senecan style (in contrast to Ben Jonson's "curt" Senecan style).
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reminds us that Burton intends his text as a palliative for the melancholic. 167 Recent neo-
formalist critics continue to detail the historically situated, rhetorical subject. As Sari
KivistO observe in her analysis of the development ofHumanist stylistics against
Scholastic ones, "[s]tylistic study means unmasking the speaker" (41).168
The problem that Burton discovers is that if we identify the man by the linguistic
examples we have from him, by the categories by which we can anatomize him, and the
taxonomic methods by which we can relate him to other subjects, then man is nothing
more than a linguistic entity. As Stanley Fish argues in Self-Consuming Artifacts (1972),
the center of Burton's stylistic outpourings is the (missing) subject. The problem is that
exhaustive definition and division ultimately fail to produce a coherent subject. (By
"subject," I mean the man and melancholy.) And it is not only the human subject that is
missing in the Anatomy. The natural world, too, is fundamentally absent from the
language that purports to represent it.
After reading the Anatomy, one expects to be able to answer the simple question
"what is melancholy?" The answer, in short, is that melancholy is everything.
Discovering that the passions are a seat of melancholy, Burton considers each passion in
turn; however, all divisions create melancholy, so the distinctions Burton suggests seem
beside the point. Burton discovers that "there is no part [of the body] which does not
167 This is Lund's argument in "Reading and the Cure of Despair in The Anatomy of
Melancholy."
168 See her Epistolae obscurorum virorum (1515-17) (2002). KivistO observes that
accusations of barbaric, obscene, loquacious, and flattering styles are not limited to
writing style alone, but presuppose that such stylistic traits reveal authors' moral
failings, which can be exposed through critical analysis.
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include melancholy" (228). In fact, vegetables, cities, and even inanimate entities can be
considered melancholic (65). For Burton, there are three problems with this discovery:
first, if melancholy means everything, then melancholy means nothing; second, if
melancholy means nothing, than language ultimately fails; third, the distance between
language and the world to which it is supposed to refer is a melancholic one.
As Burton "anatomizes" melancholy, breaks it down to its categorical bases,
taxonomizes every possible atomistic detail, he finds himself ever further away from his
(subject) matter. Attempts to get the world into the text, through, for instance,
increasingly detailed description and taxonomization, through copia, only emphasize the
sheer impossibility of a coterminous language and (real) world. The fundamental
division between world and language/text, the Anatomy suggests, produces a universal
linguistic melancholy. It is impossible to return from the details and examples he offers
to the complete "whole," the "truth" identified with the scientifically defined physical
world. The only thing Burton can recreate out of the details he has assembled is a world
in which linguistic, taxonomic melancholy infects everything.
Burton diagnoses the separation of the word from the world, the missing world in
the word, as a universal and universalizing melancholy. It is this melancholy that the
Scientific Revolution codifies with its attempts to develop a universal "language" that
bypasses all ofthe problems oflanguage (such as homonyms; ultimately mathematics is
the preferred language of the physical world). And it is this melancholy that Burton
inherits in the form of a "dark ecology" and that ecocritics inherit as a nostalgic desire for
the world beyond the words.
APPENDIX A
T-O MAP FROM THE ETYMOLOGIAE OF ISODORUS, 1472
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APPENDIXB
CITYVIEW OF WELLS, THOMAS CHAUNDLER, EARLY 1460S
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APPENDIXC
MAP OF UTOPIA, 1516 EDITION
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APPENDIXD
MAP OF UTOPIA, 1518 EDITION
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APPENDIXE
EXAMPLES OF FOLK TAXONOMY AND SCIENTIFIC TAXONOMY
Ulisse Aldrovandi. Orthinologiae, hoc est de avibus historae libri XIl 1600. 2.14.
Concerning Domestic Fowl who Bathe in the Dust -- The Chicken, Male and Female:
Terminology; Synonyms; Differentiae of the Genus; The Form and Description of the
Rooster and the Hen in their Genus; Anatomical Details; Sex; Sight and Taste; Voice and
Song; Lustfulness, Coition, Parturition, Incubation, Generation, Egg-Laying; Rearing and
Feeding; Nature, Habits and Character; Magnanimity and Fighting; Sympathy and
Antipathy; The Diseases of Chickens; The Method of Catching Chickens; History;
Presages; Derivates; Use in the Sacred Rites of the Pagans; Auguries and Prodigies;
Mystical Interpretations; Moral Interpretations; Secret Signs (Hieroglyphics); Dreams;
Emblems; Riddles; Epitaphs; Apopthegms; Proverbs; Fables; Apologies; Use in
Medicine; Injurious Effects of Chickens; Use of the Chicken as Food; Various other Uses
of the Chicken; Insignia, Images and Coins.
Caspar Bauhin. Prodomus theatri botanici. 1620. 269-70.
From a short tapering root, by no means fibrous, spring several stalks about 18 inches
long: they straggle over the ground, and are cylindrical in shape and furrowed, becoming
gradually white near the root with a slight coating of down, and spreading out into little
sprays. The plant has but few leaves, similar to those of Beta nigra, except that they are
smaller, and supplied with long petoiles. The flowers are small, and of greenish yellow.
The fruits one can see growing in large numbers close by the root, and from that point
they spread along the stalk, at almost every leaf. They are rough and tubercles and
separate into three reflexed points. In their cavity, one grain of the shape ofan Adonis
seed is contained; it is slightly rounded and ends in a point, and is covered with a double
layer of reddish membrane, the inner one enclosing a white, farinaceous core.
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APPENDIXF
SELECTION FROM INTRODUCTORY APPARATUS, BOOK ONE OF
BURTON'S ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY
rIO] ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY
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